




















THE DISSERTATION COMMITTEE FOR SARAH ELLEN VARTABEDIAN 





WORKING THROUGH A MONUMENTAL BREAK UP: IDEOLOGICAL 






             Committee: 
 
 
         
          Dana Cloud, Supervisor 
 
         
          
             Carole Blair  
 
 
          
            Paul Bolin 
 
 
          
          Barry Brummett 
 
 
           






Working through a Monumental Break Up: Ideological Transitions, Ironic Monumental 
Disruptions and Public Deliberation 
 
by 





Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
 in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements  
for the Degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 











 So many people contributed to this dissertation in significant ways. I will not do them 
justice in the next few pages, but please know that I will forever be grateful to you all.  First, I 
want to thank my advisor Dana Cloud. Her feedback and encouragement throughout this process 
made me a better writer and scholar and I will always be in awe of her editing skills. Thank you 
for always finding the kindest way to say “your passive voice is slowly killing me.”  Thank you 
for being such a wonderful role model and showing me what it means to be committed to a 
cause. Next, I want to thank Carole Blair for her mentorship over the last seven years. Carole and 
her partner Bill Balthrop are the reason I pursued a Ph.D.  Thank you both for holding my hand 
every step of the way. Thank you for attending all of my conference panels, sending me notes of 
encouragement, and always being there when I needed a pep talk.  I will be a better teacher and 
mentor because of you.  A special thanks to Carole for agreeing to be on my committee and for 
contributing so much to my growth as a scholar and a person. Next, I would like to thank Barry 
Brummett for forcing me to embrace the methodology section.  I know it needs to be there. I do 
not know why I fought it for so long.  Also, thank you to Paul Bolin for being such a supportive 
teacher and committee member throughout the process. I am so grateful I took your class as soon 
as I got to Texas. Finally, thank you Sharon Jarvis. You are a saint. You make such insightful 
contributions and always found caring ways to convey your concerns. Thank you for your time, 
comments, and commitment to your students.  Susan Corbin, thank you for helping me out with 
schedules, paperwork, and everything else imaginable. I am indebted to you all. Thank you. 
Thank you.  
 I also want to thank everyone at UT who made the experience so memorable and 




wonderful friends and colleagues to boost my spirits. First, Kristin Stimpson, where do I begin? 
You really are my scholar soul mate. I cannot imagine what graduate school would have been 
like without you. Thank you for the encouragement, the love, and the occasional tough love. 
Your outlook on life inspires me. Next, Kayla Rhidenour, you are the most patient and kind 
roommate a girl could ask for. Thank you for never judging me when I sat in the same spot 
typing for days at a time. I look forward to all of our future travels. Matt Morris, thank you for 
being my constant friend for the past four years. I loved our lunch breaks and dance breaks. You 
are a true friend. MaryAnne Taylor, thank you for the real talk and the love of NCAA basketball. 
I could always count on you for a reality check. Lastly, Maegan Stephens, you are the id I wish I 
could be. Thank you for making all of our lives livelier. I also want to thank Andrew Ishak for 
the pick-up games and Gamze Yilmaz for putting up with me as a roommate. If nothing else, we 
can always open up a Middle Eastern restaurant in Austin.  
 Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my wonderful family. Rob, Audrey, and 
Bobby, thank you for all of the Skype sessions, cards, and support. You have always been there 
for me. I love you. To all of my grandparents, thank you for supporting me and loving me. 
Granny, thank you for telling me to get my Ph.D. Grandma, thank you for always being 
interested in my progress.  Thank you to the Hesters and Vickers for all of their support. I am so 
lucky to have you.  I also want to thank the Dawes-Klinger family for encouragement, interest, 
and Grand Canyon hikes. Lastly, I want to thank my Mom and Dad. Even though I frequently 
felt that my Dad had misinformed me when insisting that writing a dissertation was a ‘labor of 
love,’ I could not have asked for more loving, understanding, and supportive parents. Any 
success I have is because of you. I hope you know how much I love and appreciate everything 




 One final thanks needs to go to my cats, Mother Jones and Houdini. Kidding, only 
kidding. To my partner, Conrad Hester, your love carried me through the last few years of this 
process. Your encouragement always came at the right time and your proofreading is the only 
reason I passed. You supported me intellectually, emotionally, and with an endless supply of Hot 
Tamales. Thank you. I am so glad you asked me to define “trauma” the first time we met. I can 
now tell you it means marrying someone while they are writing a dissertation. You are my great 






Working through a Monumental Break Up: Ideological Transitions, Ironic 






Sarah Ellen Vartabedian, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
 
Supervisor: Dana Cloud 
 
  
At present the literature of counter-monument studies does not account for the complex 
interactions of irony and nostalgia in memorial spaces. The three case studies examined in this 
project show that nostalgia can produce critically engaging spaces of deliberation depending on 
how ironic commemoration intervenes in comic or tragic frames. In order to show that more 
rhetorical focus is possible, I have challenged the conceptualization of counter-monument studies 
through what I have termed the “ironic monumental disruption.”  Monument studies must 
address how the idea of the counter-monument, in which the "counter" supposedly resides in the 
artifact itself, valorizes monolithic critiques and fails to recognize that contexts, interactions, and 
artifacts all shape the symbolism of the commemorative site. Alternatively, ironic monumental 
disruptions offer critical and deliberative opportunities in their interactions with visitors and 
provide more conceptual insight into transitional commemorative practices. The monuments 
reviewed in this project initially appeared to provide additional reinforcement for escapist, 




commemorative contradictions provides discursive openings for publics unknowingly silenced 
by a lack of public deliberation. Commemorative irony produces valuable insights into the 
current historical moment and the representational issues created by ideological transitions. The 
citizens of Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Hungary express varying levels of nostalgia about their 
communist past, which is why the commemorative sites within these countries create a valuable 
spectrum of ironic and nostalgic entanglements. Commemorative irony produces valuable 
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A 2008 global survey conducted by Gallup found that the Eastern and Southeastern 
European countries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania were among the “10 most discontented 
countries in the world.”
1
  According to another survey conducted in Hungary in 2009, “70 
percent of those who were already adults in 1989 say they were disappointed with the results of 
the regime change,” and in Bulgaria “60 percent say they lived better in the past, even though 
shopping queues were routine, social connections were the only way to obtain more valuable 
goods, jeans and Coca Cola were off-limits and it took up to 10 years' waiting to buy a car.”
2
  
The results of the surveys suggested that the people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe were 
dissatisfied, in large part, because their living conditions had not substantially improved from 
their communist days.  
Eastern and Southeastern Europeans appear to be increasingly disappointed with the 
unstable life capitalism has produced in the post-communist era.  As the economic downturn 
continues to widen the gap between Western and Eastern Europe, it also increases the social and 
economic disparity within the newly transformed Eastern European and Baltic countries in the 
region.  Within the new capitalist system, many Eastern Europeans find that their spending 
power is as low as ever but their desire for goods has skyrocketed.  Some Eastern Europeans 
reported that their “thirst for materialism,” was at an all-time high.
3
  A 2009 Reuters article 
suggests, “A big chunk of the loans taken in the boom years was spent on fancy cars and yachts, 
flat TV screens, designer clothes, silicon surgeries and exotic trips abroad.”
4
  Ultimately, as their 
economies continue to struggle, Eastern Europeans and Southern Slavs find themselves looking 
back on their communist chapter with nostalgia while simultaneously craving all of the material 




increasingly disappointed with the unstable life capitalism has produced in the post-communist 
era.   
No doubt, there are many portals through which to examine nostalgia for the communist 
past and disillusionment with the capitalist present. One of these is the study of monuments. 
Central to this study is the way in which monuments reflect and engage the ideological dualities 
expressed by discontented or “disappointed” citizens in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.  
Within the field of communication, scholars recognize monuments as the materialization of 
public memory and identity.  As such, monuments can create some of the most visible and 
controversial sites of ideological tension and public deliberation.  Recently, monumentality 
scholars have identified a “new” category of study—the counter-monument—to explain the 
inevitable controversies that arise from solidifying a memory in stone.   
Proponents argue that a “counter-monument,” critiques or contradicts traditional 
commemorative practices and institutions of power, and consequently, forces a re-
conceptualization of those commemorative practices and their effects on public memory.  But, 
there continues to be a division among scholars in the field of communication regarding 
traditional monument studies and the efficacy of the more recently identified study of counter-
monuments.  My purpose is to overcome this limited conceptual binary by bringing the concept 
of irony into the study of monumentality, and demonstrating that irony is a common and 
rhetorically powerful memorial strategy particularly well-suited for vexing historical situations. 
 In chapters to come, I argue that counter-monument studies place too much emphasis on 
the symbolism of the artifact and not enough value on the contextual, historical, and political 
interactions of the artifact and its audience.  It is precisely because of the overvaluation of the 




counter-monumentality are not recognizing the rhetorical potential of irony when applied to 
nostalgic (and in many cases traumatic) narratives.
5
   In particular, counter-monument studies 
could benefit from a better understanding of how irony disrupts and responds to nostalgia, in 
what I believe is best described as a process of “ironic monumental disruption.”  Ironic 
monumental disruptions have the potential to create a kind of public deliberation presently 
unaccounted for within the conceptualization of counter-monuments. 
IRONY AND NOSTALGIA IN AN AMBIVALENT AGE: ARGUING FOR THE 
CONCEPT OF THE IRONIC MONUMENTAL DISRUPTION  
 Ironic monumental disruptions offer valuable insight into shifting ideological narratives 
and investments.  The interplay of irony (as it is represented through monuments) and nostalgia 
within comic or tragic frames of acceptance shapes how audiences perceive historical 
experiences, former ideologies, and even their own political subjectivities.  Specifically, irony 
and nostalgia act as counterparts that can create oppositional readings of an artifact depending on 
the commemorative context.  
 Understanding the relationships between all of these rhetorical elements helps illuminate 
the political potential of the concept of the ironic monumental disruption.  While irony is 
commonly understood as a reversal of meaning, irony’s critical potential for monumentality 
comes through its ability to reveal contradictions between surface forms and deeper contextual 
meanings.
6
  On the other hand, nostalgia is defined as an emotional attachment or “sentimental 
longing for the past.”
7
  Many scholars see nostalgia as a debilitating affect that allows people to 
idealize the past rather than engage with the political present. In fact, counter-monuments are 
constructed in part to combat nostalgia (as it is symbolized in the form of monuments) on the 




potential of nostalgia and irony.  Irony is a powerful rhetorical tool that can unhinge the 
ossifying effects of nostalgia because it can negotiate and even highlight competing loyalties for 
the ideological past and present.   
Furthermore, in order to explain the potential of irony and nostalgia as they shape 
representational practices and create deliberative spaces, I rely on Kenneth Burke’s 
conceptualization of frames of acceptance.  Burke defines ‘frames of acceptance” as “the more 
or less organized system of meanings by which a thinking man [sic] gauges the historical 
situation and adopts a role with relation to it.”
8
 For Burke, there are both comic and tragic frames 
of acceptance.  I use the concepts of comic and tragic frames to explain how the relationship 
between nostalgia and irony can transform a commemorative space and its political potential.
9
  
Specifically, nostalgia creates and constrains the way people experience and understand the 
world.  Thus, within a comic frame, irony and nostalgia can open up a space of playful reflection 
and deliberation. The comic frame seeks to point out the flaws in the system (in this case the 
system is the ideology of both communism and capitalism). The goal of the comic frame is not to 
overthrow the system, but to playfully challenge it in hopes of provoking a meaningful response 
among audiences.  Conversely, the tragic frame is not playful.  The tragic frame seeks to place 
blame on a person or idea in hopes of putting the episode to rest.  The lack of any significant 
nostalgia for the idea or place represented transforms irony from a playful critique into a critical 
accusation.
10
  I define all of these concepts further in the next chapter. 
 Finally, the recent construction of ironic monuments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
(and the ironic repositioning or reappropriation of monuments constructed during the communist 
era) poses new questions for researchers of monumentality. Whether these monuments mock 




that reposition both artifact and audience.  As such, I will analyze three ironic monumental 
disruptions in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Hungary as exemplars of a larger monumental trend in post-
communist Europe.  The case studies reveal how nostalgia for the rejected ideology of 
communism is at odds with ambivalence for the present ideology of capitalism.  Thus, the three 
case studies demonstrate the deliberative potential of irony-driven monuments as they respond to 
nostalgic narratives constructed into comic and tragic frames.   The next section contextualizes 
the specific commemorative sites used for this study and poses the critical questions utilized 
throughout this project.  
THE CAST OF CHARACTERS, COMMEMORATIVE QUESTIONS, AND 
DEFINITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS 
To demonstrate that the irony-driven monuments of Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
have the potential to create a new commemorative ethic that allows for necessary 
contextualization, engages audiences, and produces deliberation, I examine the defacement of the 
Soviet Liberation monument in Sofia, Bulgaria, the erection and removal of the Bruce Lee 
monument in Mostar, Bosnia, and the discursive repositioning of Memento Park artifacts in 
Budapest, Hungary, as important and vexing political outlets for “histories” in transition.  While 
news outlets originally reported on the statues as absurd and politically problematic 
representations of memory, the unusual monuments have actually encouraged the public to ask 
interesting questions about the ethics of commemoration and public engagement.
11
  Celebrating 
(mostly foreign) popular icons as national heroes or choosing to resurrect monuments that 
celebrate old and sometimes oppressive histories has angered people who felt victimized by the 




abroad because, at least on the surface, the statues seem to defy traditional commemorative 
ethics by replacing or remaking history rather than acknowledging lived experiences.   
The citizens of Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Hungary express varying levels of nostalgia about 
their communist past, which is why the commemorative sites within these countries create a 
valuable spectrum of ironic and nostalgic entanglements.  At present the literature of counter-
monument studies does not account for these complex interactions.  The field must find a place 
for commemorative irony as it produces valuable insight into the current historical moment and 
the representational issues created by ideological transitions.  
Thus, the questions that guide this project are complementary and contingent.  Three 
overlapping concerns shape the discussion of monument-building in post-communist Europe, 
and they are:  ironic representation and disruption, nostalgia as it operates within comic and 
tragic frames, and counter-monument politics. The first concern of the project is the potential of 
ironic representation.  To build on the earlier definition, Burke states that irony creates a 
“strategic moment of reversal.”
12
  Burke suggests that irony is a comic corrective that can create 
contested meanings and set different political agendas.
13
   In Burke’s definition, irony’s 
representational and disruptive potential become clearer.  In terms of the former, irony has 
representational potential because it can reference more than one idea and allow for a more 
complex construction of political identities.  In terms of the latter, irony creates contested 
meanings, which in turn creates space for critical confrontations.  The critical confrontations 
come in the form of physical or symbolic disruptions, which serve to dislocate the 
commemorative space from its original context.  Irony and disruptions compliment and overlap 




unsettle monuments from their discursive foundations.  In this way, the two provide new insight 
into monument studies when examined as critical material extensions of each other. 
The concept of the ironic monumental disruption holds political potential precisely 
because it unsettles and reorients the relationship between public memory and monumentality.  
In other words, if monuments are the materialization of public memory and that memory is 
contingent upon a reasonably coherent national identity, how do societies with transitional, 
traumatic, and nostalgic historical narratives represent themselves in the interest of communal 
understanding?  What alternatives do societies in transition have to commemorate their past and 
present?  I would tentatively propose that irony as a rhetorical tool can provide communal 
understanding without demanding absolute narrative coherency.  Ironic monumental disruptions 
potentially create then bridge some of the inevitable gaps of meaning presented by historical and 
ideological transitions.  By building additional frames of reference, irony draws attention to 
contested ideas and creates more space for deliberation.
14
  
The next conceptual tool needed to understand the potential deliberative power of ironic 
monuments is nostalgia.  According to Maya Nadkarni, many Eastern and Southeastern 
Europeans have expressed frustration that life is so difficult under capitalism and they long for 
the economic certainty of communism.
15
  The nostalgia that many articulate in post-communist 
Europe is not so much a definitional “longing for home” as it is a longing for an “already lost 
and irretrievable” object of desire.
16
  In other words, nostalgia is an affective experience or 
connection to another time and place that typically provides escapism from the present.  Some 
scholars suggest that nostalgia is an uncritical emotional response that erases the material reality 
of a problematic past, but nostalgia actually provides a very important foundation from which to 




connection to the past that is largely discouraged after ideological transitions.  Depending on the 
degree of nostalgia expressed in Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Hungary specifically, these societies have 
relied on nostalgia to reflect on the past or to reaffirm their connection to the present. 
Revisiting the previous definition of tragic and comic frames, Cheree Carlson defines 
frames as “symbolic structures by which human beings impose order upon their personal and 
social experiences.  Frames serve as perspectives from which all interpretations of experience are 
made.”
17
  Nostalgia offers to the comic frame the dual perspective it needs to enact a rhetorical 
critique. Nostalgia is an important component of the comic frame because, without it, it is 
difficult to understand why non-representative statuary is still standing.  The comic frame 
contextualizes the nostalgia present in commemorative works by providing historical, 
ideological, and political connections.
18
  Conversely, ironic monuments situated within an un-
nostalgic tragic frame do not have as much deliberative potential because they are not creating 
diverse perspectives through conflicting representations.  In the case of the tragic frame, 
continued nostalgia makes it more difficult to place blame on an idea that is still emotionally 
valued.  But if little nostalgia for the past is actually present, then the tragic frame simply 
reinforces the desire to place blame on an easily identifiable factor and move on.  In order to 
purge one’s self or one’s community of the past, the past must be simplified and dismissed.  In 
both modes, peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe have constructed (comic and tragic) 
frames of understanding in order to process their newly re-envisioned past and present.   
The presence of nostalgia in Eastern and Southeastern Europe is not surprising 
considering the rapid transformation of the region.  What is intriguing is that irony toys with and 
disrupts nostalgia creating commemorative spaces that defy time and space.  Irony allows people 




means by which to contemplate desires and ideas without entirely abandoning their past or 
present political investments. So the question becomes: How would the scholarship of public 
memory and monumentality change if it accounted for the political and ethical potential of 
monuments that ironically challenged nostalgic narratives? Conversely, what new 
understandings of monumentality could the field produce if it recognized that irony enacts 
different critiques depending on the conceptual and contextual frames offered within nostalgic 
spaces?  
Finally, the enactment in monumental form of ironic monumental disruptions has the 
same potential as a counter-monument to critique, but irony does so by reversing or toying with 
an accepted meaning rather than by refuting it.  Additionally, the ironic monumental disruption 
utilizes nostalgia as an additional form of critique rather than a psychological obstacle like 
counter-monuments do.  Unlike the current conceptualization of counter-monument studies, the 
concept of the ironic monumental disruption can account for various political, psychological, and 
ideological transitions.  
 At this point, I do not aim to discard counter-monument research entirely, but I will show 
the need for more conceptual clarity.  Presently, many scholars in the field of monumentality 
label all atypical or confrontational monuments as counter-monuments.  Counter-monuments 
tend to critique hegemonic commemorative practices through their abstract symbolism and 
impermanence.  But the monuments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe are not “countering” 
state-sponsored discourses or critiquing hegemonic commemorative practices as much as they 
are creating dialogue through the presentation of unexpected incongruity (namely, ironically 
producing and confronting nostalgia).  In that vein, what if a monument acts not as a 




the community are encouraged to engage rather than reject their understanding of the past?  The 
monumental enigmas in Eastern and Southeastern Europe reveal that the scholars of counter-
monument studies must account for ironic commemoration if they are to more fully 
conceptualize critical, disruptive practices.    
 For introductory purposes I have examined the dissatisfaction that permeates the citizenry 
of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the uneasy duality of ideologies, and noted the role of 
nostalgia and irony in monument (specifically, counter-monument) studies.  The following 
section discusses the three commemorative sites chosen as case studies in greater depth in order 
to identify the important relationship between irony and nostalgia as they transform national 
identity, public memory, and present new avenues of research for the scholars of monument 
studies. 
POST-COMMUNIST COMMEMORATION AND KUNG-FU: SITUATING THE CASE 
STUDIES   
 Rather than reconciling the nostalgia for both the promise of communism and capitalism, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europeans are looking to combine history and Hollywood in an 
attempt to keep both ideologies and their ideals alive in the form of irony-driven monuments.  
The three monuments that form the case study section of this project are all formations of ironic 
monumental disruptions, but they reflect distinctive responses to varied nostalgic investments.  
The monuments in Bulgaria and Hungary (the Soviet Army monument and Marx and Lenin 
statues respectively), symbolize communism quite literally, while the Bruce Lee monument (in 
Bosnia) indirectly references the loss of communist Yugoslavia.  In fact, the real curiosity is that 
the least literal acknowledgment of the past (Bruce Lee in Bosnia) represents the most nostalgic 




in Budapest) represents a largely un-nostalgic population.  All of these monuments uniquely 
perform dual narratives as they nostalgically reflect their communist chapters and erase, deface, 
and mock historical, political, and social values in their respective countries.  
 While the three case studies detailed subsequently are illustrative of the negotiations of 
public memory in a rapidly transitioning society, it is important to note that they are not 
complete anomalies.  Rather, there are a series of monuments that are stretching the parameters 
of monumentality as it has previously been studied and categorized.   In this vein, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and the former Yugoslavia have erected and desecrated statues ranging from those of 
Bruce Lee to Bob Marley, Canned Beef to Captain America, Stalin to Superman, and Rocky 
Balboa to Robin (of Batman and Robin), all claiming to acknowledge a history of violence, 
governmental oppression, and failed (or idealized) multiculturalism.   
 These particular artifacts run the spectrum from comical to combative, but they share a 
commonality in their attempts to bridge the gap between past and present, rejecting communism 
while nostalgically recalling its stability. The June 2011 vandalization of Soviet statuary in 
Bulgaria reveals that public memory and Russian politics are sources of on-going tension in this 
region.  The debate surrounding the construction of monuments in Belgrade, Serbia reveals the 
complex nature of monument-building and its pressing political, social, and psychological 
implications.  Finally, the reappropriation and removal of communist statuary in Budapest, 
Hungary reveals a less ambivalent (nostalgic) representational ethic.  In order to gain greater 
insight into ironic commemorative practices, the next section examines the delicate political 
balancing act Bulgarians must play with their Soviet Statuary.  Sofia, Bulgaria becomes the first 






The contestation over communist-era symbols is nothing new in Eastern Europe.  In 
2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev created a Historical Truth Commission to combat the 
“falsification of history.”
19
  The purpose of this committee was to quiet the “aggressive” anti-
Russian campaign in the Western media.
20
  What Medvedev did not mention was that the 
committee hoped to silence any unfavorable discourse regarding the Stalinist era in the former 
USSR states.  Natalia Narochnitskay, a member of the new Historical Truth Commission asserts 
that the West is “almost hysterical” in their “prejudice against Russia and Russian history."
21
    
Russian historian Robert Service of Oxford University was quick to challenge President 
Medvedev’s committee stating that Medvedev is attempting to “control history as a means of 
controlling the present.”
22
  But Medvedev is not alone in his pursuit to stifle criticism.  Over the 
last five years, the Russian parliament has repeatedly proposed a “memory law,” which would 
make it a criminal offense to "infringe on historical memory in relation to events which took 
place in the Second World War."
23
   
 The memory laws legally protect monuments constructed during the Stalinist era.  These 
pillars of memory continue to be some of the most debated and contested sites of representation 
in recent years. The removal or recontextualization of post-World War II Soviet-era statuary is 
particularly complicated because the monuments symbolize political, ideological, and historical 
chapters which significantly shaped Eastern Europe as it is today.  Consequently, the Eastern 
European governments that chose to purge their cities of communist statuary reported 
tremendous international backlash from their Russian neighbors.
24
  Russian politicians have 
expressed their disgust that countries helped by Soviet armies are now trying to tarnish a glorious 
past by defacing their monuments.
25




in the past twenty years continues to be a source of great ongoing political tension in the former 
Eastern Bloc.   
Sofia, Bulgaria's Soviet liberation monument illuminates the ideological tension in the 
region.  The “Liberation” monument in Sofia was a gift from the Russians who initially forced 
out the Nazis only to later control Bulgaria as a satellite state.  Certain populations within 
Bulgaria still maintain a sense of nostalgia for their communist past, but loyalty to this former 
ideology is also a source of friction in the country.  Vandals and artists alike frequently paint 
over the monument’s pedestal as an act of protest.  Within the last year, a graffiti group 
transformed the soldiers on the pedestal into comic book characters and western icons with the 
words “in step with the times” painted across the granite face of the monument.  Several 
Bulgarians commented in the local newspaper the Sofia Echo that they liked the colorful 
augmentation and thought the new message was comically relevant.
26
  The Russian government 
was not as amused and insisted that the city remove the graffiti.  
Yugoslavia 
Located directly west of Sofia, but much less Westernized, are the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia.  The former Yugoslavia serves as a particularly poignant example of how 
ideological anxiety can take on material form.  Many people living within the Baltic region 
maintain a strong sense of Yugoslavian and thus communist identity.  It is not uncommon for 
locals to speak fondly of the Yugoslav years.  Nostalgia for the past is so strong in this part of the 
world that a few scholars have warned about the dangers of romanticizing the ideals of 
Yugoslavia or the phenomenon of “Yugonostalgia.”
27
  In fact, an uncanny manifestation of 
Yugonostalgia popped up in a popular city park in Mostar, Bosnia.  The park became the site of 




German organization known as the Urban Movement joined forces to create the Lee monument.  
The monument was a controversial choice with many townspeople demanding that the city of 
Mostar commemorate an historical figure and not a Hollywood fantasy.  Within the same year of 
the monument’s erection, unknown perpetrators defaced it.  The Urban Movement decided to 
remove the statue and place it in a warehouse indefinitely.  
Bruce Lee is not the only unusual manifestation of memory in the former Yugoslavia.  
The recent construction of Rocky Balboa, Bob Marley, and even George W. Bush monuments 
have concerned some locals who insist that the statues are eclipsing real political problems by 
not trying to represent the “reality” of the past.  In fact, a group of fifty local artists and 
intellectuals in Serbia, later known as the Monument Group, organized a number of public 
meetings in order to address the politics of monument building.  Prominent Serbian visual artist 
and founder of the Monument Group, Milica Tomic, called the Serbian monument to Bruce Lee, 
“a dangerous joke in which history is being erased and replaced by Mickey Mouse.”
28
  She also 
stated, “This turning to Rocky or Tarzan is unhealthy and dangerous.  We need to find a way of 
representing our grief, our responsibility and our despair.  Until we do that, Serbia cannot come 
to terms with the present and the future.”
29
  For the rest of the world, the Yugoslav War ended in 
1995 with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, but the memory of rape camps, NATO 




In an attempt to put their inglorious past behind them and to combat commemoration like 
Bruce Lee, the local Serbian government, launched a design competition entitled “Sculptural 
design for a memorial to the ‘Fallen Fighters and Victims of 1900-1999 Wars in the Territory of 






Within the same month of the competition announcement, the Monument Group, led by Tomic, 
gathered to discuss how to respond to the memorial project.  Tomic explained that the group was 
encouraged by the competition as it recognized the vital role art plays when representing the 
complex politics of war; additionally, they hoped that the monument would finally give voice to 
the Yugoslav people.
32
  Over the course of a year the competition took on different names, 
different agendas, and different political battles.  Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians never jointly 
reached a consensus on the best way to represent the Yugoslav War and eventually abandoned 
the competition.  They in fact never even agreed on a name for the competition itself.  
To the present day, the Monument Group continues to struggle with the ethics of 
representation and commemoration in former Yugoslavia.  The competition revealed that 
community members did not know how to speak for the victims. More specifically, the 
community realized they could not even agree who was the victim.  The design competition 
became a reflection of the larger conflict faced by much of Europe as it tries to understand a 
history still in transition, with the most important question being, how does one commemorate a 
contentious past without simplifying it, or worse, celebrating it?  
The design competition demonstrated that an artistic reproduction of history was not 
going to appease a community with varied political investments.  Furthermore, the competition 
proved that trying to “capture” a contested historical experience was a virtual impossibility.  The 
continued debate all over Eastern and Southeastern Europe suggests that shifting ideologies 




While the various groups involved in the memorial project believed that the rhetorical 




tension was that the traumatic histories are still evolving and continually defying discursive 
representation.  The defiance of linguistic and material representation continues to prevent the 
people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe from commemorating their past.  Another intriguing 
consequence of the memorial project is that the discussion surrounding the political and 
commemorative obstacles has invigorated the public sphere and created active political 
engagement in parts of former Yugoslavia.  The conflict created by the design competition 
created a space where Serbs were encouraged to reflect upon their history and gain a deeper 
understanding of their involvement in the war and what it meant to be a Yugoslavian.  This 
discussion has proved invaluable to those still trying to make sense of their current political and 
national identity. 
Hungary 
The third and final site I will investigate is Memento Park, a major tourist attraction in 
Budapest, Hungary.  Budapest looks like a case study in memorial confusion, but the public 
spaces within the city appear to embrace the emerging contradictions.  For Budapest, like many 
other Eastern and Southeastern European cities, its monuments run the spectrum—representing 
everything from guilt to anger to nationalist pride—depending on what chapter people choose to 
evaluate.  The curious obstacle Hungarians face today is how to represent their historical 
narrative of communism while simultaneously expressing a new capitalist sensibility.    
Historians have extensively documented Hungary’s history of war and conquest. Its 
central location between superpowers left it vulnerable to wars and ideological feuds throughout 
the twentieth century.  The Hungarian capital of Budapest served as the primary battleground for 
many political and territorial disputes.  Budapest now looks like any Western European country 




distinguishes itself from many other Western cities is in its elaborate and sometimes 
contradictory statuary that seems to reflect a complex national identity.  Monuments ranging 
from the grand to the grim line virtually every park in the city.  World War I and II monuments 
line Budapest’s major boulevards. On the shores of the Danube River, there are bronze shoes to 
remember the victims of the Holocaust.  Within several prominent squares are famous Magyars, 
the Asian nomads that founded Hungary.  Walking from the downtown metro station to the 
ornate Parliament building, you will likely run into giant statues of Doberman Pinschers, Ronald 
Reagan, and the pro-communist-turned-Hungarian-revolutionary Imre Nagy.   
For the most part, Hungarians have successfully put their historical and ideological 
tensions behind them by relocating their most contentious monuments to the outskirts of town in 
Memento Park.   In 1993, the Hungarian government helped supply Memento Park with statues.  
Every year thousands of tourists pay approximately seven U.S. dollars to “talk with Stalin” as it 
is advertised on their website along with bright red banners stating, “Here are the removed 
commie statues.”
34
  In 2006 the park created a grand entry to the park using a monumental 
reproduction of Stalin’s boots and in 2007 the park added a film depicting the life of a Soviet 
spy.  Other than the additions in 2006 and 2007, the park may not acquire any new statues. 
According to a park tour guide, this is because the artist and architect, who originally envisioned 
the park, saw it as a visual metaphor for the transition from communism to democracy.  The 
artist believed that adding to the park would throw off its message and its ideological balance.
35
   
Memento Park is distinctly different from the previous two case studies because the 
audience produces the commemorative space rather than the audience in dialogue with the 
artifact. Additionally, the monuments in Bulgaria and Bosnia are positioned (through irony) to 




its former ideology (communism) for the sake of propping up its current commitments 
(capitalism). Thus, the representational ethics of the spaces are varied and create a range of 
political subjects. The ongoing debate in, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia and the monumental 
frenzy in Budapest, Hungary, reveal that commemorative artifacts can operate like material 
microcosms of public memory.  Because monuments are such useful rhetorical and historical 
representations, scholars wanting to research shifting ideological politics should examine 
monument-building practices in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in order to understand how 
Europeans are articulating their "post" communist identities.   
The three case study sites and the additional commemorative sites listed in Figure 1 
(below) demonstrate a spectrum of new ways to challenge (or reinforce) public memory by 
creating unexpected political openings—openings that expose memory’s elusiveness for those 
without a consistent narrative to stabilize it.  After years of colonization by other countries or 
ideologies, the people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe are refusing to blindly participate in 
traditional modes of commemoration; instead, they seem to be reflecting their disdain for the 
past and frustrations in the present by utilizing ironic monuments that serve to mock misplaced 
loyalties.  I argue that these monuments continue to be valuable for two reasons. First, ironic 
monuments allow the people of these countries time and space to terms with their past and 
present through personally interrogating the meaning of these monuments rather than having 
their feelings expressed for them. Second, they create valuable intellectual and affective spaces 
for societies still in transition to engage in public dialogue for the first time in decades.   
The following table shows the range of monuments explored in this project.  The selected 
case studies are not isolated examples; rather, they are representative of a type of emerging 




disruption.  The primary focus of utilizing these three distinct case studies is to develop a clearer 
understanding of the ethical possibilities of embracing irony, memory, and monumentality and 
offer new outlets of research for those currently relying on the language of counter-monuments.  
The monuments referenced within this project are listed below along with their location, year of 
erection, and if they have been altered in any way.  The table does not include monuments 
abandoned in the conceptualization process or built for more typical or traditional reasons (e.g., 
















Figure 0.1   
Ironic Monuments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe* 
 
Former Federation Country Statue   Year   Altered 
   Albania  George W. Bush 2011 
Croatia  Winnetou  2009 
Yugoslavia  Bosnia  Bruce Lee  2005  Staff broken/removed (2006) 
     Canned Beef  2007  Frequently tagged 
Serbia  Rocky Balboa  2007  Frequently tagged 
  Bob Marley  2008 
Eastern Bloc  Hungary Ronald Reagan  2011 
Statue Park                       1993   Stalin Boots (2006) 
Bulgaria              Soviet Liberation    1954   Ronald McDonald, Santa 
        Wonder Woman, Captain America, 
                    Superman, the Joker added (2011) 
*The pedestal to Samantha Fox entitled “Rumors” and the monument to Tarzan are also in Serbia. 




 Figure 0.1 reveals a wide spectrum of monuments that present a new set of possibilities 
and questions for monumentality studies.  With noted exceptions in Memento Park and the 
original Soviet Liberation monument, the other monuments listed here represent Western figures, 
celebrities, or pop culture icons.  These unusual artifacts suggest that global forces not local 
politics shape public memory, but the monuments may reflect a more localized and increasingly 
nostalgic public sentiment than they readily admit.  Additionally, the fact that the monuments are 
“altered” reveals another layer of commemorative anxiety.  While irony disrupts the place of 
commemoration and creates additional space for reflection, physical confrontations with these 
newly created spaces shows that public dialogue is most freely encouraged when there is no 
explicit political message but rather a general feeling of anxiety about a lack of consensus.  This 
observation is particularly important when countries face ideological transitions without the 
advantage of stable historical narratives to prop up their present politics.  Important questions of 
representation arise as the audience is encouraged to interrogate their present situation removed 
from (local) contested historical narratives altogether.   
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
Over the course of my examination of these monuments, it became evident that different 
histories may result in, or in fact, require different spaces and—in order to interrogate these 
“different” spaces—a new critical (and ironic) interpretation is necessary.  Ironic monumental 
disruptions create space within larger contextual frames to interrogate the ethical foundations of 
memory, but still leave open the possibility of creating ongoing reflection and dialogue.  These 
unusual markers of memory may serve as one of the most productive outlets for giving voice to 




With this overarching argument in mind, I turn to a brief overview of the following 
chapters.  While this introductory chapter contextualized monument-building in the former 
Yugoslavia and Eastern Bloc, Chapter one will develop the rhetorical foundation of this project 
with a review of the public memory and monumentality literatures. Additionally, Chapter one 
explores representational tensions and protest strategies within monument studies by reviewing 
and contrasting counter-monuments, irony, and nostalgia.  Chapter two will outline Hungary’s, 
Bulgaria’s, and Yugoslavia’s relationships to communism before and after 1989.  I contrast 
Yugoslavia’s genocidal civil war with Eastern Europe’s political and economic shift away from 
communism.  The chapter concludes with an outline of Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavia’s 
distinct relationships to socialism and their subsequent transition to shock therapy capitalism.  I 
argue that the distinct transitions away from communism manifest themselves in each country’s 
monumental responses.  Chapter three will focus on the theoretical and methodological 
foundation for the project.  Most significantly, I interrogate the conceptualization of counter-
monuments in hopes of creating critical space with—and justifying the need for—the playful 
interventions of the concept of the ironic monumental disruption.  
While irony aids communication scholars in their understanding of art, literature, and 
even the postmodern condition, ironic monuments are largely unexplored.
37
  The case studies 
that compose Chapters four, five, and six apply and examine the notions of irony, nostalgia, and 
comic and tragic frames to elicit a more comprehensive understanding of the function of 
monuments and counter-monuments.  Irony may not apply to all acts of commemoration, but the 
case studies undertaken in this project demonstrate that there are more critical options than a 
simplistic understanding of traditional monuments versus counter-monuments.  The 




monumentality scholars and specifically develops new spaces of deliberation in Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe as those publics create their own political subjectivity in relation to 
communism, the civil war (in Yugoslavia’s case), and their current economic status.  
The case study in Chapter four builds on the discussion of Eastern Europe’s economic 
transition in order to examine the Soviet “Liberation” monument in Sofia, Bulgaria. The 
Liberation monument shows the rhetorical potential of creating an ironic monumental disruption 
through a revisionist act of vandalism.  Bulgarians repeatedly deface the Liberation monument as 
they work through competing political identities and residual nostalgia for their communist 
chapter.  The interplay of capitalism and communist loyalties creates a comic frame from which 
to explore public memory in this region.  The altered monument creates an important space for 
public reflection.  Alternatively, removing the monument would send a strong message that it 
was time to abandon Bulgaria’s communist history.   
Chapter five addresses the controversy surrounding the statue of Bruce Lee in Mostar, 
Bosnia to show how the construction and removal of the monument reveals the interplay of 
trauma, irony, and a strong nostalgia for a never-realized multicultural ideal.  The comic frame is 
again relevant in the case of Bruce Lee as Bosnians express conflicted allegiances to the East and 
the West, communism and capitalism, popular culture and history.  The Lee monument faced the 
most immediate and direct confrontation of all the case studies and was removed entirely and 
placed under security.  
Chapter six explores Memento Park in Budapest, Hungary as an attempt by the 
Hungarian people to create an ironic space using the similar ironic strategies utilized during the 
communist years.  While the other case studies produce irony through an interactive dialogue 




not produce a space of interaction.  Tour booklets and tour guides encourage tourists to consume 
the monuments as historical jokes in an effort to minimize their symbolic power.  Tourists are 
not encouraged to nostalgically contemplate the meaning behind the monuments, but they are 
encouraged to ironically buy a piece of nostalgia in the form of a Lenin mug.  Additionally, 
Memento Park does not encourage reflection or deliberation like the other sites; rather, it utilizes 
a tragic frame which insists that communism is to blame for the Hungarian peoples’ social, 
economic, and political problems in the twentieth century.  In Hungary, Memento Park 
reinforces the Hungarian people’s decision to abandon the ideology of communism, but never 
actually considers any other alternative.  As such, the tragic frame positions everyone in the park 
to come to the same conclusion: Communism is a monumental joke.  
Finally, Chapter seven will serve as the conclusion of the dissertation along with a brief 
discussion of monuments recently built in Europe that fit within the conceptualization of the 
ironic monumental disruption.  The dissertation will close with a discussion of the importance of 
disruptions as they continue to open up space for debate and shape political subjects who 
struggle to formulate an identity after their political and ideological transition from communism.  
The political act of commemoration is especially important to Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
as it continues to negotiate conflicting ideologies, national identities, and violent histories.  Even 
those who initially opposed the erection of the Mickey Mouse-esque monuments have started to 
see them in a new light. Only two years after expressing frustration over the Bruce Lee 
monument, Tomic acknowledged that while she still has apprehension about the statue erasing 
the reality of Yugoslavia’s bloody dissolution, she hoped that the monument’s recent removal 
might create an interesting space for significant political reflection.
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  Her change of heart is 




the pain of war but their physical or symbolic desecration may tap into a deeper conflict —an 
unwillingness to either entirely accept or entirely abandon the past.  Whether it was the gradual 
separation of Hungary from the USSR or the bloody confrontations that erupted as Yugoslavia 
collapsed, citizens of former socialist Europe must question how their past fits into their future.   
THE POLITICAL PROMISE OF IRONIC MONUMENTAL DISRUPTIONS 
In order to explore the concept of an ironic monumental disruption and the intriguing 
complications that arise from “playfully” representing unstable historical narratives, I intend to 
provide scholars within the field of public memory and monumentality a new theoretical lens for 
exploring the relationship and political promise of ironic monumental disruptions.  The 
application and conceptualization of the ironic monumental disruption will provide interesting 
insights into the politics of place and the anxiety produced by societies in ideological transition. 
The new string of irony-driven monuments serves as ideal artifacts for understanding how 
ideological tensions play out physically, politically, and psychologically.   
In other words, the people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe appear to be negotiating 
competing desires.  The three case studies examined within this project reflect the interplay of 
nostalgia and irony as they compare and contrast the promise of communism’s stability and the 
unrealized economic and political freedom of capitalism.  The following chapter reviews the 
literature of public memory and monumentality in order to establish the rhetorical foundation for 
the concept of the ironic monumental disruption and its deliberative potential. 
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Chapter One:  Public Monuments to Political Transitions:  
Rhetorical Foundations 
While the former Stalinist states of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia have distinctly 
different histories, geographical conflicts, and ethnic demographics, they have all experienced 
abrupt ideological, economic, and political shifts in the past 30 years.  Through Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe’s transition from communist to capitalist states, monument-building has 
become one of the most visible symbols of ideological anxiety.
1
  Many statues to the old regime 
remain, but in a slightly altered form; similarly, newly constructed monuments appear to have 
little interest in reflecting on the past.  The tendency to commemorate fiction over fact and 
fantasy over reality has puzzled those who study commemorative works.  But ironic and iconic 
monuments in post-communist Europe appear to be creating paradoxical spaces with political 
promise.  A political dialogue has arisen in response to monuments such as the reappropriation of 
a Soviet soldier as Ronald McDonald and the statue of Rocky Balboa.  Is it possible that these 
material disruptions have the power to question larger institutions of memory precisely because 
they reshape memory in such ironic and unobtrusive ways? 
Scholars of public memory and monumentality require new understandings of the 
representation and creation of political subjects as they are constructed and dismantled through 
ironic monumental disruptions.  In order to develop the rhetorical foundations of this project, I 
review the literature regarding monumentality and counter-monuments, public sphere theory in 
post-socialist Europe, public memory and its use of nostalgia, and monumental protest strategies 
with respect to irony.  Additionally, I discuss the entanglement of nostalgia with Burkean comic 
and tragic frames in order to show that some spaces hold more ethical and deliberative potential 




explore the various strategies the public has employed in their confrontation with these 
monuments ranging from indirect confrontation (e.g., placing monuments in less offensive 
contexts and leaving them alone) to direct confrontation (e.g., the desecration of monuments) in 
order to evaluate how irony is challenged and critiqued further in already unsettled 
commemorative spaces.  The case studies explore all of these strategies further as they help to 
inform and shape public memory and identity.  
Finally, the chapter reviews different avenues of research within monumentality by 
contrasting traditional monuments with counter-monuments in order to demand more rhetorical 
specificity and find a more defined place for irony within the literature.  The conceptualization of 
ironic monumental disruptions within monument and counter-monument literature becomes 
particularly valuable in the dissertation’s methodological and theoretical foundations in Chapter 
three.  For now, how ironic monuments are treated appears to depend on the degree of nostalgia 
the affected public is still experiencing.  This chapter demonstrates how the concept of the ironic 
monumental disruption fits within the larger study of monumentality as a complementary 
terminology that maintains rhetorical and historical specificity while expanding the field’s 
theoretical foundation.   
All of the monuments examined within this project, while envisioned differently, erected 
separately, and desanctified uniquely, create valuable space for public discourse—a public 
discourse that was and is still needed in hopes of making sense of the present.  What is so 
fascinating and perplexing about the seemingly incongruent iconic and pop-heroic statues of 
Eastern Europe is that they have taken authority out of the government’s hands and aroused a 
lively discussion within the public sphere.  At first glance all of these commemorative spaces 




toying with it—creating an altered public memory and consequently providing productive 
political openings through the materialization of irony. 




 When pressed to identify the moment that communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, 
many Westerners would quickly respond that it was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
3
  While 
that date has symbolic value, the answer ignores the complex historical and rhetorical events 
leading up to and following that pivotal destructive reckoning.
4
  The fall of communism did not 
occur overnight, and the transition Eastern Europe faced as it shifted from communism to 
capitalism was, and still is, marked by political, social, and ideological tensions.  Within a 
decade’s time, communist ideology, which had shaped a sense of community, became obsolete 
as capitalism refashioned new political and social identities.  The rapid economic transition to 
privatization, also known as “shock therapy,” produced an equally jarring cultural shock, as 
religion was encouraged again and Eastern Europeans with means were able to take advantage of 
the newly restructured economy.   Many saw their lives change drastically during this time.  One 
of the biggest changes came in the emergence of a newly formed public sphere. 
Cezar Ornatowski explains that in the wake of communist fall-out, Eastern Europe 
struggled “to rearticulate the relationship between rhetoric and history as it pertains to the 
(re)constitution of the ‘public.’”
5
  Public sphere theory has been a part of the critical lexicon 
since Jurgen Habermas published Structural Transformation in the Bourgeois Public Sphere in 
1962.  In that text, Habermas defined the sphere of influence as the peoples’ use of reason to 
arrive at a consensus on issues of public concern.
6
  Gerard Hauser explains,  
Society’s self-production is historically situated and intrinsically tied to its rhetoric… We 
 locate the possibilities for social action in and through our rhetoric.  It is the agency by 
 which we make and remake our political and social relations… which is to say that 
 rhetoric is among the social practices by which society constitutes itself.
7




Ornatowski builds on Habermas and Hauser, claiming that the creation of the “public” in Eastern 
Europe was further complicated because of “Real Socialism’s” oppressive policies toward 
political discourse.
8
  As an example of Eastern Europe’s struggle to voice their political identity, 
Ornatowski states that eight months before Poland’s national election, Prime Minister 
Mieczyslaw Rakowski used the first person singular form, for the first time, “even referring to 
the communist party—typically heretofore spoken of exclusively as ‘the’ party, implicitly the 
only party realistically possible—as ‘my party,’ thus allowing, at least rhetorically, the 
possibility of the existence of other parties.”
 9
  Rapidly, the notion of the public sphere came into 
being as reflected through public discourse.  Societies transitioned from ones without civil 
society or public practices to commodified public spaces.  
Hauser extends the discussion of the public sphere in his study of civil society in Poland. 
Hauser explains, “Inventing publicness invariably poses the problem of integrating conflicts.”
10
 
Habermas states that autocratic states with no civil society cannot have “publics;” therefore, the 
transition from communist state to Polish nation enabled the formation of publics alongside the 
new doctrine of shock therapy capitalism.  Describing Eastern Europe’s transition from 
Stalinism, Hauser states:  
With their traditions suspended, their national struggle under communism was to create 
models for integrating into a political system in which they lacked power.  This effort has 
persisted in the post-1989 world and invariably involves an understanding of their own 
historicity.  Appropriating historicity entails acts of selection and emphasis on which self-




Hauser departs from Ornatowski by concluding that the Poles were able to successfully shift 
from a communist identity to a Polish identity by maintaining narratives of Polish cultural 
memory throughout the regime changes.
12
  Hauser saw the shift to publicness as an on-going 






The entire international community repositioned itself within a new global politics after 
communism’s collapse.  Noemi Marin reaffirms this transformation, asserting that in 
societies in transition the relationship between rhetoric and history is fundamentally 
“unsettled,” since the linear relationship established by the communist regimes had been 
disrupted.  This very unsettled character provides a “space of rhetorical invention” for the 
discourses competing in the new developing public sphere, in which “history” as 




Within the span of a decade, Eastern European’s needed a new vocabulary as they began to 
articulate a new national identity with new political allegiances and re-envisioned historical 
experiences.  As Hauser suggested, the rhetorical (re)constitution of publics became a central 
force in the construction of a new identity.  Therefore, with the new post-communist era 
vocabulary, new forms of public memory and representation emerged as well.  
THE MATERIALIZATION OF PUBLIC MEMORY AND IDENTITY: MEMORY 
PLACES, NOSTALGIA, AND COMIC AND TRAGIC FRAMING 
How our collectivity constitutes us is in large part decided through a selection of 
representational forms that indicate to ourselves and others what we should remember and what 
we should forget.  Irwin-Zarecka explains that securing, “a presence for the past demands 
work—‘memory work’—whether it is writing a book, filming a documentary or erecting a 
monument.”
 15
  This memory work produces, “the ‘infrastructure’ of collective memory,” and 
“makes an engagement with the past possible.”
16
  In fact, the stakes of memory often coalesce 
“in objects, sites, and monuments.”
17
  These representational forms have tremendous power to 
shape and create various publics and, in some instances, will even serve to reinforce nostalgic 
desires for the “authentic” past.  Monuments influence our understanding of the world by 




memory in mind, this section explores the complex interaction between memory places, 
nostalgia, and frames of acceptance.  
Memory places create “a specific kind of relationship between past and present that may 
offer a sense of sustained and sustaining communal identification.”
18
  Blair, Jeppeson, and Pucci 
argue that monuments construct important “memory places” that depict our present values and 
“instruct” us on how we saw the past and what we should deem valuable in the future.
19
  
Examples of memory places are the Astronaut’s Memorial in Florida, Mount Rushmore in South 
Dakota, and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington D.C.  All of these monuments 
encourage the American public to reconnect with their patriotic ideals or question their blind 
loyalties.
20
    
But memory places can take on various shapes and push distinctly different agendas.  
Scholar Greg Dickinson has written extensively on sites such as Old Pasadena and even movies 
like Pleasantville creating a nostalgic desire for a “simpler” time and place.
21
  While scholars 
define nostalgia as a deep longing for home, new research on nostalgia suggests that it is also a 
longing for an idealized origin.  As such, memory places are ideal commemorative sites for the 
production and engagement of nostalgia.
22
  Dickinson asserts, “Memory offers to consumers the 
possibility of coherent identities firmly situated within a warmly remembered past.”
23
  Memory 
places have the ability to capture moments of historical pride or erase moments of historical 
disgrace, but what makes them [memory places] so unique is that along with building a source of 
identity and filling in the gaps of memory, they also encourage the viewer to consume their so-
called authentic selections of the past.   
Nostalgia scholar Zala Volcic argues that there are several forms of nostalgia commonly 




broadly researches public memory in Yugoslavia and specifically studies a form of revisionist 
nostalgia which “presupposes the existence of a verifiable historical reality in order to transform 
and reshape it in accordance with contemporary political priorities.”
24
  Other forms of nostalgia 
include the aesthetic, which is “primarily a cultural phenomenon calling for the preservation of 
an authentic Yugoslav past,” and an escapist, utopian nostalgia, which is a “commercial 
phenomenon that celebrates and exploits the longing for an idyllic Yugoslav past.”
25
  Volcic’s 
research points to the fact that nostalgia continues to shape political identity after the fall of 
communism in Europe in hopes of cashing in on an unstable historical narrative.  
Considering the abrupt transition from communism to capitalism, it is not surprising that 
the European people might seek out a time with more stability, coherency, and community.  
Before 1989, being a part of the Eastern bloc or Yugoslavia offered a strong sense of communist 
identity, but now, capitalism has fractured that unity and replaced it with a sense of competition.  
As Dickinson suggests, “memory, space and identity regain importance in the contemporary 
moment…contemporary identities are performances that utilize the resources of memory; these 
performances occur in and are structured by landscapes of consumption.”
26
  Popular nostalgia-
driven memory sites like Yugoland in Serbia and Memento Park in Hungary encourage paying 
customers to reflect on the past.
27
  Whereas the former channels a deep longing for a country that 
no longer exists, the latter challenges communist nostalgia with its display of emasculated 
figurines.  Both sites encourage tourists to buy communist trinkets for the ride home.  Dickinson 
explains that nostalgic memory places help counter the anxiety of our postmodern condition 
stating, “In a post-traditional period, a time of deepening memory crisis, secured place becomes 






What is so fascinating about the complex interaction between memory places and nostalgia is 
that while nostalgia can channel public desire, it can also offer a means by which to explore 
ideological investments or—in the case of Eastern and Southeastern Europe—“uncover the 
discomforts of the present.”   
As referenced in the introduction, nostalgia is an affective experience produced within 
and shaped by a selection or frame of reality.  For Burke, frames produce our understanding of 
ourselves in relation to the world around us.  Burke explains that “frames” possess the ability to 
shape a person’s construction of reality and arouse a complex response in line with that 
perspective.
29
  For Burke, rhetors use frames to build “the mental equipment (meanings, 
attitudes, character) by which one handles the significant factors of his time.”
30
  In the case of 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe, nostalgia-driven memory places create the mental equipment 
and in turn shape the current reality of the various publics trying to understand their past in 
relation to their present.  
This project explores the rhetorical potential of nostalgic memory places by utilizing 
Burke’s discussion of comic and tragic frames of acceptance.  Briefly reviewing both concepts: 
the comic frame does not take ideas at face value and mocks the idea of “Truth,” while the tragic 
frame looks to alleviate personal guilt and place blame on a symbolic scapegoat.
31
 The comic 
frame “challenges the status quo by a corrective ideology which confronts and demeans the 
failings of the operating ideology,” but ultimately continues to participate in the current system.
32
  
Burke explains, “The comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while 
acting.  Its ultimate would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness… it would provide a 
rationale for locating the irrational and the nonrational.”
33




powerful structures that highlight social victimage and require some form of purifying 
mechanism to alleviate guilt.
34
   
Comic and tragic frames of acceptance provide valuable insight into public memory and 
monumentality as they are both concerned with the construction and representation of 
perception.  Specifically, frames of acceptance reinforce how commemorative works shape a 
selection of reality so that people may find a place within it.  Applying these frames to our case 
studies, the Bulgarian and Bosnian people display their nostalgia within comic frames while the 
Hungarian people articulate their memory and identity within a tragic frame.  The comic framing 
of the ideological contradiction in Bosnia and Bulgaria allows for an intervention (or disruption) 
of ironic meaning.  This in turn creates a space of deliberation as the public is encouraged to 
examine their nostalgic investments in contrast to their present conditions.  The monuments in 
Bulgaria and Bosnia encourage the kind of maximum consciousness Burke described previously 
as they simultaneously toy with and interrogate their representation and perception of both 
communism and capitalism.   
 Alternatively, the case study in Hungary shows that ironic monuments situated within 
tragic (and decidedly un-nostalgic) frames do not encourage the same kind of deliberation as 
their comic counterparts.  The tragic frame does not juxtapose ideas for additional consideration; 
rather, it simplifies an interpretation and encourages invested publics to sacrifice that idea or 
interpretation as a way of freeing themselves from further responsibility (or reflection).  Carlson 
explains that tragic frames develop an understanding of the world that relies on a victim and an 
oppressor.  Society can only regain order through the punishment or symbolic sacrifice of an 
oppressive force.
35
  For Hungarians, the oppressive force is communism with monuments 




landscape of communist monuments is an important symbolic act of defiance.  The framing of 
nostalgic or not-so-nostalgic memory places (or monuments) creates an important framework to 
explore the potential of irony.   
As referenced in the introduction, the three commemorative sites chosen as case studies 
for this project all demonstrate varying levels of nostalgia.  For example, citizens of the former 
Yugoslavia express the most nostalgia for their communist chapter and in turn have created the 
most ironic commemorative artifact in the monument to Bruce Lee.  Bulgarians, on the other 
hand, remain ambivalent about communism.  Bulgarian nostalgia for communism appears to ebb 
and flow as the economy does.  As a result, the Bulgarian people have created dynamic spaces of 
irony by temporarily reappropriating communist statues into Western superheroes.  Finally, the 
country of Hungary has very little nostalgia for communism and so their attempt to ironically 
address their former ideology serves to reinforce rather than reinterpret their current capitalist 
loyalties.   
The complex interaction between the transformed public sphere and a lingering nostalgia 
for a time before the public sphere was a theoretical possibility creates conflicting and sometimes 
confounding representations of memory. While this section examined how memory places are 
the product of a larger rhetorical framing which interacts with nostalgia, the following section 
demonstrates how monuments shape (and are shaped by) their interactions with the viewing 
public.   
MONUMENTS AS IDEOLOGICAL MICROCOSMS  
Monuments can create important sites of cultural angst as their materiality, or physical 
presence, draws attention to contested collective identities. They can also function as a source of 




representations of the past can offer new political perspectives through their physical or symbolic 
reappropriation or alteration.  All monuments have the potential to address diverse interests and 
contexts over time.  Monument-building is an undeniably political act with significant 
ramifications for how a society views its past and present, but monuments do not simply mark 
historical and cultural memory; they have the potential to evaluate it, mock it, and respond to it. 
Nikolai Voukov notes the importance of monument-building as a response to historical 
tensions and transitions, 
The end of socialism as state ideology touched deeply ingrained mechanisms of social 
expression and representation and, together with the changed attitude to the legacy of the 
socialist past, led to deep transformations in the notions of sacred places, ritual sites, 
death and the sacred.  Monuments of the socialist epoch were among those sites of public 
memory, which bore most directly these shifts in representation, and their fate as 
destroyed, desecrated, neglected or fallen into oblivion presents an important episode in 




Consequently, the monuments of the socialist era provide useful case studies for examining the 
politics of monument-building after an ideological transition.  Monuments are microcosms for 
larger social, political, and ideological phenomena making them ideal texts for understanding 
larger commemorative ethics.   
 Whereas not all monument-building necessarily improves the health of the public sphere, 
recent examples of ironic monumental disruptions suggest that monuments can produce public 
deliberation through a complex engagement of affirmation and agitation.  For the countries of 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and the former Yugoslavia, the debate over former and future 
commemorative objects rages on as citizens try to untangle complicated and occasionally 
competing memories and identities.  In Framing Public Memory, Kendall Phillips addresses 
public memory’s rhetorical foundation, claiming, “The study of memory is largely one of the 




themselves contested, subverted, and supplanted by other memories are essentially rhetorical.”
37
 
Additionally, Phillips states, “Rhetoric is deeply steeped in a concern for public memories.  
These memories that both constitute our sense of collectivity and are constituted by our 
togetherness are thus deeply implicated in our persuasive activities and in the underlying 
assumptions and experiences upon which we build meanings and reasons.”
38
  Thus, where 
memories constitute “our sense of collectivity,” monuments serve to give material form to that 
collectivity and memory.  In this respect, monuments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
become the physical representations of a nostalgia-driven public memory and political ideology. 
Eastern European studies scholar Nikolai Voukov explains the dilemma of communist 
statuary stating, “Among the primary problems post-socialist societies faced were how to 
reintegrate those former emblems of power into the new social and political context and how to 
acquire distance from the past without losing the memory of it.”
39
  Leaving a monument from 
another era untouched sends a message that the idea it represents is still worthy of some 
veneration or, at the very least, that the history or symbolism it recognizes is still valid.  But, as 
Voukov acknowledges, the negotiation of historical meaning proves even more difficult when 
ideological and political transitions throw societies into uncertainty. 
Other theorists have taken on the issue of commemoration and time as well.  According 
to Paul Ricoeur, commemoration forces a kind of obligated memory that demands the viewing 
public see the past in a certain way.
40
  Ricoeur states that the obligation of memory comes in the 
form of an injunction or a demand that “you will remember.”
41
  Ricoeur criticizes the sentiment 
behind this injunction, explaining that it employs “the future tense to speak of this memory that 
is given as the guardian of the past.”
42
 Ricoeur suggests that the political act of commemoration 




commemorative objects such as monuments ask for an audience to repeatedly recall a specific 
moment that can quickly fall victim to the “tyranny of memory.”
43
  For Ricoeur, monuments 
encourage a form of obligated memory that has the power to replace outmoded historical 
accounts and becomes a new untouchable marker of a former “reality.”
44
   
In other words, as whole societies are encouraged to make sense of their world through 
the art and monuments that surround them, they may find, as Ricoeur suggests, that the memorial 
model or commemorative object can eclipse the historical narrative.
45
   The displacement of a 
historical narrative by a nostalgic retelling is particularly worrisome as nostalgia has the power to 
reshape conflicting memories and to enhance old institutions or whitewash unpleasant 
experiences.  While Ricoeur’s concerns are worthy of further examination, his distrust of 
commemoration appears to be short-sighted.  Monuments are not dismissing history as Ricoeur 
suggests; monuments like books, films, and photography are offering a selection of events for 
public consideration.  For some, the fact that a monument stands as a marker of history 
automatically elevates it into the realm of the sacred, but monuments are not all static emblems 
of power.
 46
  While monuments do have the potential to elevate certain people and events, they 
also create important spaces of engagement for publics to come to terms with their historical 
narratives.  Monuments, as rhetorical phenomena, serve to solidify interpretations of the past and 
offer idealized depictions of the future. 
Monuments are powerful cultural markers precisely because they have the potential to 
remain in perpetuity.
47
  It is also for this very reason that public memorial sites become 
susceptible to symbolic and physical threats.  Carole Blair acknowledges, “Any stone or metal 
structure, though composed of a hard, lasting substance, is more vulnerable to destruction by 
hostile forces than is a book or even oral speech.”
48




beyond the monument’s physical attributes to include its symbolism as well.  In other words, the 
monument’s very material exposes it to powerful rhetorical acts that can disrupt or destroy its 
message.  
Currently, the literature on monumentality does not provide much insight into the 
desanctification of public memory.  On the other hand, many scholars have discussed the 
“sacred” label affixed to most public artifacts.  Scholars frequently examine what happens to 
monuments when their message is no longer valued, but little research exists discussing how 
monuments can be reappropriated to operate as interactive (and transitional) nodes of public 
memory.  While constructing a material marker of memory may draw attention to an idea or 
event, it cannot guarantee univocal political engagement or memorial closure.  Rather, defiling 
that same material marker may create a powerful dialogue over its rhetorical and historical 
meaning. 
CONFRONTATIONS WITH MONUMENTS AND MEMORY PLACES  
The concept of ironic monumental disruption has the potential to open up dialogue and 
demand deliberation through a symbolic confrontation with a monument or memory place.  As 
such, Chapter three further explores the political potential of irony as it takes on monumental 
form.  In addition to ironic disruptions of memory and meaning, the act of a physical 
confrontation coupled with irony creates an even more complicated and interesting interplay of 
memory and meaning. This form of desecration encourages the public to ask, Are these 
monumental artifacts still representative of contemporary times and why was this particular 
memory targeted?  This section reviews various literatures dedicated to material confrontation 





Targeting the artifacts (e.g., monuments) of former regimes, or in Bruce Lee’s case, an 
artifact dedicated to a utopian narrative, is not uncommon.  Iconoclasm, or the destruction of 
important religious or political symbolism, has been and continues to be a common practice 
throughout history.  Iconoclasm is an “obliterative act” that “tends simultaneously to unmask and 
to enhance the power of images.”
49
  The focus for this project is not that regime changes 
inevitably lead to destruction or erasure, but rather what this desecration or erasure does to those 
who have—or continue to—identify with the material emblems of  the past and present.  
Specifically, how do acts of desecration enacted through physical vandalism and erasure 
transform, enrage, or even pacify affected publics? 
The practice of physically damaging sacred spaces is a more direct form of confrontation.  
Numerous authors have explored desecration as a way to undermine the authority of sacred 
symbols such as the American flag.
50
  Additionally, extensive scholarship exists on the ethical 
dimensions of vandalism, particularly how it pertains to the sacred spaces of nature.
51
  Much like 
erasure, acts of vandalism can ignite public deliberation, but many invested publics are quick to 
call such acts disrespectful or cowardly.  Foote considers the vandalization of sites to be an act of 
obliteration or a message that the public no longer wants to face a particularly painful memory.
52
  
On the contrary, tarnishing the sacred allows for an engagement of public sentiment which 
reveals whether a memory still fits into the current culture.  While Foote and others are partially 
correct in their reading of desecration, they miss the larger potential this rhetorical act holds.  
Whether vandalism elicits anger or sympathy, material confrontations have the political potential 
to reinvigorate or create public debate. 
Richard Marback references an example of desecration leading to political deliberation in 
his article on the defacement of the Joe Lewis monument in Detroit.
53




white paint on the black fist of the Lewis monument as an act of racism while others saw it as a 
protest against the celebration of violence.
54
  Regardless of interpretation, the act of vandalism 
operated as a symbolic disruption that opened up a discussion about political space and 
contemporary issues.  In an interesting theoretical turn, Victoria Gallagher and Margaret Laware 
also study the Joe Lewis Fist, but their discussion is concerned with its lack of textual legibility.  
Whereas Marback studied the Fist as a transformed disruption, Gallagher and Laware find that 
the monument’s “openness to multiple readings” makes it “nearly meaningless to some 
audiences,” therefore, necessitating the construction of a more traditional counter-monument to 
respond to the Fist.
55
  But the Fist’s illegibility may be the precise strategy the people of Detroit 
need.  In a city with so many contested identities, the monument itself served as a disrupted 
space in need of further interpretation. The act of desecration opened the monument up to a 
significant debate about local politics and institutionalized racism.  The “counter” monument to 
the Fist simply became redundant after the paint incident—a monument built to critique that 
which was already under critique. 
The erasure of place creates the most common form of indirect confrontation.  In 
Shadowed Ground, Kenneth Foote argues that collective sites of shame are typically subject to 
symbolic erasure.
56
  In his book, Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation in Public 
Space, Daniel Walkowitz outlines several case studies where political upheavals led to the 
removal or erasure of public monuments.  One specific study shows how local Nicaraguan 
officials painted over murals and political graffiti with white paint in order to remove signs of 
contestation.  The physical whitewashing of the country sought to silence the most accessible 
form of protest.
57
  Furthermore, Zala Volcic’s article on communist nostalgia after the war in 




The removal of monuments and the changing of street names were small but telling acts, 
the “invisible losses” that helped to erase a sense of common Yugoslav supranational 
identity and belonging.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new framework of internally 





Victoria Gallagher speaks to the negative cleansing effect of symbolic erasure, claiming that the 
removal of sites of controversy eliminates the possibility of debate by depoliticizing “efforts 
aimed at cultural understanding.”
59
  Consequently, Gallagher believes that acts of political 
erasure produce historical amnesia.
60
  While Gallagher’s argument is entirely valid, occasionally, 
acts of erasure can draw attention to an idea that otherwise might be taken for granted or ignored 
completely.  In his work on the National Civil Rights museum, Armada explains, “Somewhere 
beneath the surface of all presentations of the past lie the potentially defiant voices of 
marginalized groups awaiting fulfillment in the crucible of public controversy.”
61
  What many 
critiques of erasure do not acknowledge is that rather than quieting public controversy, 
sometimes erasure brings visibility to an artifact’s absence.
62
 The previous sections have 
reviewed scholarly literature on monuments, memory places, nostalgia, frames, and 
confrontation. The next section applies all of these concepts to the case studies in Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe in order to create conceptual space for ironic monumental disruptions. 
FINDING SPACE FOR IRONY, NOSTALGIA, AND CONFRONTATON IN THE 
MONUMENTALITY LITERATURE 
Where some monuments reflect cultural or political anxiety, the new string of 
monuments recently created or reappropriated in Eastern and Southeastern Europe serve as the 
physical embodiments of the discursive rupture produced by the ideological shift from socialism 
to capitalism.  The commemorative trend in this part of the world appears to be a tangible 
symptom of the larger political and ideological obstacles still facing Europe today.
63




political upheaval inevitably create valuable potential spaces for public deliberation and Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe are no exception.  Monuments can serve as important sites of memory 
and highly visible platforms through which historical and political ideas are developed and 
critiqued.  In other words, these monuments are not constructing counter-narratives to socialism; 
they serve as unique materializations of the ironic tension between socialism and capitalism.    
The complicated relationship between irony, identity, nostalgia, and representation makes 
Eastern Europe and its southern neighbor, the former Yugoslavia, important sites for 
interrogating public memory in the form of monuments and how these forms of identity can 
affect the public sphere. The people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe are not unfamiliar with 
irony’s subversive potential.  Many authors have written extensively on how the Eastern 
European people used irony during the Stalinist years to maintain a sense of individualism and 
agency.
64
  It becomes all the more surprising that the same populations are yet again utilizing 
irony to conjure up nostalgic memories within comic or tragic frames as a way to explain the 
communist epoch in Europe.  As people increasingly express nostalgia for a community or state, 
the ironic response is intensified.  Within irony’s critical and deliberative space, invested publics 
may choose to additionally confront transformed representations of memory by ignoring or 
destroying monuments as a reflection of the current public sentiment.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
correlation of irony, nostalgia, confrontation, and the frames of acceptance in the three case 




















Figure 1.1:  
Ironic Monumental Disruptions within Comic and Tragic Frames in Post-Soviet Europe 
 
The above Figure shows the degree of confrontation and subsequent deliberation the three ironic 
monumental disruptions examined within the case studies created.  There is an important 
correlation between the historical narrative, the current economic situation, and the degree of 
nostalgia each country expresses for their communist past.  These factors appear to shape 
whether communities construct their national identity within the comic frame or the tragic.  For 
instance, Hungary is the most financially stable country on this list and its citizens are happy to 
leave the past behind.  Hungarians are quick to place blame on communism for their past and 
present misfortunes.  The ironic monumental disruption experienced at this particular site is 
encouraged rather than interpreted because a tragic frame created within this commemorative 
space precludes the possibility of significant aleatory interaction between the artifact and the 
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audience.  Because Hungarians are not as ambivalent about their past, the ironic monumental 
disruption is only superficially encouraged within the commemorative space.  Memento Park is 
not subject to additional physical confrontations as the monuments are already largely 
decontextualized and sanitized.  The lack of confrontation with this site is indicative of the fact 
that the metaphorical positioning of these monuments and their comical descriptions 
intentionally channel irony but they do not acknowledge any residual nostalgic affect.  
On the other hand, “De/construction of Monument,” the group who helped fund Bosnia’s 
Bruce Lee, removed the statue within a few months of its erection because of its frequent 
defacement. The statue is now in a secure with no immediate plans for its return to Mostar.  The 
extreme nostalgia still present in the Baltic region and the contentious nature of the monument’s 
multicultural message made it a prime site of ongoing deliberation.  Both Bosnians and 
Bulgarians have mixed feelings about their communist past and, as such, have not vilified 
communism in the same way Hungarians have.  Ultimately, Bosnians and Bulgarians utilize the 
comic frame to question ideological inconsistencies.  Comedy explains what many in the West 
see as a calamity (the Yugoslav War, Stalinism, etc).   The erection of Bruce Lee and the 
creation of the Western comic book heroes encouraged the global community to ask, Is this a 
joke? Thus, Bosnians and Bulgarians got precisely what they had been missing—a more visible 
platform from which to question their relationship to global politics. 
ARGUING FOR THE MATERIALIZATION OF IRONY AND ITS INTERACTIONS 
 The foregoing section reviewed the public memory and monumentality literature. The 
section also explained the need for more deliberative space, in which institutionalized values are 
more visible and even possibly more susceptible to various forms of social, political, and 




nostalgic memory places with ironic, agitational performances that engage people to assume a 
vested interest in the politics of commemoration.  The various forms of confrontation (namely 
desecration and erasure) further undermine, but ultimately end up heightening, the ironic and 
typically unsettling representations of memory.  These commemorative spaces show that 
additional confrontations with ironic placeholders help societies experiencing ideological 
transitions resituate their relationship between the commemorative object and their lived 
experience.   
Presently, monument studies needs more research on the benefits of irony in monument-
building.  Some scholars are even hesitant to recognize how commemorative spaces can have 
irony constructed into them.  In fact, scholar Linda Hutcheon has suggested that ironic 
monuments are not particularly useful objects of study because irony cannot take on a physical 
presence; rather, the viewing subject produces irony.  In Irony’s Edge, Hutcheon states that  
to call something ironic or nostalgic is, in fact, less a description of the ENTITY ITSELF 
than an attribution of a quality of RESPONSE. Irony is not something in an object that 
you either "get" or fail to "get": irony "happens" for you (or, better, you make it 
"happen") when two meanings, one said and the other unsaid, come together, usually 
with a certain critical edge… [It] is not something you "perceive" in an object; it is what 
you "feel"… it is the element of response—of active participation, both intellectual and 




While Hutcheon is entirely correct that irony can produce an affective response, she is too quick 
to dismiss the rhetorical place of the ironic object.  Hutcheon goes so far as to say that “irony and 
nostalgia are not qualities of objects; they are responses of subjects—active, emotionally, and 
intellectually-engaged subjects.”
66
  This project seeks to untangle this false binary and prove that 
irony can be both constructed and exchanged.  
While there is extensive literature on performative irony and its politics, there is little 




appears to be a newer phenomenon, but the recent construction of ironic monuments in Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe suggests that the idea has scholarly potential.  Irony becomes a 
powerful way to engage ideas without confronting painful histories, which characterize many 
historical monuments.  Traditionally, monuments stabilize the multitude of discourses that 
circulate around them, making them ideal cultural texts of interpretation.   But the stabilization of 
discourse may in some cases limit the therapeutic and sometimes threatening act of public 
deliberation.  
It would be easy to simply write off the painted figures of Superman or Santa Claus or 
the statue of Bruce Lee as harmless jokes, but, as Jim Collins suggests, with irony, there is “a 
hyper awareness on the part of the text itself of its cultural status, function, and history, as well 
as of the conditions of its circulation and reception.”
67
  All of these monuments reveal their own 
awareness.  Various groups built, moved, and vandalized the monuments in hopes of bringing 
more attention to and critiquing their messages. The monuments—just like the people who live 
with them—are not ready to fully abandon their past; they would rather play with their historical 
narrative in hopes of gaining more clarity.  Consequently, all of these seemingly superficial 
statues in Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia become important cultural nodes for 
understanding the representational and political potential of irony.
68
  The ironic statue might not 
even acknowledge the history or person it wishes to critique.  Instead, irony creates an opening 
within the historical narrative by threatening to ignore it entirely or by offering a reversal of its 
intended message. Irony creates conflict without ever admitting to it. 
It is because of irony’s rhetorical power to highlight an idea with the intent of calling it 
into question that it becomes such a useful tool for studying the monuments of Eastern and 




memory.  Hungarians placed monuments to Stalin in a virtual amusement park, Bosnians 
destroyed Bruce Lee because his message of “justice” was too offensive for display, and 
Bulgarians invited Ronald McDonald to boldly occupy the body of a Soviet soldier.  But the real 
commemorative power stemming from these monuments comes through their ironic forms.  
They are materially producing a dialogue with their audience that reflects back on them.  It is the 
interplay and the uncertainty of accepting any one particular interpretation that creates a highly 
contextualized space filled with many questions and few answers.   
In other words, these monuments can disrupt acceptable forms of public memory, create 
commemorative anxiety, and do it in such a way as to appear relatively harmless or 
uncontroversial to the uninformed outsider.
69
  Ultimately, ironic monumental disruptions 
materially demonstrate how societies are coming to terms with their histories.  These monuments 
“countered” nothing, but they did challenge ideas and histories as counter-monuments claim to 
do, which is why it is important to situate this new form within the current counter-
monumentality literature before turning to additional conceptual concerns in Chapter three.   
MONUMENTS VERSUS COUNTER-MONUMENTS: OVERCOMING BINARIES 
WITH IRONY 
Scholars continue to overlook irony because of a larger conceptual confusion still 
plaguing the field of monumentality studies.  When it comes to the intervention of “counter” or 
critical memories, many scholars in the field create a binary between “traditional” monuments 
and counter-monuments.
70
  The problem with this distinction is that it oversimplifies both 
categories of study and does not make a clear case for why either category is expanding or 
improving monument studies.  Political scientist Elizabeth Strakosch explains the perceived 




Traditionally, nation-states have built unified political identities around their institutions 
by mobilizing social memory of a glorious past that erases crimes committed in the 
process of nation-building. Such stories have been physically embodied in monolithic, 
didactic monuments that take complex moments of historical conflict and transform them 




Counter-monuments on the other hand, are “abstract rather than literal forms…capable of 
allowing the stories of victims and perpetrators to coexist.”
72
  Strakosch’s definitions appear to 
hinge upon a representational distinction that literal representations reinforce traditional 
institutions of power and abstract depictions allow for more interpretation and dialogue.   
What is clear is that monuments and counter-monuments have the ability to aid in the 
sense-making process by exceeding the potential shortcomings of language and serving as an 
alternate mode of expression.  Additionally, both monuments and counter-monuments can be 
subject to desecration or defacement.  Both monument and counter-monument have the potential 
to capture the emotional complexity of human suffering and historical tragedies through an 
affective exchange.  In Rhetorical Bodies, Carole Blair explains the affective visual experience, 
stating that monuments “construct valenced reaction and depths of visitor experience that cannot 
be described, much less explained, in terms of their symbolism or by reference to the intentions 
of their makers.”
73
  At this current juncture in monument studies, it is still not clear how counter-
monuments are defining themselves in opposition to every other monument.   
This study seeks to provide more precise vocabulary for the study of monumentality by 
demonstrating that certain critical practices do not fit within a binary logic.  This chapter broadly 
reviewed the literature of public memory and monumentality in order to show how the 
scholarship is shaping the field and where conceptual gaps still exist.  The literature combined 
with the case studies within this project show that counter-monumentality would greatly benefit 




Beginning with ironic commemoration, this study shows that scholars of monumentality should 
be less concerned with static categories and should instead look to specific commemorative 
practices in order to understand how artifacts and communities are jointly reflecting public 
sentiments.  In order to interrogate localized practices, I propose the concept of ironic 
monumental disruption as a rhetorical formation that allows old and new monuments, ideologies, 
and political and historical narratives (rather than a conceptual battle between monuments and 
counter-monument) to produce a critical dialogue.  
As mentioned earlier, Chapter three expands on the conceptualization behind the category 
of the counter-monument in order to show where the recognition of ironic strategies could be 
helpful to scholarship. Chapter two, to which I now turn, explores the construction of Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe’s historical narrative.  It is important to understand what policies and 
ideologies have shaped public memory in post-communist Europe in order to explain its [public 
memory's] contestation. From the inception of Stalinism in the mid-1940s to the current 
application of capitalism, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs have all found ways to make 
meaning of monumental change.  
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Chapter Two:  Historical Complexities:  
A Problem of Rhetoric and Memory 
In a June 8, 2011, interview, a woman told the story of her parents fleeing from Mostar, 
Bosnia, during the Bosnian War in 1995 and seeking refuge in Norway. Her father went to a 
local butcher shop and tried to explain that he was a Bosniak refugee looking for work.
1
 When 
his language failed him he gestured to the man behind the counter that he too worked as a 
butcher by dragging one finger along his neck. The man behind the counter called the police to 
report that the “Butcher of Sarajevo” was confessing his horrific crimes.
2
  Coincidentally, the 
Serbian government captured the real “butcher,” Serbian General Ratko Mladic, a few days 
before our interview. When asked how she felt about Mladic's capture 17 years after the 
Srebrenica genocide, the woman responded that he was an old man who got to live his life. There 
was no justice in his capture now.
3
  
The narrative of justice is one many societies rely on when trying to understand tragedies 
brought on by war.  In International Criminal Justice, author George Andreopoulos states that 
societies believe some form of social balance is restored when those guilty of inhumane crimes 
are found and prosecuted.
4
  According to Andreopoulos, justice is a product of holding the guilty 
accountable for their crimes, and it [justice] is an important first step to “secure world order.”
5
  
In Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the reality that so many people in this area of the world 
perpetrated unthinkably heinous crimes against one another complicates the idea of “justice.”  
Many of these crimes were encouraged under the guise of an extreme nationalism, which seeks 
to elevate national and cultural identity above all else. The rhetorical dimensions of nationalism 
are of particular interest here as they continue to construct a sense of history and political destiny 




demands for political, cultural, and economic “justice” that have largely shaped Eastern 
European and Yugoslavian identity in the twentieth century. But whereas nationalism propelled 
and sustained independence movements in Eastern Europe in the 1970s and ‘80s, it alternatively 
led to the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. 
This chapter traces the multiple narratives of Eastern and Southeastern European politics 
to give context to the current commemorative strategies utilized in these regions today.  
Currently, the competing ideologies, histories, identities, and memories are most visibly 
displayed through monuments situated in museums, city parks, and public squares.  Monuments 
built to former ideological narratives typically become one of the first artifacts of the old regime 
to receive a symbolic makeover.  The desire to remove or reappropriate old statues reveals that 
monuments continue to enforce their political power over the local population.  Similarly, the 
need to build new monuments reflecting a new ideology suggests that monuments can reinforce 
perspectives in need of additional political and material support.  Monuments, much like 
historical narratives, can be subject to revision; thus, the ability to reshape Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe’s representation of history relies on a willingness to overlook or repress 
some of that same history.  Thus, the goal of this chapter is to offer the reader a deeper 
understanding of the abrupt historical and ideological transition from communism to capitalism 
as an explanatory device for the region’s lingering nostalgia (and subsequent comic and tragic 
frames).  Additionally, to understand the value of the concept of the ironic monumental 
disruption and how its rhetorical (monumental) formation creates deliberation, this chapter 
explores the complex and sometimes contradictory forces that shaped Eastern and Southeastern 




So in order to gain insight into the rhetorical dimensions of “post” politics and its 
implications for political representation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, this chapter 
explores the changing political ideologies in Hungary and Bulgaria by examining their 
allegiances during World War I and II, their relationships to the Soviet Union, the subsequent 
collapse of the satellite state system in the late 1980s, and the abrupt transition to capitalism in 
the 1990s.  The chapter also reviews Yugoslavia’s construction of nationality over the past 
century and why its configuration led to its genocidal end.  
Spanning from the 1980s to the mid 1990s, some of the most complex and contradictory 
political identities began to take form in post-communist Europe under the banners of 
communism and nationalism. The next section highlights the important historical events which 
led up to the fall of communism in the Eastern bloc and the devastating war which erupted and 
subsequently ended the Yugoslav nation. All of these significant historical moments continue to 
shape how people see themselves as victimizers and victims. Curiously, Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe’s stories, though somewhat overlapping, get rearticulated quite differently.  
Hungarians and Bulgarians were victims of their physical location between East and West 
whereas Yugoslavs politically position themselves as neither East or West; instead, destroying 
their national unity from the inside out. The histories are undeniably similar, but the rhetorical 
framing is vastly different.  
CONTESTED POLITICAL IDENTITIES 
Episodes of imperialism and oppression mark Eastern and Southeastern Europe’s 
historical narrative.  While many of the countries in this region aligned their political interests 
with Nazi Germany, and before that, the Hapsburg Empire, the people now speak about that 




twentieth century.  It is, in fact, an interesting rhetorical revision that has left many of the former 
oppressors as the self-described oppressed.  Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Croats all joined the 
Axis powers, albeit some by force, during World War II.  After World War II, many Eastern and 
Southeastern Europeans were grateful to no longer live under the rule of fascism but quickly 
found that they had not gained any real sense of autonomy under Stalinism.  Many of these same 
people expressed hope that, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, they would finally 
gain economic and political freedom under capitalism.  The monolithic interpretation that 1989 
marked the death of communism in Europe is still pervasive in the West, but this interpretation 
ignores the distinct formation of socialism, which briefly lived on in former Yugoslavia.  While 
Eastern Europe maintained a tenuous relationship with Stalinism, Southeastern Europe willingly 




While Cold War tensions surrounded Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia positioned itself to 
avoid political alliances with both the East and West after the infamous conflict between Tito 
and Stalin in 1948.
7
  It was the push to avoid identification with Cold War politics that led to the 
creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
8
  Many claim the NAM was the product of 
Tito’s vision to strengthen nations without forcing them to establish ties to superpowers.
9
   By 
1961, the NAM was established in Belgrade, Serbia (at the time, a state of Yugoslavia), along 
with India, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia.  All five nations sought to find a political course that 
united developing nations rather than making them satellite states for Eastern or Western blocs.
10
  
The NAM included 55% of the world’s population at various points, but the end of Cold War 
politics quickly undermined the organization's power.  The founding nation of Yugoslavia 






Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians abandoned all political and economic alliances and subscribed to 
racist ideologies that reinforced genocidal policies.  It is imperative to understand the nuances 
between—and within—Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe’s relationship to communism 
because their monumental responses reflect their varied historical narratives. 
Alternatively, within the span of several decades, Eastern Europe buckled under the 
weight of Stalinism, a system where “all spheres—economic, social, legal, aesthetic, religious, 
etc.—were subordinated to political criteria” as set forth by the Communist Party.
12
  The 
transition was relatively peaceful as frequent protests stretching from Poland to Hungary further 
undermined an overextended Soviet Union.  While communism in Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe ended very differently, both regions faced similar conflicts leading up to World War II. 
The following sections outline several important conflicts in the twentieth century leading up to 
the rise and fall of communism in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. 
Foundations of Conflict: World Wars I and II 
As the intersection between Europe and the East, the Balkans became a site of conquest 
for Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Consequently, the Balkans experienced numerous political 
and ideological shifts under the authority of various empires and dictators.  Occupation by the 
Ottoman Empire led to the Islamic conversion of many Slavic people, but it was not religion or 
culture alone that led to the genocidal purges of entire ethnicities.  In fact, Norman Naimark 
suggests that claims of “ancient historical tensions” are patently false.
13
  Following the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy, the frontiers in the western Balkans were 
redrawn and a completely novel South Slav entity was created.”
14
  Naimark argues that this 






  Thus, the true catalyst of the war was the rhetorical 
harnessing of a fragile nationalism to fuel the anxieties of a historically colonized people. 
Much like Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe was also fated to occupy the ideological and 
physical space between East and West. In fact, Eastern Europe rarely possessed authority over its 
own governance during much of the twentieth century.  Frequent territorial disputes erupted in 
the region as the empires of Europe crumbled.  The land of Eastern Europe served in the south, 
the Ottoman Empire, in the west, the Austro-Hungarian and Prussian Empires, and in the east, 
the Russian Empire, by becoming a source for raw materials (including food) and cheap labor.
16
   
Against this backdrop of exploitation, the people of Eastern Europe “struggled to develop 
or preserve their national identities against attempts to assimilate or control them.”
17
 Ottoman 
rule dominated Bulgaria throughout the thirteenth century.
18
 Corruption and rising nationalism 
propelled the Ottoman Empire’s decline and made it susceptible to foreign invasion by the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, which then claimed the territories of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia.  
The division of land between the Austrian and Hungarian empires largely determined 
how each region would develop.  Austrian authorities ruled over Slovenia, Hungary, and the 
Czech states and encouraged industrial development and local governance. Croatia, on the other 
hand, fell under the jurisdiction of Hungarian rule and had “fewer opportunities to develop 
national movements.”
19
 The hostilities created by the Austro-Hungarian division of lands 
reverberated around the world when WWI began with the assassination of Austrian Archduke 







Larger empires frequently subsumed the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.  
Adrian Webb describes the divisions during World War I, stating: 
Austria-Hungary, Germany and Turkey, with their Balkan ally Bulgaria, had been pitted 
against Russia (with its British, French and at the end American, allies on the Western 
Front) and Italy with their Balkan allies Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Greece. All 




The divisions forced the people living within those countries to take up arms against neighboring 
countries with overlapping nationalities. It was not uncommon for Russian Poles to fight German 
Poles due to the boundaries of empires.
22
  Additionally, the infrastructure each empire left behind 
foreshadowed many of the future economic divisions affecting their citizens today.  The 
remnants of each empire ultimately shaped how the states of Eastern Europe would eventually 
adopt and structure democracy and industrialization.
23
   
As World War I wound down, it was clear that the Austro-Hungarian Empire would need 
to be broken up in order to avoid future power grabs. As punishment for their hubris, Europe 
dismantled Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in hopes of creating a substantially 
weaker Hungary with less land and fewer resources.
24
  Bulgaria ceded much of its territory to 
Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. By the War’s end, an entirely new Eastern Europe emerged. 
The capitals of the former empires were resource-rich and built for trade while other cities were 
underdeveloped, leaving them isolated and susceptible to future exploitation.
25
  After the war, 
Budapest benefited from elaborate transportation systems and grand palaces, but Bulgaria 




 Consequently, the redistricting of land created a new configuration of Yugoslavia that 
“brought together ethnic groups that were very different in their religions, cultures, economies, 
and levels of development.”
27




up and made into autonomous states, but the fragile configuration of new statehood left East and 
Southeast Europe vulnerable to the influence of its more powerful European neighbors.  
With the development of several new Eastern European states, the Russian Revolution of 
1917 provided a path for finding a new sense of shared political identity through a common 
Marxist ideology.  The movement within Russia showed the developing states an alternative to 
their former imperialist oppression. But the ideological transition for Eastern Europe was not 
smooth, as the identity that they did share was one grounded in cultural and religious traditions.
28
 
Predictably, many Eastern European countries experimented and simultaneously struggled with 
communism after WWI. Robin Okey asserts that while many in Europe simultaneously had 
curiosities and misgivings about communism, Hitler’s invasion of Poland set into motion a string 
of events that led to the inevitable (and sometimes forcible) implementation of communism in 
the lands between central Europe and the Soviet Union.
29
  
Not surprisingly, the widespread destruction of World War II was the breaking point for 
the fragile democracies of Eastern Europe.  The political loyalties of the newly formed states 
quickly dissolved as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania fought alongside the Germans as part of 
the Axis powers. Croatia initially put up fleeting resistance but ultimately emerged as a puppet 
state occupied by Germany.
30
 The Germans appointed Croat-nationalist, Ante Pavelic, as leader 
of the fascist Ustasa movement in Croatia. Using Nazi extermination techniques, Croatian 
Ustasas sent local Serbs to concentration camps where they were starved or murdered. The 
memories of World War II continued to haunt Yugoslavia throughout the twentieth century, as 
lingering resentment over Croatia’s fascist allegiances and demands for independent statehood 




Most other Eastern European countries allied with the West because they were resentful 
of Axis destruction. What appeared in the West as a clear cut alliance between “good” and “evil” 
was complicated further by the national politics of Eastern Europe. Hitler’s vision of a “New 
Order” capitalized on old, conflicting territorial claims.
31
 Eastern states were encouraged to align 
themselves with the Axis powers in hopes of being gifted newly conquered lands. Okey outlines 
the Axis hierarchy of power, stating: 
Hungary and Bulgaria retained their independence and extended their frontiers in return 
for close alignment of their economic and foreign policies with German interests; 
Hungary, but not Bulgaria, joined the war against Russia… in the second rank came the 
Slovaks and Croats, dissatisfied minor partners in 1919 who received the trappings of 
statehood under closely supervised native fascists.… At the bottom rung in the New 
Order were the victors of 1919, the Poles, Serbs, and Czechs, their states dismembered 




These political and cultural hierarchies became especially significant once ethnic cleansing 
became a tool of control in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Okey describes how “Psuedo-
science mingled with vulgar prejudice,” as Croatia’s president “pronounced the Croats not to be 
Slavs but Goths.”
33
 The Croats saw themselves as having distinctly different “racial traits” from 
the Slavs throughout Southeastern Europe.
34
 Racist propaganda described Slavic racial traits as 
“a markedly disorderly and careless family life.”
35
  
World War II produced much of the resentment, which would ultimately undermine the 
subsequent configuration of Yugoslavia. As the war wound down and the Axis powers met their 
eventual defeat, new superpowers emerged and laid claim to former German territories. 
Wolchick explains the redistribution of land and power, stating: 
Hungary and Bulgaria, as Axis powers, were simply occupied by the Soviet Union.… In 
Yugoslavia and Albania, the Soviets played a very limited role in establishing 
communism. Although the Soviet army helped liberate Belgrade, Josip Broz Tito and the 
Partisans liberated most of Yugoslavia through guerilla warfare against the German 
occupiers. Most of the aid they received came from the Western Allies. The Partisans 




nationalist Croatian Ustasa forces and Serbian Chetniks who, in turn, fought each other 




Thus, much of Eastern and Southeastern Europe allied with the ideology of communism either 
through occupation (Hungary and Bulgaria) or self-determination (Yugoslavia). 
The Rise of Communism in Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
After World War II, the Soviet Union occupied most of Eastern Europe under the 
authority of Joseph Stalin. Stalinism as a specific brand of communism enforced an ideological 
system that controlled every aspect of political and social life. When tensions arose in the 
satellite states, the Soviet Union’s military units typically put them down by force. According to 
Wolchick, within the political realm of Stalinism, “The Communist Party structures were the 
skeleton of the state. The party selected or approved the managerial or politically significant 
personnel working at all levels of the state bureaucracy and economy.”
37
 Additionally, Stalinism 
quickly restructured social relations. The elimination of religious associations created friction 
within the substantial Catholic and orthodox populations of Eastern Europe. While some resisted 
the abrupt social transitions, women found a more promising role in society. They were able to 
work, some for the first time, and become politically involved. Stalinism also pushed the 
Hungarian people to move from an agricultural economy to an industrial one.  Young adults 
began moving to the cities in order to pursue further education. While Hungary and Yugoslavia 
voiced mixed emotions about the Soviet model, communism created beneficial economic 
changes for the less-developed states during its initial implementation. Wolchick asserts, 
“Stalinist economic policies worked best, at first, in the least developed countries in the region.  





Directly to the south, Josip Broz Tito unified the territory of Southeastern Europe into a 
communist government in 1946 and later created the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
on April 7, 1963.
38
  Tito envisioned a multicultural state where Orthodox Serbs identified equally 
with Catholic Croatians and Bosnian Muslims.  Tito’s greatest challenge was establishing a 
political unity that could trump the ethnic and religious identities constructed over the last 
century. Tito’s solution to maintain peace within these war-torn states was to allow each nation 
authority over its own territory and parliament.  “On the Soviet model, these units would be 
‘national in form and socialist in content,’ meaning that the Communist party, representing the 
socialist future, would ensure unity through its Leninist principle of democratic centralism.”
39
  
Within the new government, each republic and province had its own constitution, 
supreme court, parliament, president, and prime minister.
40
 All of the sub-governing bodies were 
under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav government made up of President Tito, the federal prime 
minister, and the federal parliament. Scholar Ivo Banac refutes the idea that communism was 
thrust upon the people of Yugoslavia, instead insisting that “[w]ithout communism there would 
have been no postwar Yugoslav state.”
41
 
The states of Yugoslavia formed a political union and subsequently associated with the 
USSR to strengthen the area against foreign threats after centuries of colonization from Western 
Europe and the Near East.  In 1948, Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist Information 
Bureau by insisting that Tito was disloyal to the USSR. Tito responded to Stalin's expulsion by 
claiming that Yugoslavia wanted to stand alone.
42
  Tito insisted that “Soviet-style communism 
was ideologically incorrect.”
43
  Instead, Tito proposed decentralized decision-making in both 
party and government and sought to have a system of “worker self-management” that opened up 






Yugoslavia’s unceremonious exit, Tito maintained the Soviet model but included free market 
structures in order to encourage the development of small businesses.
45
  
 During the 1960s and 1970s, sporadic skirmishes occurred between the different 
republics in Eastern and Southeastern but the USSR and Yugoslavia’s powerful central 
governments prevented major conflicts from materializing further. The Soviet Union used 
violence and intimidation tactics to maintain authority while Tito maintained a balance of power 
by using violent force and limiting Serbian claims to territory and political votes in parliament.
46
  
Wolchick states that the Yugoslavian balance of power was complicated because  
Serbs and Croats composed the majority of the state’s population as well as the 
overwhelming majority of the three largest republics—Serbia (and its autonomous 
provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina), Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Approximately 24 
percent of the Serbs lived outside of the Republic of Serbia, 22 percent of Croats outside 
Croatia, and tensions between these two groups influenced interethnic relations 
throughout Yugoslavia. Montenegrins generally identified with Serbs, and Muslims lived 
intermixed with Serbs and Croats. Only Slovenia and Macedonia, with their very small 




In Yugoslavia specifically, the arrangement of a centralized government proved to be highly 
beneficial to the poorer states of Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, but it drew the ire of 
more resource-rich territories like Croatia and Slovenia. The latter felt like their economy was 
sacrificed on behalf of the weaker economies, which had little hope for substantial growth.  
Much like Hungary and Bulgaria, Yugoslavia experienced a period of economic boom before 
reaching a period of stagnation in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The Decline of Communism 
In Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the beneficial gains produced by a centralized 
government were short lived as “[t]he inefficiencies of centralized economies and Stalinist 
strategies of development eventually plagued the economies of the region.… [Ultimately,] 




low rates of productivity.”
48
  But it was not until the full-blown international economic downturn 
of the 1980s that Stalinism began to face insurmountable obstacles. With the Soviet Union and 
its satellite states deeply in debt, the various countries borrowed more and more money as food 
became a precious commodity. General Secretary of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev 
rose to power in 1985 with the promise of revamping the current economic stagnation and 
granting satellite states more autonomy. The west lauded Gorbachev for his social and economic 




The process of liberalization in the Soviet Republics weakened the central government 
and encouraged greater democracy. Nationalist movements replaced the old authoritarian 
systems. Fuelling the Republic’s political resentment, food lines and oil shortages were a 
common occurrence as world economy continued to suffer.  As the USSR became economically 
unsustainable, governance over satellite states became a lower priority. In a last ditch effort to 
appease those within the Soviet Republics, Gorbachev granted Eastern European’s more self-
determination through the Soviet Sinatra Doctrine.
50
  Gorbachev’s reforms quickly created an 
opening for countries like Hungary to establish their political independence.
51
  
By 1989, the Soviet system fell apart, leaving a weakened centralized government which 
could no longer support its various economic and political dependents.  As Wolchick points out, 
“The fused nature of political and economic power both contributed to the end of communism 
and complicated the transition away from it.”
52
 The rapid transformation of the Soviet Union led 
to an ideological and economic collapse which created a massive economic shock, leaving 
hundreds of thousands of people in crisis. Within the next two years, the Soviet Union 
disintegrated entirely.
53




bureaucracies and institutions created to direct the economy as well as the state.  In addition to 
the residual economic structures, communist statuary transformed from a symbol of power to an 
uncanny presence on the landscape. 
The transition from Stalinism occurred at different rates for Hungary and Bulgaria. For 
the Hungarians, the “communists negotiated themselves out of power without any significant 
pressure from mass public action other than the peaceful crowds that came to the streets for the 
reburial of the leaders killed after the 1956 revolt.”
54
 In Bulgaria the transition came in two parts. 
“Following a wave of public protests and increasing political pressures against the communist 
regime, on November 10, 1989, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Central Committee 
announced the resignation of Todor Zhivkov.”
55
  Following Zhivkov’s departure, there was an 
initial shift when “less repressive Communist Party leaders took over from the old guard,” and 
then those leaders were replaced yet again in future elections.
56
  Bulgaria faced several power 
shifts as different manifestations of the communist party took power until the mid-1990s.
57
  
Yugoslavia had an entirely unique transition from communism as it utilized a different 
brand of Stalinism than that imposed on Eastern Europe; furthermore, its ideological decline 
happened to “coincide with the breakup of a country.”
58
 Upon Tito’s death in 1980, the dream of 
a multicultural state began to dissolve as the “Economic problems in the 1980s, including severe 
inflation and high rates of unemployment, were compounded by pressure from the country’s 
creditors. This economic crisis prompted the richer republics, Croatia and Slovenia, to cut loose 
from the ballast of the poorer ones, including Serbia.”
59
  Slovenia and later Croatia saw secession 





Much of the political conflict in Yugoslavia stemmed from anxiety over a succession 
plan upon Tito’s passing.  In fact, Tito did not establish a successor upon this death, but he did 
insist upon a rotating Presidency that would allow each country to take leadership on a 
temporary basis.
60
  Tito believed that the exchange of power would provide checks and balances, 
but the richer, more populous countries still found ways to dictate the policy.
61
 
Rise of Democracy/Shock Therapy Capitalism 
Eastern Europe’s transition from communism to capitalism was abrupt for most states 
and therefore, the shift lent itself to economic and social uncertainty. Whereas Hungary 
transformed into a democratic state, Serbia and Croatia eventually became authoritarian states. 
Bulgaria initially fell somewhere in between these two ideological poles.
62
 Author Evgenii 
Dainov states that an extensive overhaul of many Eastern and Southeastern European 




Shock therapy is the rapid liberalization of state-controlled economies. The sudden 
withdrawal of state subsidies, the release of currency controls, and the immediate privatization of 
former publicly-owned assets creates the “shock.” In Peter Murrell’s critique of shock therapy he 
suggests that the masterminds behind the idea, David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, have only 
abstract understandings of economics and little interest in the reality of societies.
64
 He suggests, 
“Politics is paramount; economic calculus and immediate economic effects are secondary.”
65
 
Quoting Lipton and Sachs, Murrell summarizes their stance on shock therapy in Eastern Europe, 
“The economic strategy must take cognizance of the political context, which in our view argues 








The rapidly shifting economy did not affect Hungary in the same way it affected other 
countries.
68
 As mentioned before, Hungary had already taken steps toward economic reform and 
political liberalization over the last several decades so it was able to avoid the Polish “shock 
therapy” model for the most part.
69
  Instead, Hungary began moving toward private ownership 
through a social market economy where industries produced consumer goods and services. Even 
though the transition was less dramatic, the people of Hungary still experienced a rapid shift in 
living standards as capitalism brought substantial inequity to the region. Furthermore, “The 
transition in Hungary was complicated by its high debt to the West, the collapse of the Soviet 
market, and the end of cheap Soviet oil and natural gas supplies.… [Consequently,] between 
1989 and 1992, Hungary’s GDP had collapsed by 18 percent.”
70
  
But the application of shock therapy did not come as easily to most of Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe.  Dainov suggests that elections in Bulgaria revealed that some people were 
even seeking a return to their former way of life. By 1993,  
[D]ifferences between the different former “socialist countries” appeared [and] Bulgaria 
slid back into the ranks of slow developers. Reform sagged and at the end of 1994 the ex-
communist Bulgarian Sociality Party—the least reformed of its kind—returned to power 
on a platform of a further slowing down of the transition process and the  recovery of 




Bulgaria had multiple moments of “stop and go modernization,” as democratic governments 
were elected then replaced by less democratic leaders as soon as the economy slipped.
72
 In fact, 
Bulgarian politicians spent much of the ‘90s unsuccessfully staving off the discontent caused by 
inflation and unemployment. During this time, Bulgaria began privatizing business, diversifying 
its trade, and looking to countries other than Russia for resources.
73
 Politically, Bulgaria moved 




Western institutions and economic models accelerated after 1998, when a reformist coalition 
government was elected.”
74
   
Yugoslavia’s transition to capitalism took slightly longer than its Eastern European 
counterparts as it coincided with a bloody war. Croatia and Serbia embraced the politics of 
democracy over a decade’s time as they pushed out semi-authoritarian governments through the 
electoral process.
75
  In Bosnia and Kosovo, international troops and peacekeepers organized the 
first several years of democratization. Only recently have these countries declared their 
independence.
76
   
The process of transition was complex for all post-communist countries. New 
governments undermined the Communist Party claiming that the communists built a faulty 
system based on illegitimate economic and political power.
77
 Additionally, there was the new 
creation of parliamentary systems and their corresponding legal structures.
78
  Each country 
privatized their assets, opened up trade with international businesses and redistributed property 
seized during the communist years.
79
 Some of the most substantial shifts occurred in people’s 
social and economic status. Cezar Ornatowski suggests that with the abrupt transition in Eastern 
Europe, a new “history, geopolitics, culture, economics, and, inevitably, rhetoric” took part in 
constituting the concept of “the social.”
80
 Wolchick describes the new reconstruction of social 
life after the ideological transformation, stating:  
With the shift to the market, restitution of property, and the end of most state subsidies, 
visible income differentials, which were previously small, increased. Social inequality, 
poverty, and unemployment also increased substantially.  While some people were able 
to take advantage of the new opportunities available in politics, the economy, and society, 
many others were not. For the latter group, the end of communist rule entailed largely 
new hardships, particularly in the early postcommunist period when production and the 






As economic disparity influenced social inequities, newly disadvantaged groups found other 
ways of creating a profit. Specifically, organized crime and revived xenophobia increased 
substantially during this time.
82
 
Interestingly, the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and Yugoslavia produced the possibility 
for formerly communist societies to build a civil society, a place outside the purview of the state 
in which to conduct business and politics.
83
  But once economic disparities and interests 
colonized the newly produced public spaces, the character of public memory and deliberation 
was fractured by inequality. The former Stalinist states ultimately guaranteed their own inequity 
alongside their newly found “freedom” from Stalinism.  The rise of nationalism and the eventual 
emergence of the public sphere produced a new economic, political, and social identity that 
painted the inequality of the present as a necessary response to the oppression of the past.   
The international community seized upon the instability of Eastern Europe to offer loans 
and become further entwined with the rehabilitation of the market economy.  The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank became key players in the reconstruction of Eastern 
Europe along with the European Union.  All three organizations exerted significant influence on 
the policies adopted by the various governments in the region and even “on the institutional 
design of these societies and polities.”
84
  In fact, recent elections have reflected the current 
concerns many Eastern Europeans have that they simply trade one exploitative empire for the 
next. Specifically, there are “certain segments of the population in all of these countries, who ask 
whether they have traded rule by Moscow for rule by Brussels.”
85
  
Yugoslavia did not have the same relationship with the Soviet Union that Bulgaria and 
Hungary did; therefore, its transition to capitalism took on a different course. Since the 1950s, 




mostly came in the form of loans which crippled the Yugoslav economy. “By 1990, Yugoslav 
debt to Western banks had grown to $20 billion. Unemployment reached 15.9 percent and, in the 




Furthermore, the onset of “shock therapy” in the 1990s was destined to dismantle 
Yugoslavia, which had not “fully embraced the implications of liberalizing reforms that would 
lead to significant privatization of economic assets.”
87
  Shock therapy instantly increased 
economic inequality across and within republics. With the end of communism, “corruption 
flourished; the open market turned into robber capitalism; the elites found ways to control natural 
recourses and industries.”
88
  Former Yugoslavians responded to the upheaval by becoming 
apathetic to the promise of democracy. Large sections of the population stopped voting as 
democratic deliberation grinded to a halt.
89
  Deprived of former social and political institutions in 





It is important to note the shifting identities and affiliations in Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe in order to understand why overly simplistic delineations between monuments and 
counter-monuments do not adequately address the complex entanglement of public memory in 
this region.  As explained before, monuments serve as the materialization of memory and 
identity, and with the rise of nationalism, monuments built to celebrate communist ideals of 
egalitarianism and unity looked utopian and outdated.  While the communist system “provided 
leaders with unprecedented power to conduct ‘social engineering,’ none of these regimes 




each other for national rights.”
91
 No foreign power was ever able to establish loyalties to an 
internationalist ideal that could temper a nationalist identity.  But as aggressive nationalism 
served as a source of tension for the communist cause, it became the natural solution to organize 
people’s anxieties after their previous social and political institutions deteriorated.  Nationalism 
provided a powerful rhetorical discourse with economic dimensions that “recognized” which 
ethnicities and cultural practices should gain supremacy in post-communist Europe.  Ultimately, 
nationalism proved relatively beneficial in the Eastern European countries of Hungary and 
Bulgaria as protests gave way to political change, but a more divisive configuration of 
nationalism created political and social chaos in former Yugoslavia.
92
 
According to Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe adopted their unique formations of nationalism through years of foreign imperialism. 
Referring to Yugoslavia and some of its Eastern European neighbors, Anderson states: 
A very large number of these (mainly non-European) nations… took from linguistic 
European nationalism its ardent populism, and from official nationalism its Russifying 
policy orientation. This is why one sees… a genuine popular nationalist enthusiasm and a 
systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, 




The entanglement of a populist (European) and an institutionalized (Russian) nationalism created 
a unique Eastern and Southeastern European identity that demanded ideological space for “the 
people” while still demanding full allegiance to the state.  These two brands of nationalism were 
complicated further by Western political theories of self-determination in the early twentieth 
century. While both Eastern and Southeastern Europe had foreign pressures shaping their 
nationalistic identity, Eastern Europe had a Soviet national ideology imposed upon them while 
Yugoslavia imparted its version of nationalism from within. This distinction may explain why 




After the fall of communism, the West predicted that Eastern Europe would fall in line 
with the majority of Europe and look to the European Union (EU) for guidance.  Instead, Eastern 
Europe relied on a construction of nationalism that would value territorial sovereignty and 
culturally homogenous nation-states.
94
  Wolchick explains, “As with other political ideologies, 
nationalism is forward-looking in the sense that it articulates a vision about a national future; at 
the same time, nationalist strategies almost always call for turning to the past for self-
definition.”
95
  The continued allegiance to nationalism was surprising to those in the West who 
were convinced that profitability and autonomy would trump politics constructed through ethnic 
and national identity.
96
  But the idea of “nationhood” appealed strongly to populations controlled 
by foreign empires for centuries.  Emerging leaders within the former Stalinist states espoused 
rhetoric based on the “inalienable rights of groups rather than individuals.”
97
 Nationalism offered 
the people of Eastern Europe the means to embrace “democratization as the opportunity finally 




The interesting paradox was that some of the countries in the Eastern bloc had not 
actually experienced nationhood before they were quickly subsumed into the Soviet Union, 
making local leaders’ appeals to nationalism a rather transparent but nonetheless effective 
political ploy.
99
 Some have gone so far as to argue “that it was the process of democratization 
that engendered manipulative elites’ interests to employ nationalism.”
100
 Regardless of the 
motivations and political timing of nation-based identities, nationalism emerged as a popular 
ideology for political leaders and the voting public alike. 
Nationalism in Hungary took on a very different form than other places in Eastern 




‘nationhood’ across existing state borders” rather than an expansion of territory to encompass all 
similar ethnic identities or co-nationals within its borders.
101
 This kind of nationalism is known 
as trans-sovereign nationalism. Trans-sovereign nationalism does not seek any border changes, 
like most other forms of nationalism. It demands that people remain loyal to their “homeland” by 
fighting assimilation in their current country of residence.
102
 Therefore, it was the lack of 
territorial demands and a quickly emerging market economy that kept Hungary from dissolving 
into violent protest.  
In Bulgaria, the ideological transition from communism to capitalism proved as difficult 
as the economic transformation.  Bulgarian’s accepted a Russifying nationalism that never 
gained traction in Hungary. Consequently, Bulgarians maintained a strong sense of political 
loyalty to Stalinism. In fact, communist rule shaped much of Bulgaria’s understanding of 
nationalism.  In Yannis Sygkelos’s book, Nationalism from the Left, he insists that Bulgarian 
communists were able to control the narrative of Bulgarian nationalism by shaping “the 
(re)construction of the past via history-writing, state-driven education, and the single and 
obligatory history textbook. Within the political project, the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] 
put all its efforts into controlling publications and institutions related to history-writing.”
103
 With 
a single interpretation of history available, Bulgarians continued to look to the Soviet narrative 
for inspiration. Sygkelos asserts that “Soviet patriotism of the 1930s exerted a strong influence 
on history-writing under the Bulgarian communism regime… [it] favored a factological narration 
on a national basis, demanding a nationalistic interpretation and a reverence for the national past, 
a simplified linear historical trajectory and… an emphasis on individuals as national figures.”
104
 
After the fall of communism, many Bulgarians had to re-conceive their national identity. To this 




nations or Eastern Europe.  While the people of Hungary and Bulgaria used their national 
identities to forge democratic movements, the leaders of Yugoslavia were utilizing extremist 
rhetoric based on xenophobia and economic inequality to organize the distrust of their people. 
Yugoslavian Nationalism and the Yugoslav War 
The people of Yugoslavia, much like those in Eastern Europe, struggled to re-envision 
their national identity after communism could no longer quiet nationalist loyalties.   In the case 
of Yugoslavia, the disintegration of the entire Yugoslav federation coincided with the decline of 
communism.  The rapid transformation created by economic stagnation, genocides, and political 
and geographical divisions left a traumatic void of meaning that the countries of Serbia, Bosnia, 
and Croatia are still struggling to commemorate.  To understand why narrativizing the past is so 
difficult for many in the former Yugoslavia, it is necessary to trace the dissolution of its 
[Yugoslavia’s] political, social, and ideological structures.  
Yugoslavia’s relationship with nationalism transitioned from a source of identity to the 
foundation of a bloody civil war within the last decade of the twentieth century.  Tito had been 
successful in mitigating regional economic inequalities, but the reality remained that Slovenia 
and Croatia had substantially more money and resources than their neighboring countries. Once 
the transition from communism began to transform Yugoslavia in the late ‘80s, the new states—
ranging from the richer (Slovenia, Croatia) to the poor (Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia)—found 
themselves feuding not only over resources but also over formerly suppressed regional, cultural, 
and religious distinctions. Comprehending how the territory of Southeastern Europe spiraled into 
war relies on a deeper knowledge of the area’s geographical location, political corruption, 




Regardless of how people re-narrativized Tito’s legacy, Serbs felt that Tito had left them 
without political power. They were a poor country with a longstanding tradition of sacrificing 
their identity to prop up a larger state. Serbs also believed that Tito pandered to the Bosnians, 
ultimately opening the door for civil unrest.  In an act of political defiance, the Serbs tried to 
reassert their power by claiming Kosovo as their rightful Serbian land. Serbs view Kosovo as the 
cradle of Serbian civilization; therefore, it retains powerful religious and cultural meaning for 
them to this day. Additionally, Kosovo was the sight of several important historic Serbian battles 
and still maintained a large Serbian population at that time.
105
  Naimark explains, “The breakup 
of Communist Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s unleashed forces of national antagonism that 
recapitulated, in some ways, those of World War II.”
106
  
The dissolution of Communist Yugoslavia left an ideological void, which rising political 
stars Slobodan Milosevic from Serbia and Franjo Tudjman from Croatia sought to fill with 
nationalistic rhetoric.  While many assign blame solely on Milosevic, Tudjman used the moment 
to further his political aspirations as well. During the 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic began his 
ascent to power by asserting a new Serbian Nationalism. His racist ideology altered the 
constitutional balance of power as Serbs began pushing other ethnic minorities out of the Serbian 
state.
107
 Reinforcing historical ethnic tensions, Milosevic set about dismantling Tito’s legacy. 
 Ian Traynor asserts that Milosevic was “[f]ueled by a profound Serbian persecution 
complex, a deep sense of historical grievance that Serbia had sacrificed itself for Yugoslavia, 
first in 1918 and then in 1945.”
108
 Milosevic’s answer to his persecution complex was a state-
mandated ethnic cleansing campaign. Initially the violence seemed limited to the Republic of 
Srbska in the northeastern tip of Bosnia and the southwestern side of Serbia, where many 




the Serbian state did not coincide with the boundaries of the Serbian nation lent a galvanic 
quality to the very notion of Serbian nationality while, politically and ideologically, every 
Serbian national program perforce looked to changes in the international status quo.”
109
  
Milosevic’s rapid ascension to power worried other non-Serb republics such as Croatia 
and Slovenia.  Whereas most of Yugoslavia organized around a Slavic national identity, Slovenia 
and Croatia had maintained their historic ties with Hungary and the rest of Western Europe. Both 
of these resource-rich countries sought to secede from Yugoslavia quickly after the economic 
downturn of the ‘80s in hopes of aligning themselves with the Western world.  
It was clear by 1990 that nationalist “form” and socialist “content” had backfired as each 
country put their own political desires first.
110
  General Franjo Tudjman, although democratically 
elected, capitalized on nationalist sentiment to gain more power throughout his tenure.  Tudjman 
was widely known throughout Croatia as the author of a book title Absurdities of Historical 
Realities, which claimed that the Ustasas never committed genocide against the Serbs in World 
War II.
111
  Tudjman recognized the potential of creating a nationalist fervor in order to achieve 
an independent Croatian state, which had been an ongoing desire for the Republic for 
centuries.
112
  Upon seeing Slovenia gain independence from Yugoslavia on June 26, 1991, with 




With Serbia and Croatia’s new brand of nationalism gaining momentum, the 
governments of the two states began limiting political and civil rights for the different ethnic 
minorities living within each nation-state’s borders.
114
 Initially European viewed the harassment 
of minorities within Serbia and Croatia as a product of cultural and political tension, but once 




their territory through genocide and military conquest.
115
 Croatia and Serbia began building up 
their military forces, which was made more complicated due to the fact that the Yugoslav 
People’s Army or JNA consisted of soldiers pulled from all of the different nations. Croats, 
Bosniaks, and Serbs had to decide whether their loyalty was to Yugoslavia or to their nationality. 
With memories of Serbian persecution at the hands of Croat Ustasas during WWII still fresh, 
Milosevic and Tudman set the stage for a bloody conflict.  
Yugoslavia’s fate as the most violent example of communism’s implosion is interesting 
because its genocidal end had less to do with communism and more to do with a brand of 
nationalism that had previously emphasized a collective identity articulated through a single 
national culture.
116
  It was, in fact, the multicultural composition of Yugoslavia that led to such a 
convoluted and complicated civil war.  Families and friends found themselves divided by the 
political and cultural conflict. The following creates a timeline of events, ranging from the first 
occurrences of violence in the early 1990s to the Serbian persecution of the Albanians in the last 
part of the century. All of these individual wars fall under the larger category of the Yugoslav 
Wars. 
In June 1991, a series of wars erupted between the JNA and the Slovenian defense.
117
 At 
times, the Croatian army allied with the Croatian Serb militias and the JNA, but by May of 1995, 
the Croats aligned themselves solely along nationalist lines.
118
 In the third war from 1992-1995 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniaks found themselves fighting “at times consecutively and at times 
simultaneously against the Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and rebel Bosnian Muslim forces while 
the Bosnian Croat forces at times fought against, and at other times collaborated with, both 






By 1995, the international community intervened on behalf of the Bosniaks against 
Serbian aggression. The political alliances were complex to say the least. By October 1995, “the 
Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces, jointly with the Croatian army from Croatia, armed 
by the U.S. and supported by the U.S.-led NATO air-bombing campaign, defeated the Bosnian 
Serb forces (left without the support of the Yugoslav military in Serbia).”
 120
 Without a doubt, 
Bosnian Serbs enacted some of the most heinous and unthinkable crimes against humanity 
during this time period. Ethnically-motivated rape camps appeared in the Republic of Srbska. 
Serbs created the camps in order expand the population by raping and impregnating Bosniaks 
with Serbian babies.
121
 It is projected that 20,000-50,000 Bosniak women were raped and 
tortured during the Bosnian War from 1992-1995.
122
  
Sadly, Serbs were not alone in their violent aggression. Croatian and Serbs both targeted 
weaker minorities in and outside of their countries. All violence was ethnically motivated, but 
the poorer nation of Bosnia became the easiest target. Ultimately, the fighting in Bosnia ceased 
with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on December 14, 1995. The Agreement laid out 
a plan for a “loose confederation that holds the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serb republic in 
the common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dividing the Muslim-Croat federation into 
separated national cantons and allowing the Bosnian Croats to maintain a close link with the 
Croatian state.”
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 The various countries eventually agreed to the compromise, but the crippling 




The aftermath of the war produced no further clarity for those involved. Ultimately, the 
world believed that the war was a product of Serbian nationalism, which was and is true, but this 




nationalism, but they [the Croats] could not escape their own fascist history during WWII. Serbia 
had a larger population while Croatia had the financial resources. All sides used nationalism as a 
justification for rape, murder, and destruction.   
TRANSITIONAL HISTORIES AND SHIFTING RHETORICAL IDENTITIES  
Today, the people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe are still trying to make emotional 
and political sense of the events of the past century.  For the most part, Eastern Europeans have 
chosen to distance themselves from their fascist and communist pasts, but the rhetoric of 
victimization still looms large.  Museums and monuments all over Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans recount the tragedies faced in the twentieth century.  The Hungarian “House of Terror” 
painfully points out that the people of Budapest are both victims and victimizers.
125
  Bulgarians 
have struggled as well, rhetorically, to frame their past for the sake of their current narrative.  
Ties to communism still forge an important sense of identity for a country struggling to survive 
during the current economic recession.  Finally, the citizens of the former Yugoslavia have a 
distinct, yet equally complex, relationship to their post-communist identity as well.  Serbs, 
Croats, and Bosnians see the tragedy of war as intrinsically linked to the end of the communist 
state.  For those still struggling to make sense of the past, nostalgically embracing their 
communist chapter means not having to yet face the reality of war. 
And so Hungarian, Bulgarians, Serbians, Croats, and Bosnians continue to negotiate their 
“post” identities by redefining and delegitimizing the past. In the most extreme example, 
Yugoslavians had to rebuild their lives around religious and national allegiances after their entire 
Slavic communist identity disintegrated. The rhetorical position of being “post-” communist 




society in contrast to it.  The language and values of communism, a worldview, which had been 
ingrained since birth for many, was now deemed valueless.  
Noemi Marin describes the significant rhetorical shift brought on by the transformation of 
post-communist Europe. She suggests that while some history is too painful to revisit, other 
histories fall victim to ideological transitions that make certain identities and even vocabularies a 
thing of the past.   Marin explains this shift stating; 
“1989” collapses rhetorically communist discourse as a historical discourse into an 
unsettled discursive formation…Thus the demise of communist rhetoric re-positions 
public discourse in the interrogative, asking questions on political practices and 
vocabularies of “past” or “post,” on re-invention of arguments from history and collective 




In response to their re-positioned rhetorical identity, the people of Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe sought out ways to represent a new value system that could vilify communism and 
promote democratic institutions as the new voice of the people.  Thus, commemoration became 
and remains an important mediator of the past, “post,” and present. 
Trying to recall identities and ideologies in the post or past tense has been a traditional 
focus of commemorative works. Monuments are charged with the unusual task of (re)presenting 
the various voices (of the peoples’ past) that society may no longer value. The collapse of 
historical and political narratives—as well as whole societies—speaks to the productive outlet of 
ironic monumental disruptions as a way to confront this ideological anxiety.  The abrupt shift of 
worldviews in Eastern and Southeastern Europe may also explain the choice to mock memory 
rather than consecrate it. Monuments in this part of the world appear to be offering a rhetorical 
outlet for those still hoping to understand how present struggles are predicated upon their 




Recognizing the nature of transition with its linguistic, political, and economic narratives 
in flux, it is not surprising that formerly communist countries are still struggling to 
commemorate their histories while untangling themselves from the abrupt ideological void of the 
past.  This chapter provided a historical and rhetorical overview of the rise and fall of 
communism, the emergence of nationalism, the Yugoslav War, and the introduction of shock 
therapy capitalism.  A rhetorical perspective is of particular value for this project as it helps the 
reader understand the need for complex memorial responses especially when a history is 
catastrophically fractured.  Within the complex ideological space of Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe, sectarianism needs to be represented in public discourse as much as narratives of justice 
or unity, which explains the utility of ironic monumental disruptions.        
To explore the political and rhetorical possibilities of ironic monumental disruptions, the 
next chapter turns to the methodological and theoretical foundation of this project. I pay specific 
attention to the current conceptualization of counter-monuments and how the literature needs to 
develop a dynamic rhetorical construct for challenging “traditional” and transitional institutions 
of power. 
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Chapter Three:  Ironic Monumental Disruptions:  
Methodology and Theory  
While the countries of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Bosnia still maintain a strong presence of 
what some scholars refer to as “traditional” monuments (i.e., monuments that were built by the 
state and tend to represent their version of the historical event), the people of Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe appear to be challenging the foundations of monumentality and memory by 
producing—what I have termed—ironic monumental disruptions.  This chapter discusses data 
collection for the three case studies before explaining what the concept of the ironic monumental 
disruption is and how it is distinct from the counter-monument.   Additionally, the chapter also 
examines how the category of the counter-monument has falsely pitted itself against monument 
studies, ultimately limiting its conceptual and political potential.  Again, I assert that the 
“counter” category is not without value but public memory and monumentality scholars must 
challenge the field to more fully explain contextual, historical, political, and material 
commemorative practices.  As I have been arguing, irony has the potential to engage (and 
dismantle) larger ideological, historical, and political contexts as they shape audiences and 
artifacts.  Additionally, studying the ironic repositioning of monuments provides a more 
conceptually sound rhetorical and historical analysis than the present scholarship on counter-
monuments.   
As mentioned in the introduction, proponents of the counter-monument category place 
too much emphasis on the artifact itself when conceptualizing its critical potential.  In theory, 
counter-monuments defy typical means of representation by refusing the sacred label bestowed 
upon them and “countering” the dominant political and social values of the time.  Many who rely 




commemorative objects develop within varied contexts and respond to and are engaged by 
multiple audiences making their meaning time and place contingent.  In other words, the idea of 
counter-monuments is not historically specific enough to provide insight into the vast array of 
social, political, and ideological issues which accompany commemorative works, and instead of 
trying to identify a large category with universal features; monumentality scholars need to 
examine the on-the-ground practices of creators, disruptors, and their former and current 
contexts.    
Returning to the recent examples of ironic monumental disruptions, Rocky, along with 
his comrades Bruce Lee, Batman, the United Nations’ inedible “Canned Beef,” just to name a 
few, all defy traditional strategies of commemoration and instead materially serve as symbolic 
placeholders or comical protests of a history still under revision.
1
  All of the monuments 
encourage ironic engagement by utilizing the audience’s expectations of traditional 
commemorative strategies but reversing the implied symbolism of the space.  Ironic monuments 
create distinctly different spaces than counter-monuments because ironic monuments need 
political, historical, and ideological contexts to be understood.  Furthermore, ironic monuments 
encourage the audience to question which (and whose) reality is depicted. 
In order to attain more rhetorical specificity and offer more insight into shifting political 
and ideological investments, I have used the literature in this chapter to argue for the concept of 
the ironic monumental disruption as it applies to the three case studies in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
the former Yugoslavia.  This new terminology is particularly valuable because it engages local 
conflicts and nostalgic representations while still allowing for conceptual fluidity during times of 
social and ideological transition.  The idea of investigating local politics and commemorative 




but for now, the disruption is a useful tool for negotiating frames because it does not demand that 
all symbolism be undermined or permanently altered; rather, it offers a way to address 
transitional discourses as they intervene and unsettle formations of public memory.  Specifically, 
the “disruption” materially changes the political space of public memory by confronting it and 
recognizing its own impermanence.  In addition to the disruption, irony agitates discourses and 
discursive frames by indirectly referencing other ideas and creating additional political space.  
This chapter revisits both disruptions and irony as important rhetorical strategies in the case of 
transitional histories.   
Many of the ironic monumental disruptions (e.g., Rocky, Bruce Lee, and Captain 
America) occurred in the last decade.  The monuments serve as unique placeholders while the 
various countries in which they reside continue to work through political and ideological 
transitions.  As evidenced by the debate surrounding the construction of the monument in 
Belgrade, Serbia, sometimes literal symbols cannot accommodate all of the invested parties.  
Ironic monumental disruptions, on the other hand, function more like a symbolic placeholder.  
The ironic monument is less concerned with literal representation and more concerned with 
creating space for deliberation.  Irony can even make nostalgic spaces more deliberative without 
simply reinforcing or contradicting former values and symbols.  The aforementioned monuments 
of post-communist Europe depict the anxieties societies face when trying to represent a 
(capitalist) present divorced from a (communist) past.  In order to further develop the theoretical 
framing for this project, the next section begins with an overview of the methodology before 







Foundationally, monuments of all forms are on some level material nodes of identity and 
memory; therefore, how they are ironically depicted and subsequently destroyed speaks to the 
local and sometimes even national psyche.  The interplay between how these monuments are 
constructed and destroyed becomes an intriguing snapshot of the current public sentiment.  As is 
typical of a case study, I began by observing what I believed to be an unexplained phenomenon--
the “ironic” monuments appearing in Eastern Europe.  Subsequently, through research and 
observation I noted that this did not appear to be an isolated occurrence.  In order to evaluate the 
discourses surrounding these monuments, I conducted interviews, internet research, textual 
analysis and on-site observations to acquire a deeper understanding of how these monuments 
influence local and national bodies on political and psychological levels.   
In 2008, I travelled to former Yugoslavia to see a monument dedicated to Rocky Balboa 
in Zitiste, Serbia.  It was an election year, and the citizens of Serbia had to decide between 
aligning their political interests with or in opposition to the West.  One leader promised 
continued ties with Europe while the other rose to prominence on an anti-Western platform 
which promoted a more aggressive nationalism.  Ultimately, the pro-Western leader won by a 
narrow margin, but not before the entire country of Serbia momentarily reverted back to some of 
their old hostilities. Locals watched Western journalists suspiciously.  Serbs were careful to 
avoid certain political rallies taking place in abandoned buildings in the city.  Citizens were 
paranoid, and outsiders were not particularly welcome.  
While these complicated political dynamics were unfolding, the Italian Stallion sat 
innocuously in the middle of a village square.  In many ways, Zitiste appeared to be the village 




Powerful political memories of the past surrounded by weeds lined the town square.  The 
monument to Rocky stood next to a granite maternal figure from the communist era and another 
monument celebrating Serbian pride.  Even more intriguing was that this ideologically contested 
space in Zitiste seemed to fit into a larger trend of monument-building throughout Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe.   
In order to better understand the monumental trend and its representation possibilities, I 
evaluated the three selected commemorative sites in their past and present historical, political, 
ideological and artistic contexts.  I began my research by reading news coverage of the 
controversies surrounding each commemorative site.  I reviewed regional, national, and 
international newspaper articles and press releases discussing the monuments.  Then, I 
researched commemorative controversies occurring in the same city or region that might shed 
light onto larger concerns of public memory.  Next, I created timelines for all of the sites tracing 
each country or region’s history from pre-World War II until the present day (Yugoslavia was 
originally traced back to the Ottoman empire in order to understand the recent development of 
Southern Slavic identity).  Within this search I paid close attention to the formation and 
dissolution of national identities, social movements, and political and ideological transitions.  I 
researched the websites promoting the monuments (when available) and observed the 
commemorative spaces.  If there was a guided tour of the site, I participated in it.  If there was a 
tour book to accompany the monument, I analyzed it. I conducted interviews with artists and 
intellectuals directly involved in the production of these monuments.
2
  Additionally, I 
interviewed and corresponded with people living in the same communities as these monuments.  
Most of these interviewees had no say in who got commemorated and how they were displayed.
3
  




commemorative politics on the local level and how they helped or harmed citizens in the sense-
making process.   
I selected the three commemorative sites because they all utilized ironic representational 
strategies but produced distinctly different forms of public deliberation.  All three served as 
unique configurations of irony, nostalgia, and politics.  The decision to examine the artifacts as 
both nostalgic and ironic objects existing within comic or tragic frames emerged from the 
research and interviewing process.  I researched local and national discourses about communism 
and communism versus capitalism to analyze how citizens of Eastern Europe and the Balkans 
talked about their past and present conditions.  It became apparent through this research that 
nostalgia was largely the byproduct of a contemporary struggle to come to terms with the 
inequality of capitalism.  But nostalgia also emerged as a way to bridge the gap between the loss 
of a failed ideal and the harsh reality of war and economic inequality.  Communist nostalgia 
encountered a major exception in Hungary, which was positioned to accept capitalism before 
communism (Stalinism) began to falter.  While Hungarians rarely mention nostalgia for the “old 
days” it became a recurring theme in Bulgaria and Bosnia.  Hungarians were quick to dismiss 
their communist past as decidedly “tragic,” and expressed a desire to reinvent themselves with 
capitalism. Bulgarians and Bosnians, on the other hand, seemed to have mixed allegiances to 
both capitalism and communism.  The strange amalgamation of the two ideologies suggested that 
the people of these countries recognized the irony of resenting and longing for the promise of 
both communism and capitalism.  In many ways, the ironic performances in Bulgaria and Bosnia 
illustrate more awareness of a comic frame and its deliberative potential.   
Once I established the nostalgic framing of the commemorative spaces, the ironic 




monumental disruptions, again, stemmed from the fact that most of my interviewees suggested 
that the unintentional or unspoken meanings behind the monuments (and/or their desecration) 
interested the locals more than their original symbolism.
4
  Irony was demonstrated in the way 
objects were represented (Bruce Lee), treated (Western comic book heroes), and discussed 
(Memento Park), but it was the interplay of irony and nostalgia that created the most engaging 
spaces.  As a slight side note, it also became clearer through the tours and post-communist 
literature that irony was a frequently used comic corrective during the Stalinist days.  Thus, I 
read all of the commemorative sites as a dialogue between irony, nostalgia and their 
corresponding comic frames. 
 While the construction of most of the case study monuments was a political act beyond 
the control of the local community, the destruction of the monuments expresses a powerful 
public sentiment of anger, frustration, and anxiety.  My goal is to better understand how 
engaging ironic monuments transforms a nostalgic place into a deliberative space—turning the 
public from passive participant into active agent.  The people of Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe are anxious about their current economic conditions and are disappointed that capitalism 
has not brought them more wealth and autonomy.  The ironic monumental disruption serves as 
the materialization of their mixed loyalties just as its destruction reveals the complex anxieties of 
mixed allegiances. 
Building on this methodology and its emerging themes, the next section demonstrates 
how the conceptualization of counter-monuments cannot presently account for many of the 
discursive relationships uncovered through additional contextualization.  As such, the following 
section explores the representational limits of counter-monuments and proposes a rhetorical 




COUNTER-MONUMENTS: POLITICAL POTENTIAL AND CONCEPTUAL 
PROBLEMS  
The goal for this project is not to replace the concept of the counter-monument with the 
ironic monumental disruption.  The concepts are not synonymous.  Irony cannot account for all 
critical commemorative practices, but the incorporation and application of the ironic monumental 
disruption is important as it demonstrates that more conceptual focus is possible within the field. 
There needs to be a more uniform understanding of what counter-monuments are and what they 
do in order for the conception to be useful and applicable. Unless counter-monuments can be 
more uniformly understood, they provide a framework that allows for the inclusion of most 




 While many scholars have recently aligned themselves with counter-monument politics, 
scholar James Young, as referenced in the first chapter, has relied on this terminology to define 
his work almost exclusively.  Currently, Young is a popular and influential proponent of counter-
monument politics.  Many public memory and monumentality scholars cite him as the originator 
of the counter-monument concept.  Young’s article, “The Counter-Monument: Memory against 
Itself in Germany Today,” and his book At Memory’s Edge remain some of the most frequently 
quoted sources for counter-monuments.   
Young is skeptical of the monumental form and believes that it allows for historical 
revisionism.
6
  In discussing counter-monuments, Young asserts that, “By defining itself in 
opposition to the traditional memorial’s task, the counter monument illustrates concisely the 
possibilities and limitations of all memorials everywhere.  In this way, it functions as a valuable 






For Young, monuments try to supplant public responsibility for historical crimes by promoting a 
one dimensional and largely uncomplicated representation of the past.
8
  While Young’s 
criticisms are important and echoed by Pierre Nora and Paul Ricoeur in some respects, not all 
monuments enact the same kind of meaning and influence on the landscape.
9
  
According to Young, counter-monuments are “brazen, painfully self-conscious memorial 
spaces conceived to challenge the very premises of their being.”
10
  Young sees counter-
monuments as artifacts that encourage “participation rather than mere consumption,” while 
providing space for alternative voices.
11
  Young’s research hinges on his claim that counter-
monuments challenge the idea of sacred places and institutionalized memory.  One such counter-
monument is an anti-fascist memorial in Hamburg, Germany, which invites people to write on it 
as it slowly sinks into the ground.  Young concludes that once the monument finally becomes 
level with the landscape the “burden of memory” returns to the visitor.
12
 
Young’s interpretation, while thought-provoking, leaves many questions unanswered, the 
most pressing one being, How are counter-monuments categorically different from other 
monumental forms?  In Young’s current definition, “participation,” and “spaces that change over 
time and seek to stimulate memory” appear to be definitional necessities for counter-monuments, 
but almost all commemorative spaces encourage some kind of audience participation or 
reflection.  Additionally, the “task” of most monuments is to create a space for publics to reflect.  
If the counter-monument is not encouraging public deliberation, then what is its purpose? 
Young never adequately explains why something is or is not a counter-monument; he 
offers very few guidelines for identifying counter-monuments; and finally, by capitalizing on the 
“counter” distinction, he reinforces the idea that the object itself—not the people interacting with 




appears to slip at times.  The counter-monument sometimes critiques itself, at other times it 
critiques monument-building in general, and yet at other instances, it gives voice to 
counterpublics.  It is unclear when the counter-monument distinction applies and how counter-
monument politics create enduring political space for the people they represent.   
And while counter-monuments do create an intriguing new lens by which to examine 
commemorative practices, the relatively recent development of the field may explain its lack of 
conceptual clarity.
13
  Arguing that some monuments have more critical politics than others is not 
without value, but it is not presently clear when a commemorative artifact qualifies as a counter-
monument or does not.  A lack of conceptual focus further complicates the “counter” category by 
making it difficult to position it in opposition to other monuments.
14
  
Currently, scholars of counter-monumentality are taking advantage of a lack of 
conceptual focus in the field.  Rather than explaining specific monuments in terms of their form 
and function, scholars are labeling all unique commemorative phenomenon as counter-
monuments.  The problem with allowing a category to become a default for outliers is that it [the 
category] will potentially conflate or ignore inconvenient political, historical, and rhetorical 
anomalies.  There are seemingly few parameters on what does and does not constitute a counter-
monument and where exactly it fits within the research of monumentality, public memory, and 
public sphere studies.  For now, many scholars argue that counter-monuments are better suited to 
challenge authority and promote democracy by being “abstract rather than literal forms [that] 
accommodate ambivalence, multiplicity, and change.”
15
  The definition creates a few boundaries, 
but mostly invites more questions. 
To return to the very definition of “countering,”—to counter is “to act in opposition to” 
or “responding to something of the same kind, especially in opposition.”
16




theoretical framing of counter-monuments does not actually demand that “counter” monuments 
oppose something of the same kind.  While Victoria Gallagher and Bernard Armada’s pieces on 
The Fist and the National Civil Rights Museum, respectively, do address monuments or 
memorials directly countering other monuments or sites of memory, but many of the scholars 
who employ the language of counter-monuments do not have such a strict interpretation.
17
  For 
instance, Elizabeth Strakosh writes in “The Political Complexities of ‘New Memorials,’” that 
counter-monuments are abstract, interactive, and anti-pedagogical.
18
  But what Strakosh and 
others overlook is that any monument, counter or otherwise, can embody abstract or interactive 
elements and challenge classical notions of art or institutions of power. 
The paradox of the counter-monument categorization is that in order to offer a counter-
index or refutation, counter-monuments must first fix the “traditional” monuments’ meaning 
before they can respond in kind.  The problem with the “counter” distinction exists on two levels.  
One, monuments are not intended to be fixed symbols and two, counter-monuments only “fix” 
themselves further by this binary logic making them less well suited to address diverse historical 
and political experiences.  
The fixing of a memory “place” leads to conceptual reductionism that both monuments 
and counter-monuments need to avoid. It is important to offer a more fluid conceptualization of 
monumentality that recognizes the dynamic relationships between public memory, politics, and 
commemoration.  Robert Asen warns against producing a binary between the entity (the public) 
and its opposition (the counter-public).  He states, “Directly seeking the counter in 
counterpublics may itself lead to reductionism insofar as the effort produces a binary opposition 
of counter and public.… This danger may be averted by emphasizing manifold relations among 
multiple publics, some of which may articulate an explicitly counter status.”
19




are well-founded as scholars within counter-monument studies continue to force the label of 
“counter” monuments and memory on their commemorative markers.  Cautioning against the 
current push to generalize a “counter” status, Asen states:  
Reductionism is likely to stem from explicitly fixing or implicitly relying on persons, 
places, or topics as necessary markers of counterpublic status.  That is, though 
counterpublics emerge in constellations of these three elements, reductionism manifests if 
theorists and critics regard a particular person, place, or topic as necessarily defining the 
limits of a counterpublic.  All three potential reductions portend unfortunate 




Asen’s remarks are particularly vital here, as a monuments’ ability to respond to their various 
audiences depends upon an open, multiple interpretation and exchange of meaning.  Constructing 
an oppositional category serves to further define and confine all monuments.  The scholars of 
counter-monument studies do a disservice to all of monumentality studies by claiming such static 
positions of memory.   
 Beyond reductionism, it is still not clear what the “traditional memorial’s task” is and 
how it differentiates itself from the counter-monument.  For example, Young seems to view the 
interaction between “time” and physical “material” as one of the obstacles that traditional 
monuments cannot overcome without further reifying their message.  In his article, “Counter 
Monuments: Memory against Itself in Germany Today,” Young attempts to formulate the 
categorical differences between monuments and counter-monuments using an example from 
Hamburg, Germany.  He states:  
The material of a conventional monument is normally chosen to withstand the physical 
ravages of time, the assumption being that its memory will remain as everlasting as its 
form… the actual consequence of a memorial’s unyielding fixedness in space is also its 
death over time: a fixed image created in one time and carried over into a new time 
suddenly appears archaic, strange, or irrelevant altogether.  For in its linear progression, 
time drags old meaning into new contexts, estranging a monument’s memory from both 
past and present, holding past truths up to ridicule in present moments.  Time mocks the 
rigidity of monuments, the presumptuous claim that in its materiality, a monument can be 






Young suggests that because traditional monuments try to control future interpretations by 
solidifying past ones, they cannot ethically represent the present.  Young argues that lasting 
materials used to make “traditional” monuments reveal that they are static emblems of elite 
power.  For Young, counter-monuments challenge the idea that stone “guarantees the 
permanence of a memorial idea attached to it.”
22
  But a monument's materials cannot account for 
how others will physically respond to its memory.  Additionally, his statements also suggest that 
monuments cannot challenge notions of the sacred and they cannot take on new meanings in 
future contexts.  For Young the counter-monument evolves or changes with time and “In its 
conceptual self-destruction, the counter monument refers not only to its own physical 
impermanence, but also to the contingency of all meaning and memory—especially that 
embodied in a form that insists on its eternal fixity.”
23
  With his line of thinking, traditional 
monuments, as they are constrained by obligations of time, can only force messages onto their 
audiences, rather than allowing the audience to understand the monument uniquely during its 
time and space. 
But stone alone does not guarantee how others will interpret or understand a monument's 
message.  Young’s claim also appears to suggest that permanence, not reconciliation, agitation, 
or even irresolution is the aim of monument-building.  Monuments are frequently defaced and 
destroyed in the hopes of protesting a particular message, but this kind of adjustment of public 
memory does not fit into Young’s current categorization.  Young does not fully acknowledge 
that defacing a monument can simultaneously take away or further instill an object’s supposed 
authority.  There are numerous ways to take away a place’s untarnished significance, but 
desecrating a place does not necessarily make it a counter-monument. And the presence of a 




Counter-monument scholars see “traditional” monuments’ unchanging message and 
heightened status as emblematic of their institutionalized power, but a significant number of 
monuments seek to challenge historical myths or institutions of power without relying on the 
politics of counter-status.
24
  Monuments such as the Ludlow Memorial represent a massacre that 
pitted labor against big business.  In fact, monuments frequently construct a tension between the 
elites and the masses.  They can call temporality into question: being first versus coming next.  
They can even interrogate the status quo: honoring the past versus undermining it.  Counter-
monuments claim to acknowledge more diverse voices not readily represented in traditional, 
state-sponsored monuments, but this distinction neglects to recognize that monuments do not 
only reflect the ideology of the powerful.  They have the ability to mark a multitude of 




Steven Johnston also asserts that public memory studies needs the category of counter-
monuments to operate as a political tool that introduces dissenting voices into self-aggrandizing 
sacred spaces.  Johnston argues that the contestation of meaning is actually the cornerstone of 
democratic society.
26
  He suggests that sacred space runs counter to the ideals of democracy 
because it honors “the eternal and unchanging, symbolic of truth and fidelity, eliciting reverence 
and awe, demanding deference and devotion, committed to unity and consensus.”
27
  Johnston’s 
definition falters as he confuses a monument’s “placeness”—as in a place with some symbolic 
value or a place given symbolic value by the very act of erecting a monument there—with the 
problematic notion of sacred space.  The largest theoretical issue Johnston faces is that sacred 




Finally, proponents of the counter-monument category claim that such monuments 
question the relationship between the art object and the viewing public.  Young states that a 
counter-monument “undermines it own authority by inviting and then incorporating the authority 
of a passersby.”
28
  But Young creates his own conceptual contradiction.  In the same article, 
Young paraphrases one of the Hamburg monument’s creators, asserting that “all such 
[monument] sites depend for their memory on the passerby who initiates it—however 
involuntarily… sites alone cannot remember, that is the projection of memory by visitors into a 
space that makes it a memorial.”
29
  In other words, the artist did not create his piece with the 
intention of it claiming the passerby’s authority; rather, the monument becomes animated by the 
passerby’s presence.  Even excusing the misappropriation of the artist’s intent, are not all 
monuments constructed with the goal of engaging in dialogue with the passerby?  Are not all 
monuments mediated through their interactions with people?  Young’s artist seems to be 
suggesting that counter-monuments—like all monuments—cannot alone remember; their 
meaning is dependent upon people engaging with them. Regardless of material, time, and intent, 
all monuments rely on some kind of human engagement in order to communicate their message.  
At times, Young advocates for the existence of counter-monuments because they “return the 
burden of memory” by not being constructed out of the same lasting materials as “traditional” 
monuments.  
However, it is still unclear how a counter-monument is able to invite another’s authority 
or return the burden of memory any more or less than any other monument. Would not all 
monuments invite the “authority” of any onlooker’s gaze?  As an object of art and memory, do 
not all monuments seek to give some authority to the viewing public who must decipher their 




political works of art that create irresolution and take on the burden of on-going and frequently 
contested memory?  Furthermore, are not all monuments largely reliant on their audiences for 
continued meaning?  Rather than reducing an artifact’s meaning down to its materials and intent, 
the next section explores how the conceptual framing and disruption of irony speaks to artifact 
and audience, history and political context. Especially in the case of nostalgic representations, 
irony creates a new ethic of commemoration that engages the public with the politics of art and 
the politics of place.  
POLITICALLY ENGAGING COMMEMORATIVE (ART)IFACTS THROUGH IRONY: 
ACCOUNTING FOR MATERIALIZED NOSTALGIA 
 Scholars of counter-monumentality have gotten away from their rhetorical roots in their 
insistence upon a “counter” category.  Specifically, all monuments are the products of their 
material, political, and historical contexts.  This section returns to the political foundations of 
monumentality in order to emphasize how monuments function in their various contexts and 
position themselves in dialogue with their audiences.  After establishing political and rhetorical 
foundations, the literature turns to the potential of irony to interrogate these foundations. 
It is valuable to note that Young’s conceptualization of counter-monuments does raise 
important question about every monument’s critical potential.  As scholars continue to use the 
concept of the counter-monument to explain atypical commemorative practices, they have 
written extensively on an artifact’s potential to defy static forms, challenge authority, and change 
its relationship to its viewing public.  While it is a little simplistic to assume that only designated 
counter-monuments can perform said critiques, the idea that monuments can destroy, mock, and 




Currently, the literature regarding counter-monuments seems to show that these artifacts 
can critique themselves, which is an intriguing rhetorical tool until the monument is gone (e.g., 
the Hamburg monument that slowly sinks into the ground).  Once it is gone, then all the viewer 
has left is a memory, reflecting upon an idea’s absence, in its absence.  Young needs to focus his 
critique and study the unique rhetorical contexts of his commemorative sites. Communication 
scholars Danielle McGeough and Catherine Palczewski attempt to add more contextualization to 
the counter-category by insisting that “actual or symbolic destruction (e.g., toppling Saddam 
Hussein’s Fardus Square statue or Estonia’s relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn) of 
monuments” should be included in the research as well.
30
  While the act of vandalism itself 
appears to be more accurately described as a mode of confrontation (not a counter-monument), 
the newly reappropriated monument should be recognized as a transitional art object or political 
disruption of space when interpreting the monument’s critical potential.   
Young and other counter-monument scholar’s erroneously removed the art from politics 
and the politics from art that when they conceptualize counter-monuments by their materials.  
Political theorist Jacques Ranciere states, “Art promises by virtue of the resistance which 
constitutes it.”
31
  Monuments serve as material reminders that artistic and political 
representations cannot be easily divorced.  Ranciere describes this exchange, “If art is to be art, it 
must be politics; if it is to be politics, the monument must speak twice-over: as a résumé of 
human effort and as a résumé of the power of the inhuman separating the human from itself.”
32
  
As such, monuments as art objects cannot simply be divorced from the humanity which animates 
them.  Ranciere unequivocally states: 
The artwork is not only “in view of” a people.  This people is part of the very condition 
of art’s “resistance,” that is to say the union of contraries which defines it at once as an 
embrace of fighters set in a monument and as a monument in a process of becoming and 









Thus, monuments create a place where people gather to make sense of their world.  Whether the 
artifact is in its original critical form or has been transformed in order to articulate a new 
perspective, both need to be studied in order to understand how the monument(s) shape the 
viewing public and vice versa.   
As a work of art with highly visible politics, monuments can continue to shape various 
publics by creating continued irresolution.  In fact, Young states that “[t]he surest engagement 
with memory lies in its perpetual irresolution,” 
34
  But few monuments, whether they are 
categorized as “counter” or “traditional,” seek to shut down public deliberation and dialogue.  
Monuments structure the affective experience of memory; thus, they can embrace on-going 
participation, irresolution, agitation, and even confrontation. Ranciere explains, 
The artist works “in view of” an end that this work cannot achieve by itself: he or she 
works “in view of” a “still-missing” people.  But, in the second place, this work itself is 
presented as a bridging of the gap that separates the artistic embrace from the 
revolutionary embrace.  Vibrations and embraces assume a consistent figure in the 
solidity of the monument.  And the solidity of the monument is simultaneously a 
language, the movement of a transmission: the monument “confides to the ear of the 
future” the persistent sensations that embody suffering and struggle.  These sensations are 





In line with Ranciere’s critique, theorist Gilles Deleuze argues that monuments are not, in fact, 
simple emblems of the past: “A monument is not the commemoration, or the celebration, of 
something that has happened; instead it confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations 
embodying an event: the constantly renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created 
protestations, their constantly resumed struggle.”
 36
  Deleuze sees a monument’s representational 
power coming from its “constant process of becoming” and the ongoing contestation it creates.
37
  




time, depending on their audience and the current state of politics.
38
  Monuments, as 
demonstrated to varying degrees in the three case studies, have the potential to create fluid 
memories without losing sight of the people who engage them.    
Returning to the three case studies in Eastern Europe, many communication scholars 
might categorize these materialized ironic “responses” as counter-monuments, but the 
conceptualization of counter-monuments cannot account for the fact that these monuments are 
constructed of lasting materials, are intended for mass consumption, and have been routinely 
desecrated or disavowed.  The concept of the ironic monumental disruption reveals why the 
category of the counter-monument is limiting.  The introduction of irony demonstrates the 
benefits of creating a more fluid and performative conceptualization that allows for a more 
dynamic intervention of memorial meaning.  Irony does not rely on a specific kind of material to 
perform a critique; rather, it engages expectations of art, politics, and their representational ethics 
to create a multifaceted message.  In hopes of creating a tool to expand the representational and 
political possibilities of monuments rather than constrict them, this project proposes that we 
adopt the concept of the ironic monumental disruption to understand transitional ideologies and 
nostalgic commemorative practices.  The “disruption” allows those within monument studies to 
articulate specific political and rhetorical practices without getting lost in the broad 
conceptualization of “countering.”  The following section breaks down the concept of the ironic 
monumental disruption into its various parts in order to understand how it engages artifacts and 






IRONIC MONUMENTAL DISRUPTIONS: A CONCEPTUAL BREAKDOWN (OF 
TERMINOLOGY)   
Irony is everywhere in Post-Soviet Europe.  Whether it was the little subversive jokes 
told during the communist era, or the communist themed restaurants in the capitalist era.  In 
Hungary, freedom of expression is greatly encouraged unless a person wants to express an 
uncritical view of communism.  The following section briefly reviews the comic or tragic 
framing of communism and capitalism in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The framing 
ultimately determines what mode of ironic expression is most valuable as it creates the most 
open form of deliberation.  With the frames established, this section turns to the concept of the 
ironic monumental disruption.  The term is broken down in order to produce more rhetorical 
clarity about its conceptualization and application.   
The disparate frames and corresponding monuments dedicated to communism in Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe reflect the distinct political ideologies and ironies taken up in those two 
regions.  In Eastern Europe, communism is frequently conflated with Stalinism and made into a 
symbol of evil.  The public perception that communism is evil and must be purged is carefully 
demonstrated through a tragic frame.  For instance, Hungarians commemorate their communist 
chapter with museum attractions and tours all dedicated to its violence and terror.  But not all 
Eastern Europeans necessarily look back on their past with resentment.  Some Bulgarians 
recount the past quite fondly—even nostalgically—having recently built a museum to one of 
their former communist dictators.  Additionally, Yugoslavians see the war of the 1990s, not 
communism, as their traumatic and largely unresolved historical chapter.  It is not unusual to 




As referenced earlier, waxing nostalgic about communism has become its own source of 
revenue as Eastern Europeans cash in on communism in the form of clothes and kitsch.  The 
entanglement of communist nostalgia and capitalist consumption has created a comic frame 
particularly susceptible to ironic critiques.  And within the tragic and comic framing described 
above, people are finding new ways to confront the past and question the present.  The ironic 
monumental disruption creates space for public deliberation within these respective frames.  But 
as discussed previously, some frames (comic) invite interrogation while others (tragic) preclude 
it.  The next section defines the amalgamation of disruptions, irony, and deliberation as they 
constitute the concept of the ironic monumental disruption. 
Disruptions 
 Breaking down the concept of the ironic monumental disruption into its various parts 
helps situate its political potential within the studies of monumentality and public memory.  A 
“disruption” by definition is a rupture or interruption; it is the act of throwing something into 
confusion or disorder.
39
  Disruptions create the momentary intervention of memory that Young 
and others seek without falling into a false dichotomy constructed against monuments.  Whereas 
counter-monuments call upon the fixing of an idea in order to refute it, the concept of the ironic 
monumental disruption does not fall prey to the same rhetorical traps.  Disruptions are not static 
and make no larger claims to lasting in perpetuity. Disruptions play with the idea of a linear 
memory by calling chronological sequence into question.  A disruption does not stand as an 
external critique of a monument; it enacts said critique on the monument and its memory. 
In many ways the ironic monumental disruption mimics the strategy of detournement.
40
  
Detournement is a symbolic act that parodies or plays with the imagery of capitalism by 




“Censorship and Iconoclasm—Unsettling Monuments,” John Peffer describes detournement as 
an act of “witty erasure or intrusive addition.”
41
  It is worth noting that detournement plays with 
settled formations of meaning and typically incorporates an ironic element, but the two ideas 
have a major theoretical departure in their intent.  Guy Debord explains, “The two fundamental 
laws of detournement are the loss of importance of each detourned autonomous element—which 
may go so far as to lose its original sense completely—and at the same time the organization of 
another meaningful ensemble that confers on each element its new score and effect.”
42
  
Detournement seeks to make the symbolism of its target meaningless, and while 
disruptions can have that effect, disruptions are not necessarily seeking the replacement of old 
meaning; rather, disruptions are politically powerful precisely because they conjure up old 
narratives in juxtaposition to current discourses.  Both the past and present are equally vital to 
the monument’s political meaning, and irony is a mediator between the two poles.  Ironic 
monumental disruptions seek to empower the larger public, not simply dismiss the symbolism of 
the past. 
Irony 
While the disruption creates space for reflection and critique, irony creates a 
confrontational engagement between the ideas presented and the subsequent interpretation of 
them.  Ultimately, the space of translation between articulation and representation creates an 
engaging political space for those choosing to interpret it.  Irony subtly reveals a political 
disconnect in public memory by conveying a message in contrast to its explicit symbolism.
43
  It 
becomes clearer through the case studies how important irony is to understanding the dissonance 
created by the gap between the lived experience and the desire to make sense (and ideally forget) 
the painful past.
44




affective response needed to encourage a critical engagement.  It is precisely in the space of 
mediation and risky interpretation that irony creates valuable openings for political dialogue.  
Author Lawrence Bogard speaks to the interpretative power of irony, stating, “An audience 
member may ‘get’ the irony as intended, may not even understand it to be ironic, or may receive 
it in an unintended way… Irony has an edge, and it is risky for it can cut both ways.”
45
    
Rather than “countering” memory, irony opens up a space of deliberation that encourages 
a confrontation with the past and present.  Interestingly, monuments that make no claims to 
expressing enduring counter-messages are more open to adapting and adjusting to different 
contemporary audiences and contexts.  Shane Michael Boyle addresses how irony produces 
valuable anxiety in decontextualized spaces, stating:  
The presentation of a legible political message through non-rational or bewildering 
means corresponds closely to what Ranciere exhorts in his vision of suitable political art 
where legibility of the message negotiates with a “perceptible shock” caused by the 





The negotiation of opposites, which leads to a reversal of meaning or dual meanings, is 
fundamental to irony’s subversive potential.
47
  Burke suggests that irony is dialogical and offers 
a “perspective of perspectives.”
48
  Burke explains, “‘What goes forth as A returns as non-A.’ 
This is the basic pattern that places the essence of drama and dialectic in the irony of the 
‘peripety,’ the strategic moment of reversal.”
49
  Irony is able to unobtrusively challenge the 
status quo because, as Kenneth Burke explains, irony creates tension and then presents it [the 
tension] as inevitable.
50
  Burke not only views irony as a comic corrective, but he also believes it 
has ethical dimensions.  He argues that “irony depends upon the perspectives of Others.”
51
  For 




Much like Burke, performance scholar Tomaz Tobako asserts that “irony is a key 
rhetorical resource, an asset whose assistance can transform a non-democratic, monologic, and 
monistic environment into a more democratic, more dialogic, and more pluralistic one.”
52
 
Tobako insists that performative irony is a powerful tool for political protest.  Tobako defines 
performative irony as “the dissonance established by activist performers between their 
performance and the ‘original’ authority they refer to and whose structures they play with.”
53
  
Tobako uses the democratization of Poland in the late 1980s to illustrate the potential of 
performative irony.  He describes many protesters organizing a carnivalesque atmosphere to 
seem nonthreatening but still disruptive.  Demonstrations, like the one in Poland, prove how 
powerful irony is and that it “can afford political expression in circumstances where direct 
dissent is hard to formulate, risky, or unwise.”
54
  
Irony is a useful tool for recreating the memorial model into a material disruption because 
it challenges the idea that memory is to be straightforward and uncontested.  Fernandez and 
Huber write that irony “can be expected in situations of unequal power when discourses, 
interests, or cultures clash.”
55 
 Precisely because of the unequal power relations, irony 
innocuously provides “space for subordinated persons to voice resistance, imagine alternatives, 
build community, and mobilize for better times.”
56
  
Many scholars have seen the political potential of irony in the public sphere. This 
political potential stems from the fact that irony encourages “participation through 
interpretation.”
57
 Thus, irony “does not impart a static, predetermined message onto a passive 
audience.… It is up to the listener to sort out the significance of the dissonance embedded in the 
ironized performance.”
58
  Irony’s ability to agitate creates valuable space for reflection, which in 
turn, creates an ability “to shed a ‘different light on’ political and social concerns.”
59




with Authority!” Michael Shane Boyle writes, “[I]t is only through a perceptible shock, one 
which is indexical to a legible political message, that an artwork can have a substantial and non-
authoritarian political effect.  Ranciere asserts that this ‘shock’ is most often caused by an 
uncanny element in the work that resists social signification.”
60
  The “uncanny element” resisting 
signification is a byproduct of irony and has the potential to destabilize other discursive 
formations.  Ultimately, an ironic monumental disruption produces a deliberative potential by 
creating a space of reflection through agitation and not through a physical binary or a discursive 
counter-point.  Additionally an ironic monumental disruption “situates” monuments only 
momentarily but the memory of the disruption remains. The space is forever changed.  
Recognizing the importance of creating diverse, unsettled political spaces, Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe insist, “The multiplication of political spaces and the preventing of the 
concentration of power in one point are, then, preconditions of every truly democratic 
transformation of society.”
61
  Whereas monuments are usually accused of concentrating too 
much power in one site, ironic monuments question those forms of power by encouraging the 
audience to challenge their assumptions as well.  
To summarize, the destabilizing nature of irony opens up new readings on old forms 
(e.g., monuments) and frames.  Furthermore, irony provides a politically valuable and dynamic 
means by which to enact a critique and reveals multiple layers of meaning that continually 
resituate the subject.  The interplay of ironic monumental disruptions with comic and tragic 
frames creates an on-going transmission of meaning that interrogates the past and present and 
avoids falling into a reductionist trap.  The monuments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
provide particularly valuable examples of irony’s potential to agitate and incite physical 




interaction of confrontation with overtly nostalgic narratives of the past or in this case, comic and 
tragic frames, that force people to assess their ideological investments. 
HOW THE CONCEPTS SHAPE THE COMMEMORATIVE ARTIFACTS  
 At the beginning of this chapter, I outlined the methodology for this project.  I discussed 
how I situated the monuments within their historical, ideological and political contexts.  
Additionally, I argued that the current conceptualization of the counter-monument could not 
account for many of the emerging discursive and nondiscursive formations in Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe so I proposed an alternative rhetorical tool in the ironic monumental 
disruption.  The rest of the chapter defined the concept of the ironic monumental disruption as a 
counterpart to nostalgia in order to understand its political potential.  This section builds upon the 
previous methodology and conceptualization to explain how I am using the concepts of irony, 
nostalgia, and comic and tragic frames to analyze the commemorative artifacts.  
 Returning to the foundation of irony, Dana Cloud expands on Wayne Booth’s definition 
stating, “In literary contexts, irony is a marker of adept double-coding, but irony need not be 
intentional or skillful; sometimes an ironic stance toward a text attributes motive and value to the 
text and its maker beyond what may have been intended.”
62
  Irony became a central tool for 
analyzing the three case studies because it positioned the artifacts and their audiences in a 
simultaneous dialogue with larger historical and political contexts.  I used irony to read the 
exchange between explicit representation and indirect reference (sometimes by the noticeable 
absence of certain symbolism within the larger commemorative context).   I used the “double-
coding” of irony to examine competing layers of meaning and the political ramifications of 
accepting dual readings within the same commemorative space.  In other words, I read the 




audience—because they [the monuments] ironically performed dual ideological narratives while 
the audience engaged and interpreted the explicit and implicit performance.  Irony allowed for 
multiple readings of the artifacts and the audiences as they were ironically position on conscious 
and unconscious levels.  
 Similarly, I read nostalgia as an affect expressed by audience and constructed into the 
artifact.  After determining that much of the Soviet statuary was left up for the sake of upholding 
“history,” with some parties even expressing a longing for that history, I decided to read the 
monuments’ continued presence on the landscape as a sign that the old ideological construct was 
still needed to make sense of (or give context to) past and present narratives.   Nostalgia was a 
significant conceptual tool because it helped position the artifact and the audience, much like in 
the case of irony, between dual perspectives.  The past (ideology) that many expressed longing 
for was a virtual impossibility in the present political context, but the Soviet-era monuments (or 
fantasy driven monuments in Yugoslavia) create a space where the memory of the past can still 
be entertained.  Nostalgia and irony positioned both artifact and audience to embrace and reject 
the commemorative narrative.   
 Lastly, nostalgia also helped shape the comic and tragic frames, which determined how 
the audience positioned themselves in the larger commemorative context.   Put differently, I used 
Burke’s comic frame to show that play [in this case irony] could produce deliberative potential 
when it was understood as a product of—and a response to—lingering nostalgia.  On the other 
hand, Burke’s tragic frame revealed that populations’ expressing little or no nostalgia could still 
ironically engage nostalgic tokens of the past, but the deliberative potential would not be the 
same.  Where the ambivalences of the comic frame produced space for debate and reflection, the 




move on.   Thus, the comic and tragic frames position audience quite differently in respect to 
their understanding of the artifact and their interaction with it.  The next three chapters explore 
all of these concepts as they rhetorically shape how audiences and artifacts will continue to make 
sense of the past.  
METAPHORICAL AND LITERAL TRANSITIONS TO CAPITALISM AND BACK 
This chapter reviewed the data collection process and how it resulted in the 
methodological framing of the larger project.  Additionally, this chapter examined how counter-
monument literature distinguishes itself from traditional monument studies and why counter-
monuments need additional conceptualization.  Finally, I divided the concept of the ironic 
monumental disruption into its various parts in order to demonstrate how it functions as a 
rhetorically focused alternative to the category of the counter-monument. The actual 
materialization and engagement of irony creates a valuable space for political intervention and 
interrogation.  Furthermore, understanding ironic monumental disruptions within their varied 
frames shows scholars of counter-monument studies that additional contextualization creates the 
opportunity for more rhetorically sound research. 
The case studies presented in the subsequent three chapters apply the concept of the 
ironic monumental disruption to various frames in order to demonstrate how the disruptive 
rhetorical act of irony can produce important ethical openings.  All monuments contain the 
possibility to disrupt and critique their own meaning regardless of their “counter” designation.  
These case studies in Eastern and Southeastern Europe reveal that scholars of monumentality 
need more specific rhetorical tools in order to untangle historical and ideological narratives.  In 




monuments can enact and reflect their own critiques and how publics can find agency in the 
interaction between the material memory of the past and the material reality of the present.   
Curiously, monuments acknowledging the transition away from Stalinism and 
commemorating the new era of capitalism are relatively invisible; rather, the shrines to 
capitalism take a more pervasive and intrinsic form in the corporate signage surrounding the 
major cities of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.  Even though the ideological transition has 
transformed Eastern Europe more rapidly in the past 20 years than the half-century that preceded 
it, very few monumental acknowledge this shift.  In some ways museums, art collections, and 
staged exhibits most explicitly reference “transitional memory.” It is not surprising that the 
dream of capitalism is not on display.  Many Eastern Europeans want capitalism to be the answer 
to their economic troubles, but physically placing (a monument to) capitalism next to the 
memory of communism runs the risk of alerting the public to another ideological system 
susceptible to corruption and failure.   
What is apparent is that Captain America, Canned Beef, Bob Marley, and others are not 
simply comical figures of the past or idealized creations for the future; they are placeholders for 
a conflicted and contested set of memories which once occupied significant intellectual, social, 
and political space.  These examples of ironic monumental disruptions in the former Soviet bloc 
are a product of a contradictory public memory that needs more time and space to work through 
its lost ideals and inconsistencies.  The ironic intervention allows the public to embrace a 
narrative with multiple perspectives but no definitive answers.   
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Comic (book) Commemoration: Stalinism, Nostalgia and Ironic Monumental Disruptions 









In November 2010, Bulgarians held a rally at the Monument to the Soviet Army, or as it 
is widely known, the Soviet liberation monument demanding that the government tear down the 
Stalinist artifact.  Some of the protesters compared communism to Nazism while others held up 
signs saying, “The [Berlin] Wall fell, the Monument is still here.”2  In January 2011, Bulgarians 
again protested at the Soviet liberation monument in Sofia holding signs proclaiming, “We are 
no Russophobes but we are also no slaves.”
3
  Counter-demonstrations immediately formed as 
other Bulgarian citizens expressed concern that removing the monument would serve to 
effectively erase history.  The demonstrations in Sofia reveal that there is considerable 
ambivalence about the historical “facts;” but, the demonstrators appear to be negotiating 
complicated narratives and ideological tensions through their monuments.   
Whereas Hungarians and (eventually) Yugoslavians chose to move their contested 
memories to controlled spaces, Bulgarians have left one of their most contentious monuments in 
their city making it vulnerable to physical confrontations and public demonstrations.  While 
some scholars believe that Bulgarians have maintained stronger loyalties to their communist past 
than their neighboring countries, others claim that Bulgarians simply suffer from a misplaced 
case of nostalgia.
4
  Scholars and lay people alike point to the continued presence of Soviet 
monuments as evidence for their claims.
5
  But a recent reappropriation of the Soviet liberation 
monument suggests that rather than a case of misplaced nostalgia, Bulgarians may see the value 
of leaving contested statuary in place because it allows for a (highly visible) means of public 
deliberation.   
  The Soviet liberation monument has long been a site of tension in Sofia.  The communist-
led Bulgarian government built the monument in 1954 to commemorate the 10
th
 anniversary of 




the liberation monument, but a makeover in June 2011 placed the Soviet liberation monument 
back in the global spotlight.  The "vandals" painted Western figures and comic book heroes onto 
the statues of Soviet soldiers in the middle of the night.  After the initial controversy dissipated, 
the group Destructive Creation claimed responsibility for the graffiti.  Depending on one’s 
political perspective, the vandals or artists, who revamped the Soviet liberation monument, 
created an intriguing site of ironic commemoration, ideological confrontation, and nostalgic 
association.  This chapter uses the political and physical landscape of Sofia, Bulgaria, to show 
that alternative rhetorical frames and strategies open up new configurations of memory and place 
and create valuable spaces of deliberation.   
 In this chapter, I argue that Bulgarians’ ambivalence toward both communism and 
capitalism has created a comic frame from which they [the Bulgarian people] interpret the ironic 
intervention of the newly refashioned Soviet liberation monument.  The political potential of 
Destructive Creation’s ironic makeover stems from the fact that both ideological systems are 
relevant and rife for critique; they are juxtaposed to create an unsettling context in need of 
further interrogation and deliberation.  Thus, the defacement and subsequent restoration of the 
liberation monument serves as a prime example of the deliberative potential of ironic 
monumental disruptions utilized within a comic frame.   
Additionally, this chapter demonstrates how the ironic monumental disruption operates 
differently in Bulgaria than in Hungary or even the former Yugoslavia.  Because many 
Bulgarians have expressed ambivalence toward their communist chapter and the artifacts 
produced during that time, the people of Sofia appear to be negotiating their current ideological 




a comic frame is clear as they take one perspective and juxtapose it with another ultimately 
showing the limitations and possibilities of both.    
Finally, this case study’s representational complexity stems from the fact that the ironic 
monumental disruption created through the act of vandalism is only temporary.  An additional 
confrontation with the ironic monumental disruption happens when the government scrubs off 
the graffiti (removing the new monument and replacing the old), but even the cleansing act of 
erasure opens up the monument to additional interpretation.  Thus, the monument recaptures its 
government sanctioned and (arguably) nostalgic representation of communism, but continues to 
hold the memory of its vandalism.  The introduction of irony into a comic frame reveals that 
even temporary disruptions have the power to engage various formations of nostalgia and 
produce varied perspectives.  The monument literally and metaphorically takes on new meaning 
when it represents two seemingly opposed ideological narratives.  And as the monument is 
resituated within a new representational narrative in need of interpretation, the Bulgarian people 
are also resituated as (potentially) engaged political subjects.  Curiously, Bulgarians find 
themselves simultaneously pulled toward resenting communism and longing for it, but each 
intervention of meaning and memory opens up additional spaces for reflection and deliberation. 
I discussed the methodology for evaluating ironic monumental disruptions in Chapter 
three, but a quick review of the method helps contextualize the findings in this particular case 
study.  After the monument was redesigned, newspaper editorials and blog entries produced a 
few overarching themes which were used to further contextualize the monument and gain insight 
into public sentiment on the national and international level.  Very few articles reported that the 
vandalism outraged the Bulgarian people.  Those angered by the graffiti claimed it was because 
the “vandals’” destroyed property.
6




“ridiculed;” they were upset that an artifact with fifty plus years of history was changed.  I 
coupled the initial response to the event with a deeper political and historical contextualization of 
the monument.  I used all of the complex and contradictory sources of identity and representation 
to determine that Bulgarians saw their communist history through a comic frame.  The Bulgarian 
people did not want to blame communism for the country’s problems; they wanted to entertain 
the fantasy that communism and capitalism still held promise for them.   
In order to examine questions of irony and place, the chapter begins with a brief overview 
of the political and historical issues Bulgarians faced during Stalinism’s decline.  Bulgaria’s 
communist past is important as it continues to shape the commemorative conflicts in the present.  
Next, the chapter discusses the recent protestations surrounding the Soviet liberation monument 
to show that this particular commemorative site serves as an important physical and symbolic 
space for the Bulgarian people.  Finally, the chapter examines the reconceptualization of the 
Soviet liberation monument as an ironic monumental disruption to show how an act of vandalism 
can create an important space of public deliberation.  In other words, the product of Bulgarian’s 
mixed loyalties appears to be a monument frequently subjected to symbolic reappropriations. 
The vandalized monument simultaneously acknowledges, celebrates, and undermines both the 
past and present encouraging an important dialogue over the construction of public memory.   
BULGARIA AND STALINISM: SATELLITE STATE INSECURITIES 
 As one of the poorest members of the EU—and still reeling from recent austerity 
measures—Bulgarians have become even more nostalgic about their former communist 
ideology.
7
  As referenced previously, Bulgarians did not view Stalinism with as much skepticism 
as Hungarians did.  The Bulgarian people had fewer misgivings about the communist agenda 




Western Europe in many respects.
8
  Bulgaria would later become one of the Soviet Union’s most 
loyal allies.  However, Bulgaria had little choice but to fully embrace Stalinism at the end of 
World War II as the Soviet military seized power in German-occupied Bulgaria in September 
1944.
9
  Since 1989, stories and news reports from Eastern European and the Balkans have 
surfaced that after the Second World War “Soviet forces came as occupiers as much as 
liberators,” making the “Liberation” monuments particularly painful.
10
  Consequently, after the 
fall of communism in 1989, Bulgarians had to pick up the pieces of a fallen ideology and carve 
out an entirely new identity now that they no longer saw themselves as members of a satellite 
state.
 11
   
As discussed in Chapter two, Todor Zhivkov’s forced resignation began the transition 
from communism to a market economy in 1989.  Interestingly, Bulgaria’s transition to capitalism 
was conducted mostly by “former communist apparatchiks and security-service officers,” who 
worked to minimize backlash against the old communist system.
12
 Bulgaria’s relationship to 
communism was strong, and voters replaced the old communist guard with various formations of 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party until 2009.  The 2009 elections saw the Socialist Party pushed out 
amidst “corruption allegations and economic failings,” but Bulgarians have voiced concerns that 
they abandoned the ideology of socialism too quickly during these tumultuous economic times.
13
  
The tumult appears to be manifesting itself in unusual ways.  As globalization has left Bulgaria 
in a financial crisis and monuments to communism continue to receive makeovers, Bulgarians 
are unsure how to represent their memory of the past.   
While locals Bulgarians continue to debate the artifacts of communism, local government 
officials have attempted to remind them [Bulgarians] of their past misgivings by creating a 
Museum of Socialist Art, which opened September 19, 2011.
14




the largest collection of communist-era art in Eastern Europe according to the Bulgarian 
government.
15
  The museum showcases “more than a dozen towering statues of Lenin and flat-
capped workers pointing solemnly toward utopia and a 13-foot-tall red star that used to top the 
Communist Party headquarters here in Sofia.” 
16
 The idea behind the museum is to turn these 
revered objects into kitsch. Finance Minister Simeon Djankov insists that, “We want to close this 
period. We're trying to kill the boogeyman and put it in the museum… A lot of people here have 
a romanticized view of communist times and we need to show the unvarnished truth.”
17
  
 However, loyalties to Bulgaria’s communist past are still strong as the local Socialist 
Party unveiled a new monument to Todor Zhivkov, the last communist ruler before the transition 
in 1989, within the same month of the museum’s grand opening.
18
  Loyalists of Zhivkov also 
financed a renovation of his museum which contains hundreds of communist artifacts as well.
19
  
Memories of communism vary widely as the curator of Zhivkov’s museum Galia Pikova 
explains that,  
Communism here was soft... Me and my parents didn't suffer in any way—we had work 
and money.  I was 12 years old in 1989 when communism fell.  That year I was skiing 
during winter in East Germany and spent summer on the Black Sea coast.  It was 




While the memory of communism remains divided in Bulgaria, locals remain torn between 
celebrating an oppressive past and present.  Bulgarians like Galia Pikova fear that, while the past 
may not have been entirely free, it may have allowed for more personal dignity.  It is a strange 
paradox as communism, not capitalism, is usually accused of erasing difference for the sake of 
the larger community.  In Bulgaria’s case, austerity measures brought on by unbridled and 
corrupt capitalism have forced many in Eastern Europe to bend to the larger will of the EU.  
Consequently, it is not entirely surprising that nostalgia for the glory days of communism is on 




Bulgarians' interpret their communist chapter differently than Hungarians. As such, 
Bulgarians display their public artifacts with more pride, but also more ambivalence. The 
desecration or vandalism of the Soviet liberation monument suggests that Bulgarian citizens 
want to embrace a more direct confrontation with memory.  Knowing what memory is another 
story entirely.  In “Death and the Desecrated: Monuments of the Socialist Past in Post-1989 
Bulgaria,” Nikolai Voukov explains that the Soviet liberation monument remains one of the most 
contested symbols of communism and is interpreted and altered to represent vastly different 
ideas and interests depending on the political climate. He explains:  
Declarations in support of particular monuments, attempts to organize rituals and 
ceremonies in the way they were performed before 1989 and campaigns for cleaning 
monuments on memorial days and anniversaries were the usual counteractive measures 
taken in monuments’ support.  In turn, these acts were responded to with declarations 
condemning “re-communization processes” and with strikes and protests against the 
reinstallation and renovation of monuments.  In most of these monumental dramas there 
is a thick network of political implications and motives related to dealing with 




 Voukov addresses an ideological tension on clear display with the defacement of the 
Soviet liberation monument in Sofia, Bulgaria. As mentioned previously, the monument remains 
a controversial artifact dating all the way back to its original erection.  The political tension the 
monument continues to express may come, in large part, from the fact that “liberation” has been 
fleeting for the Bulgarian people.  Bulgarians continued to transfer their economic and political 
power to external forces as their national identity was subsumed by fascism then communism 







THE SOVIET LIBERATION MONUMENT:  PROTESTING THE PAST AND 
PRESENT 
The original Soviet liberation monument in Sofia, Bulgaria, like numerous others located 
throughout Eastern Europe, acknowledges the Soviet victory over the Nazis in 1944-45.  The 
monument was an important symbol during the Stalinist era, serving as a pilgrimage site for 
communist leaders such as Todor Zhivkov and Georgi Dimitrov.”
22
  The liberation monument is 
an example of Socialist-Realist art, which aims to further the goals of communism and the 
working class by depicting egalitarianism and communal identity.  Soviet-Realist art was an 
important source of propaganda during the USSR’s expansion.  At the top of the stone formation, 
the monument depicts a Red Army soldier surrounded by a Bulgarian man and woman.  On the 
platform below these figures are life-like cast-iron soldiers captured in heroic action poses.
23
   
While the liberation monument has remained at the center of the same park for over 50 
years, it is still a site of frequent contestation.  During a rally in January 2011, one demonstrator 
insisted, "This is a symbol of Bulgaria's disgrace! If it is not removed, we, or our children, or our 
grandchildren will one day build a new monument right next to it, exposing this monument."
24
 
Sofia’s news agency Novinite claims that the Liberation monument is one of the “most 
controversial issues today… because it is a matter of historical memory relevant to the nation's 
coming to terms with its own communist past with some sort of a consensus.”
25
 Other citizens 
have voiced frustration that the Bulgarian people have fixated on this monument rather than the 
structural and political problems facing their country today.
26
   
 Many protesters suggested moving the monument to a less prominent place or museum 
much like other Eastern European and Baltic countries have chosen to do, but journalist Ivan 






  Dikov also explains, “The communist heritage epitomizes probably the greatest 
problem of the Bulgarian society since 1990 – its adamant and severe division along the pro/anti 
communism lines which time hasn't managed to water down yet.”
28
  Dikov’s solution is to place 
an inscription that denounces “Stalinism, the Soviet occupation of Bulgaria, and the imposition 
of a political regime by a foreign power,” because it will “guarantee that contemporary society 
will get out of the monument its positive message of a struggle against tyranny – rather than 
replacing one type of tyranny with another.”
29
   
SUPERHEROES AND SOVIET REALISM: CONTRASTING VALUES 
 Dikov’s reflections on artistic and political tyranny became particularly valuable as six 
months later on June 17, 2011, a group of nine anti-communist graffiti artists called “Destructive 
Creation” vandalized the Soviet Army liberation monument.
30
  The monument became an 
overnight sensation when Destructive Creation recreated all of the Russian soldiers into colorful 
caricatures such as Batman and Robin, Santa Claus, Wonder Woman, Captain America, and 
Ronald McDonald. The Sofia Echo also reported that the flag held by one of the Soviet soldiers 
(painted to look like Ronald McDonald) was refashioned with the stars and stripes of the 
American flag.   The monument had the words, “in step with the times,” spray-painted across the 
pedestal leading many international news outlets to revel in the idea that capitalism and 
communism were battling for ideological supremacy. 
The ironic display of hero-worship was intriguing.  Batman kills to keep the streets safe 
and the Joker enjoys producing playful chaos whenever possible.  In addition to these characters, 
Santa Claus and Ronald McDonald (arguably) remind the Bulgarian people that capitalism 
produces an insatiable desire to consume.  Transforming humble Soviet soldiers into fictional 




historical commemorative space.  As stated by scholar Linda Hutcheon, “Irony is one of the 
means by which to create the necessary distance and perspective” to one day begin to 
remember.
31
  A site that was once a source of nostalgia for Bulgaria’s communist past revealed 
that old and new ideological narratives could be contained in one place.  All that separated 
communism from capitalism was one coat of paint.  
The most recent display of vandalism in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia seems to 
illuminate the political possibilities and challenges of confronting more explicitly 
representational art. The artists left the material of the Soviet liberation monument intact, but 
they transformed the meaning with a new coat of paint. The New Zealand Listener produced an 
editorial celebrating that in one night, “the life-size Red Army soldiers of a Soviet monument 
were transformed into a cast of western pop culture [characters].”
32
 Even the Sofia Echo seemed 
to enjoy the playful critique while maintaining neutrality, stating, “For some it was an insult and 
for others it was an inspiration.”
33
 Occupying the second camp, columnist Boika Penchev 
applauded the courage of the then anonymous artists, later identified as Destructive Creation, for 
challenging a national “mentality that leaves Bulgaria a country that resists change…. The 
anonymous painters did not just paint over the grey figures of the monument…. They painted 
over the grey face of power itself.”
34
  Penchev’s interchangeable use of the term “monument” 
and “power” is intentionally thought-provoking as he concludes that “monuments are there 
constantly to remind us of who has the power to impose an ‘official’ memory of the past.”
35
  
The “vandals” revealed themselves two months after the initial facelift.  Communist 
sympathizers in Bulgaria and Russia demanded that the government punish the "criminal" act. 
Much to these sympathizers’ dismay, the Sofia Prosecutor’s Office dropped the criminal inquiry 
into the so-called “hooligan behavior” without further explanation.
36




been cleaned by an organization known as “Bulgaria-Russia,” but its repeated desecration is 
sparking interest and discussion within Bulgaria and abroad.  Immediately following the clean 
up, t-shirts with the redesigned monument began popping up for sale in Sofia.
37
  And within ten 
days of the monument getting  repainted, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, the Sofia Poetics 
organization, and the ‘Transformers’ art movement organized “a public discussion regarding the 
monument’s future.”
38
  Some suggested commemorative alternatives to the current monument 
like a more abstract monument or a counter-monument, but others worried that a counter-
monument would only serve to further reify the original message.  Put another way, protesters do 
not want the liberation monument knocked down just so another monument can be constructed to 
obliquely “honor” Bulgaria’s communist chapter.  The next section illuminates how monuments 
on the Bulgarian landscape express nostalgia and create deliberative opportunities for ironic 
interventions.   
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MATERIALIZED NOSTALGIA IN STALINIST MEMORIES AND MONUMENTS  
The loyalty that many Bulgarian people express to their communist history and its 
corresponding monuments is not surprising.  In many ways, communism provided a safety net 
and a guarantee of social equality that many Bulgarians sorely miss today. But it is the 
entanglement of the memory of communism and Stalinism that creates such strange 
understandings of the past.  Longing for the ideology of communism is a distinctly different 
desire than maintaining the monuments to the Stalinist regime.
39
  Nikolai Voukov explains that 
the “liberation” monument progressed through time as a “symbol of enslavement throughout the 
years of socialism, a memorial sign to the war dead, an element of the recent history currently 
emptied of powerful meanings and [then] merely a reminder of the curiosities of the socialist 
past.”
40
  Voukov asserts, “the inability to come to an ultimate conclusion about the limits of 
representation determined the monument's fate and contributed to its continued survival.”
41
  The 
limit of representation that Voukov addresses is intriguing as it suggests that Bulgarians are not 
sure how they should incorporate the liberation monument for the future.  The fact that some of 
the Bulgarian people hold up the Soviet liberation monument as the last vestige of communism 
suggests that a misplaced nostalgia is making history and ideology interchangeable.  Ultimately, 
the comic frame becomes an important tool for untangling nostalgia for the past and the political 
contradictions it produces in the present. 
Scholar Zala Volcic addresses the conflation of memory, authenticity, and history stating 
that, “Nostalgia offers an idealized version of an unattainable past that can stunt the cultural 
imagination.”
42
  Volcic and others explain that the desire for a former “reality” is a natural 
response to fragmentation or uncertainty, but they warn about its political ramifications.  Cultural 






  Nostalgia produces an “embarrassing . . . cultural fantasy,” that 
Jameson insists is an “obstacle to historical knowledge rather than a resuscitation of historical 
understanding.”
44
 Jameson suggests that with nostalgia, “We seem condemned to seek the 
historical past through our own pop images and stereotypes about that past, which itself remains 
forever out of reach.”
45
 In other words, for many scholars nostalgia becomes the fantasy-driven 
outlet that obfuscates political action.
46
 Jameson’s concerns are precisely why the comic frame is 
so vital to understanding the commemorative politics in this particular case study. The comic 
frame does not allow nostalgia to be completely indulged; rather, the comic frame imposes the 
same critique on nostalgic representation as it does on historical “Truth.”  The juxtaposition of 
these two perspectives creates unsettled discursive formations in need of further interpretation. 
Thus, for the purpose of creating heightened visibility for complex narratives, nostalgia is 
not inherently “bad,” or debilitating for public deliberation and critique.  It provides yet another 
outlet for understanding transitional histories.  Russian scholar Svetlana Boym discusses the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in terms of a “restorative” nostalgia which “feeds upon a sense of 
loss of unity and cohesion” 
47
  While Boym’s work will be more extensively utilized in the next 
chapter, it is worth noting that the liberation monument in Sofia serves as an important 
manifestation of a contested ideological and political nostalgia. The reappropriation and 
immediate cleaning of the monument shows that Soviet ties and communist loyalties still 
strongly inform Bulgarian identity, but, capitalism continues to break up the nostalgic narrative 
and critique its current applicability.  But the question arises, How does the ideological 
confrontation of old statuary with new superheroes serve to more fully expose both narratives as 
imperfect solutions to the politics of their time?  It appears that the incorporation of irony into a 




dialogue that is not only about the politics of place but also about the failure of larger political 
systems.   
RESPONSES TO THE “VANDALISM”  
 While the monumental makeover was only temporary, the national and international 
response it received revealed that the reappropriation of the Soviet liberation was a political act 
with significant ramifications.  National politicians quickly aligned themselves on ideological 
sides with Finance Minister Djankov explaining, "I don't approve of the vandalism, but I 
appreciate the artistic qualities of those responsible… I'm more of a fan of Superman than 
Lenin."
48
  Other political figures were not as willing to laugh off the desecration. Bulgarian 
Minister of Culture Vezhdi Rashidov described the painted figures as an act of “vandalism” and 
ignored questions about the graffiti’s artistic value, labeling aesthetics “a different matter 
entirely.”
49
  He insisted that Bulgaria “had its history of socialism, which could not be simply 
erased.”
50
  Furthermore, he stated that the Soviet Army monument was, “the property of Sofia 
municipality… the painting of the monument was a crime.”
51
  Rashidov concluded his statement 
on the act of desecration hyperbolically claiming, “We (Bulgarians) are the only ones led by 
some kind of destructive force when it comes to monuments of socialism.”
52
  
Internationally, Western Europe enjoying the symbolic tussle with the London Daily Mail 
editorializing: 
Twenty years ago you would have been shot for stepping too close to this monument in 
Sofia in Bulgaria. But after the smashing of the Berlin Wall, statues celebrating 





But the most vocal protests have come from those who served as a source of inspiration for the 
monument.  The Guardian reported, “Moscow was not amused. In a statement issued 




vandalism’ and stop the ‘desecration of the memory of Soviet soldiers who fell in the name of 
freeing Bulgaria and Europe from Nazism.’”
54
 
 While the people of Sofia are still debating the ethics of graffiti, some insist that the 
graffiti makeover was an important reappropriation of an outdated memory.  Editor-in-Chief of 
the Sofia Echo Clive Leivev Sawyer stated that the graffiti was “The defining image from 
Bulgaria in 2011…[It] pointed to issues lying unresolved beneath the surface…The debate that 
raged, ultimately briefly as all such debates tend to do in Bulgaria, exposed not only an 
ambivalence about relations with Russia (Moscow’s embassy huffily protested about the insult to 
Soviet soldiers) but also an ambivalence about Bulgarians’ view of their own past.”
55
  Local 
newspaper editorials suggested that the defaced monument was a critique of misplaced hero-
worship and suggested that one form of imperialism was simply being replaced with another.
56
  
The effect of the makeover was slightly more complex and nuanced than a simple grudge match, 
but the increased attention the “new” monument received was undeniable.  Finally, blogs were 
flooded by Bulgarians and international onlookers all wanting to weigh in on the vandalism.  
Many wrote that this was the “kind of graffiti I can get into,” while others suggested that those 
who were offended were taking art too seriously.
57
  One anonymous Bulgarian blogger wrote,  
 I think painting over this piece turns something terrible, that made a terrible statement to 
 the people who have to see it every day, into something more meaningful. Something 
 positive to help the people move on and remember their history, but know they've 




Others unequivocally stated that monuments should be left alone.
59
  Curiously, there was little 
consensus on how this monument should be treated in the aftermath of its vandalism.  The next 
section expands upon this discourse to offer insight into how nostalgia and irony combined to 




IRONY, NOSTALGIA, AND THE COMIC FRAME: CREATING DELIBERATIVE 
SPACE 
The ironic monumental disruption created by the transformation in pop icons of the 
Soviet soldiers produced a new perspective from which to evaluate an old artifact.  The 
transformed monument metaphorically “liberates” and recontextualizes all of the figures within 
the old commemorative space.  The ironic repositioning of these historical and popular figures 
actually heightens a sense of nostalgia for the past while creating space for more open dialogue.  
It is not only the response people have to the graffiti placed on the monument that is worth 
examining; it is also the ironic positioning of the monument within a comic frame.   
Within the comic frame, irony created an outlet for the discussion of communist nostalgia 
and capitalist imperialism.  Scholar Hugh Duncan writes that, “Comedy [the comic frame] offers 
a way of challenging those social hierarchies which are vulnerable to change and enduring those 
which are not.”
60
  It is important to note that the “vandals” were not re-envisioning the 
monument in hopes of claiming that communism was wrong and capitalism is right.  The artists 
created the ironic monumental disruption to address larger ideological structures and to make the 
public aware that lingering questions persisted.   
The vandalized monument (or the memory of it) serves to disrupt the historical narrative 
of Russian authority and instead demands that the viewing public question all of their loyalties as 
they consciously or unconsciously worship at the feet of Western capitalism.  The immediate 
cleansing of the space does not take away the image or the knowledge that Bulgarian 
independence relies on an ideological fiction that gives capitalism considerable control.  While 
the psychological discomfort encouraged by this ironic disruption affects the informed public, 




then holds, its own contradiction. Thus, the space has the potential to both produce and respond 
to irony while inviting Bulgarians to engage in their own clarifying performances. 
 Additionally, the ironic monumental disruption served as a microcosm for a much larger 
discussion of monuments, ideological imperialism, and political and national identity.  In an 
editorial published almost a month after the graffiti incident, Boika Penchev explained the 
rhetorical significance of the reappropriated art, stating, 
Monuments are an attempt to cloak clashing interpretations of history behind figures of 
bronze or granite. But it is impossible to escape the war over the past. Especially where 
the Soviet army and its monument are concerned. That’s why arriving at its visual 
transformation is a logical step. What is surprising in this case is the intelligence and 
artistic subtlety of the work. Painting a Soviet soldier as Batman is a sacrilege. It’s an 
“undermining of historical memory” when history is rewritten in a non-organised way, 




Penchev thoughtfully concludes, “Despite the clean-up, the monument will never be the same—
the photos and memories will stay.”
62
 Penchev is correct in recognizing that while the monument 
will not stand as a “counter-monument” through time, its momentary reappropriation as an ironic 
monumental disruption calls upon those who witnessed or read about the act of vandalism to re-
envision the monument’s symbolic meaning.  The ironic monumental disruption created through 
the addition of superheroes opens the monument and its contested memory up to critiques and 
questions not easily articulated—or nearly as visible—in the public sphere otherwise. 
It is precisely because the liberation monument so fluidly and effortlessly constructs 
irony into its symbolism that the people of Sofia are indirectly encouraged to examine their 
nostalgic narratives in contrast to their present social, political, and economic conditions.  
Ultimately, the revamping of the Soviet liberation monument into an ironic monumental 
disruption suggests that the Bulgarian people and especially the members of Destructive Creation 




reconciliation, Destructive Creation has created a space of engagement.  This “space” is 
precisely what has been missing for the Bulgarian people—a people who have been frequently 
subsumed by various ideologies and political alliances.  Operating within the comic frame, irony 
encourages the Bulgarian people not to place blame but assert themselves as political agents by 
examining their nostalgic representations and investments.    
 The ironic intervention and disruption of the liberation monument provided a space for 
speculation, interrogation, and outrage.  Simply taking on the narrative of communism or 
capitalism in its singularity could not have produced the same kind of public engagement that the 
monument received.  The uncanniness produced through the ironic transformation even 
encouraged people not interested in the monumental debate to question what shaped their present 
Bulgarian national identity.  The juxtaposition of the two ideological poles provided the fluid 
space necessary for the Bulgarian people to situate their transitional narratives long enough to 
actually discuss them.    
Finally, the ironic disruption created by the graffiti reveals an interesting fracture in the 
current identity and ideology of the Bulgarian people.  The comic frame allows for a 
contradictory formation of communist nostalgia to couple with the inevitable “hero-worship” 
created by the promise of capitalism.  Interestingly, the monument, much like the Bulgarian 
people, is not entirely willing to “pick” an ideological side.  The confrontation of the two 
perspectives is what produces the momentarily engaged public.  But rather than fully confront a 
deeply conflicted identity and mixed ideological loyalty, Bulgarians have chosen to keep both 
representations in dialogue.  Where the conceptualization of the counter-monument would place 
the symbolic value of the monument in either the “old” or “newly vandalized” monument, the 




engage multiple perspectives and various publics.  In many ways, the attention drawn to both 
ideological positions creates an ethical space of deliberation—ethical, in that, both perspectives 
receive commemorative space and any invested public may contribute to the dialogue.
63
  
CONCLUSIONS ON CAPTAIN AMERICA  
Whereas Hungarians moved their communist past outside of town and created a space of 
political mockery, Bulgarians are symbolically and ideologically stuck between their past and 
present.  In the contested political space of Sofia, the promise of one ideology crashes into the 
fleeting promise of another. It appears that Bulgarians have the unusually difficult task of 
embracing an ideological transition with the promise of individual freedom while simultaneously 
recognizing that individualism comes with substantial social and financial hardship.  It is 
possible that the unfulfilled promise of capitalism prevents Bulgarians from letting go of their 
former narrative of communism both physically and psychologically. It is also possible that 
choosing not to choose (consciously or unconsciously) keeps the promise of both ideologies 
alive. 
It is precisely because Bulgarian identity is trapped at an ideological crossroad that the 
ironic monumental disruption is so revealing of a larger political sentiment.  The new message 
constructed into the old monument asks that both capitalism and communism come into dialogue 
for the Bulgarian people.  The juxtaposition of both perspectives reveals that the citizens of 
Bulgaria are continuing to couch their contradictory loyalties.  This chapter demonstrated how 
Bulgarians produce their historical (and conflicting ideological) narratives within a comic frame 
that uses nostalgia as a way to mediate the past and make sense of the present.   While some 
cultural critics and scholars have accused those embracing nostalgia of misplacing their political 




through a comic frame creates space for an ironic intervention.  Specifically, in the case of these 
commemorative sites in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, ironic monumental disruptions 
become valuable tools for evaluating transitional histories with contradictory allegiances.  As 
this case study has shown, Bulgarians do not seek to fully reassign a new identity to their historic 
sites; rather, they seem to be more comfortable with the irresolution created by contested 
interpretations.  In other words, Bulgarians appear to be committed to a space of ideological 
confusion that finally allows them the ability to define and critique the past and present on their 
own terms.   
 The next chapter examines the potential of physically constructing ironic representations 
into monuments.  The Bruce Lee monument in Mostar, Bosnia, appears to be an ironic 
contradiction.  Lee stands for peace after a time of war.  The martial arts icon has no ties to the 
Balkans or their genocidal war but he represents the multicultural ethic that Yugoslavia once 
embraced. Of course, Yugoslavia’s former multicultural ethic was a central force that led to the 
devastating civil war among the people of Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia.   
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Chapter Five: Bruce Lee’s Broken Staff:  
Bosnia Battles both East and West 
     
Figure 5.1 
Tourist Attractions: Bombed-out bank next to a park and the shelling of city streets in Mostar, Bosnia 
 
POST-YUGOSLAVIA: THE BALKANS FACE AN IDEOLOGICAL CROSSROADS   
Bosnia, and to a lesser degree Serbia, maintain the remnants of dilapidated buildings and 
sidewalks riddled with bullet holes for the sake of war tourism.  In Serbia’s case, much of the 
destruction is the product of strategic NATO bombings during the wars of the 1990s.  At the 
metaphorical epicenter of the destruction is the town of Mostar, Bosnia.  Mostar was home to a 
diverse population of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks before the war. The city appeared to be the 
multicultural ideal with mosques and Catholic cathedrals occupying the same city blocks.  
During the reconstruction of Mostar, many artists and intellectual critics expressed concern that 
the rebuilding the city would lead to the erasure of history.  They suggested that the only thing 
worse than a genocide fueled by a failed dream of multiculturalism would be its erasure from 




the failed experiment of their country by creating art that fit with the contemporary desire for 
peace.
1
   
In hopes of acknowledging a contested past, the Urban Movement and the Sarajevo 
Center for Contemporary Arts came together to create the Bruce Lee monument in Mostar, 
Bosnia, as a part of the “De/construction of Monuments” project.  The Bruce Lee monument was 
the brainchild of Mr. Veselin Gatalo, President of the Urban Movement in Mostar and Dr. Nino 
Raspudić a university professor in Zagreb. The Urban Movement explained that, without a 
commemorative intervention, racist political agendas of cultural amnesia and violence would 
proliferate.
2
  But Mostar is not the first city to build an unusual commemorative response in the 
former Yugoslavia.  As mentioned in the introduction, Rocky Balboa, Bob Marley, Tarzan, 
Samantha Fox, and most recently, George W. Bush have all been erected in the Balkans in the 
last ten years.  All of these monuments vary in terms of why and when they were constructed.  
The people responsible for the monuments suggest that the community needed a direct or 
indirect way to work through the political and ideological aftermath of the Yugoslav War.  Thus, 
it is no coincidence that the monument to Bruce Lee sits in the same park as the monument to the 
fallen Old Bridge across the street from the skeletal remains of a bombed-out bank. 
The Urban Movement decided that, rather than try to place blame on any particular party 
by representing a history of the Balkan conflict, they would erect a bronze statue of Bruce Lee to 
celebrate more noble ideals of justice and multiculturalism. The Urban Movement chose Bruce 
Lee as their representative figure because they were “confident of [his] noble mission to bring us 
back to the streets.… [Bruce Lee is] a popular icon, a champion of justice whose ethnic 
background is absolutely irrelevant to us all.”
3
  Curiously, the actor Bruce Lee had no historical 




“Lee was a hero to teenagers all over the country in the 1970s and 1980s.”
4
  In other words, 
when support for communism in Yugoslavia began to wane, the people looked to communist 
China and capitalist America for their vicarious action hero escapism.  Unfortunately, within a 
decade’s time, the people of Yugoslavia would see their country spiral into chaos as violence 
became a daily occurrence. 
What the Urban Movement and the supporters of the monument did not anticipate was 
that the monument would quickly become a site of contestation and public deliberation.  Many 
Bosnian citizens who were still reeling from the wars of the 1990s were not interested in 
honoring Bruce Lee’s stated values; instead, they read him as yet another manifestation of the 
out-of-touch political machine in Serbia and Bosnia—the same political machine that failed to 
pick up the pieces after the war.  As such, newspapers published editorials about the monument’s 
politics or lack thereof.
5
  The anxiety over Lee’s meaning resulted in debates about what his 
physical presence meant.  Was he positioned defensively as promised, or was his nunchuck 
leaning toward the country of Serbia?  The questions, while seemingly insignificant, produced 
tremendous acrimony about historical grievances and failed political promises.  
This chapter examines the Bruce Lee monument in Mostar, Bosnia as an example of an 
ironic monumental disruption.  While the previous chapter explored a temporary ironic 
disruption constructed into a monument, this chapter explores the political potential of a 
monument constructed as a permanent or on-going ironic monumental disruption.  In this 
chapter, I argue that the historical narrative of communism, the Yugoslav War, and the 
ideological transition to capitalism have created a comic frame similar to the one seen in 
Bulgaria that is well-suited for an ironic monumental disruption.  Both countries have sizable 




populations is creating commemorative works that place blame (representatively speaking) on 
one particular entity or ideology in an attempt to achieve closure and embrace their current 
situation.  But the comic frame in Bosnia is distinct from Bulgaria’s in that much of their 
[Bosnian’s] ambivalence toward the past and present is the product of a civil war that makes 
nostalgia for the past particularly difficult to understand.   
To evaluate the relationship between the comic frame and the rhetorical act of the ironic 
monumental disruption, this case study examines extreme nostalgia in an ideologically 
ambivalent place (Yugoslavia).  Research began in 2005 at the time of the erection of the 
monument and the local and national debates which followed.   I coupled the debate surrounding 
the monument with stories of Yugoslavia’s creation as a communist state and its dissolution to 
develop the comic frame.  Finally, within several months, the monument was desecrated and 
subsequently removed in order to protect it from further damage.  Interviews were conducted 
after the monument’s removal to examine how the erection and destruction of the monument 
affected local Bosnians (and the memory of Yugoslavia more broadly).   
In order to prove that the ironic monumental disruption is, in fact, an ironic monumental 
disruption that intervenes within a comic frame to produce deliberative spaces, the following 
sections examine the rhetorical narrative of the Yugoslav War, the new post-Yugoslav identity 
the war produced, and the lingering sentiment of Yugonostalgia.  Next, the chapter examines 
how irony has coupled with nostalgia in the monument to Bruce Lee in Mostar, Bosnia, to 
produce a surprisingly ethical space of commemoration for those still struggling with the 
traumatic memories of war.  All of these entangled sources of identity lay the foundation for the 
ultimate destruction and removal of the pop monument, which encouraged Bosnians to articulate 




   Figure 5.2:  The Removal of Bruce Lee in Bosnia 6 
 
THE END OF MULTICULTURALISM AND A POST-YUGOSLAV IDENTITY  
The Yugoslav War was undeniably traumatic as Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians found 
themselves murdering their neighbors only to later mourn the loss of multiculturalism.  Long 
before a bloody civil war led to the Balkanization of Southeastern Europe as we know it today, 
the country of Yugoslavia was an ethnically and religiously diverse patchwork of Slavic 
identities.  Even though the configuration of a Southern Slavic identity was a relatively recent 
phenomenon created by Josip Broz Tito after World War II, as a leader he was largely successful 
in convincing the citizens of Yugoslavia to identify politically and culturally with the new Slavic 
community.  
While Chapter two outlined the history leading up to the Yugoslav War, it is important to 
note that many scholars identify a distinct shift in Yugoslav identity following the 1986 
publication of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.  Many scholars 
suggest that the memorandum was the first act of aggression on the part of the Serbian 




writers and scholars… gave notice of a public turn in the ideology of the Serb intelligentsia. The 
memorandum signaled the shift from the promotion of Yugoslavism, colored with a tinge of 
Serbian patriotism, to outright Serbian nationalism and even pan-Serbism.”
7
 Subscribing to this 
doctrine meant that the Serbian elite were abandoning humanistic Marxism entirely.   
Another important turning point came on June 28, 1989, during the celebration of the 
600
th
 Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (where Serbs fought the Ottoman Empire). In honor of 
the event, Milosevic called a mass rally for Serbs living in the area now known as Kosovo. 
Milosevic insisted that Serbia had suffered too much for Yugoslavia and that wherever “Serb 
bones lie buried in the soil” that was Serbian land.
8
  Furthermore, Milosevic and the Serbian 
nationalists claimed that “Bolshevik-Titoism” almost led to their national extinction.
9
  Scholar 
Nicholas Miller described this pivotal political rally as the moment when “the ethnic model for 
political action defeated the civil.”
10
 
By the end of Slobodan Milosevic's 13-year reign, Serbia was on the brink of chaos.  A 
mix of nationalist extremists and mobsters had taken control of the governance of the state. 
Serbia's gross domestic output was less than half of what it had been when Milosevic took his 
seat, industrial output was at around a quarter of the 1988 level, and hyperinflation had taken 
hold, making the Serbian currency nearly worthless in the mid-nineties.
11
 
In the wake of the destruction of the wars, all of the respective leaders of the republics 
claimed that they were within their rights to fight for the “national liberation of ‘their’ territory 
from foreign occupation or aggression.”
12
  Orthodox Serbs saw themselves as liberating their 
land from the Islamic Ottoman occupiers.  The Bosniaks were defending themselves against Serb 
oppression.
13
  Kosovars were fighting on behalf of Albanians targeted by Serbs, and the Serbs 




themselves from “Roman Catholic (Croat) and Islamic (Bosnian Muslim) rule.”
14
  In this 
narrative, there was no truly innocent party.  
In 1999, The Hague indicted Milosevic for war crimes in Kosovo and later gave the 
additional charge of genocide for his alleged involvement in the massacre of 7,000 Muslim men 
at Srebrenica in July 1995.
15
  His trial began in 2001, with Milosevic refusing to recognize the 
charges, claiming that Yugoslavia had experienced a civil war, which did not constitute 
genocide.
16
  Before sentencing, Milosevic suspiciously died in his cell from a heart attack in 
2006.  He was never formally punished for his crimes, but his legacy haunts the Balkans to this 
day. 
At the heart of the current instability facing a post-Yugoslav identity are the traumatic 
events leading up to and following the war.  Extreme nationalism manipulated by power-hungry 
leaders transformed a cohesive federation of Southern Slavs into a disjointed collection of 
contentious national identities. While establishing a former identity might not strike many in the 
West, who have relatively “stable,” long-standing  national identities, as important, it is a 
political and cultural imperative for people facing transitional histories.  Not only does 
acknowledging a former identity allow for a coherent historical narrative, but it also creates a 
striking point of opposition for those hoping to take their country in a new direction.  
Currently, the republics of the former Yugoslavia, more than any other Eastern European 
country, are struggling to determine how to understand and represent their former and future 
national identities.  In fact, Yugoslav national identity is both the culprit and the victim of the 
Yugoslav War.  Shirin Deylami explains that, “claims to nationality operate differently than 
other identity claims. This is because national identity is instantiated through sameness rather 
than difference.”
17




culture, united on the basis of a shared descent.”
18
  But the desire for sameness and coherency 
ultimately led to Yugoslavia’s unraveling.  Yugoslavia tried to encourage loyalty to a larger 
nation, but the relatively recent constructions of a Southern Slav identity coupled with an 
economic crisis made coherency impossible to maintain.  Eventually, the lack of a longstanding 
historical (Yugoslav) identity led to the rise of nationalism, which was informed, in large part, by 
nostalgia for a past that never was and a belief that too many sacrifices were made for a Southern 
Slav identity.  
YUGONOSTALGIA AND THE COMIC FRAME: WHERE COMMUNISM MEETS 
CAPITALISM  
The complicated entanglement of national identity claims, misplaced ideological 
loyalties, and nostalgia created a commemorative nightmare for Southern Slavs hoping to 
acknowledge the past with the intent of putting it behind them.  Because understanding, much 
less collective understanding, proved so difficult, the Urban Movement along with local artists 
looked elsewhere for answers.  Specifically, the organization looked East and West in hopes of 
finding a history more to their liking.  This is precisely the historical revisionism that Jameson 
wrote about when he stated that nostalgia prevents the “lived possibility of experiencing history 
in some active way.”
19
  But the active engagement of history that Jameson craves cannot be 
forced upon traumatized subjects; rather, some publics will need more time and distance to make 
sense of their lived experiences. 
Curiously, the pop monuments of the former Yugoslavia actually create space for the 
possibility of an active engagement with the past by encouraging further memory work within a 
comic frame.  Cheree Carlson explains that, “comedy is defined in the Burkean fashion as a 
perspective that reduces social tension and adds balance to our world view.”
20




tension is advantageous for the day-to-day existence of communities, but the entanglement of 
conflicted memories along with transitional identities makes "balance" difficult to achieve.    In 
this case, the comic frame houses a war-torn Yugoslavian identity and a nostalgic desire to return 
to Yugoslavia.  Thus, the frame holds nostalgic contradictions in the form of Yugonostalgia. 
While Chapter four examined the Bulgarian people’s longing for the time before 
capitalism, Yugoslavia has an even more strained relationship with nostalgia.  Many citizens of 
former Yugoslavia paradoxically long for the return of the Yugoslav state.  Curiously, the 
prosperity and peace many citizens nostalgically recall was made possible through the 
(sometimes) forceful suppression of ethnic and religious differences.   The Yugoslav state was 
unable to maintain cultural and political unity and dissolved into a bloody civil war by the end of 
the century.  In recent years, many Eastern European scholars have explored the idea of 
Yugonostalgia as it continues to shaped public memory in the Balkans.
21
  Yugonostalgia is a 
“revisiting of the collective experience of citizens whose individual lives were embedded in the 
social life of the collapsed state.”
22
   Some scholars view this affective longing for the past as 
politically and emotionally counter-productive while others have insisted that Yugonostalgia 
produces a connection to the past that is culturally valuable.
23
   
Regardless of the ethics of nostalgia, the people of the former Yugoslavia have, by choice 
or by default, embraced a memory of the past that whitewashes many of the crimes committed in 
the name of their country.  Evoking a vision of the past to promote politics in the present is 
nothing new for the people of the Balkans. Throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, politicians 
capitalized on the discontent of their citizens. As fewer resources became available, more 
skirmishes erupted near various national borders.  Politicians like Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo 




uneasy union based on Slavic identity rather than their “natural” cultural or religious affiliations. 
Milosevic and Tudjman’s arguments relied on what Svetlana Boym calls a “restorative 
nostalgia,” which capitalizes on a nationalist sentiment aimed at “reviving, rebuilding, and 
providing an ‘awakening for the masses.’”
24
  Milosevic used the idea of Kosovo as a sacred 
homeland constantly under siege by the Albanians to rally the Serbian people into action. 
Tudjman insisted that Croatia, like Slovenia, had more similarities with Western Europe than the 
Balkans. Consequently, Milosevic and Tudjman were able to rhetorically construct a (nostalgic) 
victimized national identity that was in need of military defense.  
 While Milosevic was able to successfully create nostalgia for a nationalist-based Serbian 
identity, it was the surprising nostalgia that developed after the war which shocked public 
memory scholars.  For Boym, the people of the former Yugoslavia are expressing nostalgia for 
nostalgia.  In other words, the people of Yugoslavia long for the construction of an identity 
shaped by a false nostalgia.  Additionally, they are mourning the loss of an unsustainable dream 
while not recognizing their own participation in its failure.  
Public memory scholars other than Boym have analyzed the role of nostalgia in 
Southeastern Europe as well.  Dubravka Ugresic has adopted the position that nostalgia can be a 
productive reckoning with the past but can also fall victim to a capitalist contradiction.
25
  For 
Ugresic, Yugonostalgia serves as a way to repackage the socialist era so that consumers can feel 
good about buying into it.  Finally, Zala Volcic has written extensively on Yugonostalgia 
building on the last two authors to create more categories of nostalgic inquiry.  Volcic suggests 
that Boym argues that restorative nostalgia “attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost 
home… [It] does not think of itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition.”
26
 Alternatively, 




away from the contradictions of modernity… [it] thrives in the longing itself, and delays the 
homecoming wistfully, ironically, desperately.”
27
  
Volcic believes that both restorative and reflective nostalgia can be productive for 
identities and ideologies in transition, but she fears that Yugonostalgia has capitalized on a form 
of mourning that erases the violence of the past.  Volcic is convinced that Yugoslavia suffers 
from a form of nostalgia “that positions itself as a therapeutic longing for the past” by hiding the 
powerful structures that benefit from such an uncritical perspective.
28
  Volcic concludes, “The 
threat of nostalgia lies in its benign form, which allows the various social actors to rewrite and 
repackage for resale the years of Yugoslav unity.  It also allows them to continue to deny 
responsibility for the wars and their aftermath.”
29
 
For the purposes of this discussion, the crux of the argument relies on the recognition that 
irony encourages those longing for an idealized or unrealized past to question both their current 
desires and what it is they think they have lost.  In fact, according to Volcic, the hope to return to 
a time when Yugoslavia was still possible is an inherently ironic desire. Volcic explains,  
These celebrants of Yugo-nostalgia suggest they can resuscitate what was best about the 
old Yugoslavia, now that it has been destroyed.  In this respect, Yugo-nostalgia serves as 
an avoidance mechanism that postpones indefinitely a crucial reckoning with the socialist 





Similarly, Croatian author Dubravka Ugresic expresses concern that the irony of Yugonostalgia 
is lost on its enablers.  Volcic summarizes Ugresic stating, “If socialism relied on the promise of 
a Utopia yet to come, capitalism feeds on a sense of loss—a lack to be filled in with consumer 
goods.”
31
  Therefore, “Yugonostalgia mobilizes a sense of loss that is, ironically, borrowed and 
exploited by the postsocialist promoters of capitalist commerce.”
32
 Ugresic’s insights are 




past when the promise of a future dream was possible, precisely because it was unrealized.  Two, 
the complete contradiction of lived experience and historical revisionism suggests that a space of 
ironic reflection may be the best strategy currently available for public reconciliation.   
 The following section describes the erection of the Bruce Lee monument and the reaction 
to its subsequent removal.  Additionally, I explore the ironic elements of the Bruce Lee 
monument before moving onto the larger ethical implications of its physical and symbolic 
demise.  Finally, the section examines how the ironic monumental disruption is particularly well-
suited to intervene in nostalgic narratives and create space for public deliberation in the 
aftermath of war.   
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BRUCE LEE’S REPRESENTATIONAL POLITICS: AN IRONIC MONUMENTAL 
DISRUPTION IS REMOVED BUT NOT FORGOTTEN   
On November, 26, 2005, the Urban Movement along with the people of Mostar erected 
the monument to Bruce Lee; within a few days, someone vandalized it.  Lee’s nunchuck was 
broken off and the pedestal on which he stood was marked with graffiti.  The Urban Movement 
initially cleaned off the monument but vandals targeted it again. Finally, the city removed the 
monument for “repairs,” but it never returned.  Dunja Blazevic, who was involved with the 
“De/construction of Monuments” project, and is currently on the board of the Sarajevo Center 
for Contemporary Arts, explained that they [the board] were all hopeful that the monument 
would be taken out of storage and placed back on display because it “was such a shame” to 
remove it. 
33
  Local Bosnians within Mostar have had a very different reaction to its removal.  In 
an article in the Daily Times, an anonymous local proclaimed, “Once again we’ve shown what 
Balkan savageness is!”
34
   
While the immediate response might have been one of disbelief or disgust, more recent 
interviews suggest that the people of Bosnia are rather cynical about the monument and its 
desecration.  One woman explained that the monument seemed like an impractical publicity 
stunt.  She suggested that people around town were annoyed by the monument because the 
money should go to people who were genuinely suffering.
35
  She explained that the erection of 
the monument had a negative impact on the town because it drew attention to how little had 
changed.
36
  Furthermore, she claimed that people around town believed that the city did not 
remove the monument because it was in harm’s way, but rather, because its repeated defacement 
drew further attention to the conflict still brewing locally.  She speculated that local politicians 




city were as bad as ever.  The frequent attacks got people talking and that encouraged further 
criticism of the current political system.
37
 Another Serbian man simply explained, “That 
monument is a joke.”
38
 
Initially, the Bruce Lee monument garnered tremendous media attention as the 
international community tried to make sense of Yugoslavia’s history in the context of this 
commemorative act and vice versa.  For the most part, the reaction was playful with a few 
headlines bordering on the condescending. NPR called it a “Unique Statue Choice,” while 
several other news outlets chose to parody one of Lee’s films, Enter the Dragon.
39
  Other outlets 
withheld judgment but were perplexed as to the meaning of the monument.   
On the most basic level, the Bruce Lee monument is an ironic choice to symbolize peace 
as the man behind the statue is internationally known as the most recognizable face of kung-fu 
fighting.  He made his reputation along with his tremendous wealth as the star of violent 
entertainment.  The Urban Movement also seemingly contradicts themselves when they stated 
that Bruce Lee could virtually offend no one; yet, they positioned him facing north in a 
traditional defensive martial arts pose.  The choice to have Lee facing north was intentional as 
the UM feared that, in any other position, Lee would appear aggressive toward Croats to the west 
or Serbians to the east.
40
 
Also, Lee is a particularly curious choice because he is a visible symbol of the Eastern 
world meeting the Western.  His success can largely be attributed to the fact that he was able to 
appeal to both America and China, Hollywood and martial arts.  Yugoslavia, on the other hand, 
worked tirelessly to avoid aligning themselves with either Eastern or Western ideological 
positions.  Zala Volcic explains, “With the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 






  So in an attempt to construct a model of peace, justice, and 
multiculturalism, the Urban Movement relied on both the East and West in order to offer a path 
for the future of Yugoslavia. Whether the group was intentionally positioning themselves in 
opposition to NAM politics is unclear.   The fact that Bruce Lee served as the ideal multicultural 
representation for Bosnians suggests that an old sense of identity (refusing ideological alignment 
through NAM) is fading or forgotten. 
Beyond the ironic decision to construct a Bruce Lee monument, the monument itself is a 
valuable example of an ironic monumental disruption.  Bruce Lee as a Hollywood celebrity is 
not ironic; Bruce Lee as the epitome of peace and multiculturalism situated in the middle of a 
war-torn city with no ties to him whatsoever is decidedly ironic.   The monument defies 
commemorative expectations and redefines what constitutes a valuable public memory.  It is not 
only the artifact itself that produces irony; the monument’s ironic read is entirely contingent 
upon the viewing audience’s engagement with it.  But while the monument has an uncanny—
even illogical presence—it serves as an important disruption and placeholder of meaning for the 
Bosnian people who are still coming to terms with their historical and ideological narratives.   
The monument to Bruce Lee demonstrates the rhetorical power of ironic monumental 
disruptions.  Its erection created tremendous debate, and its frequent defacement led to 
discussions of the failed political policies of an inept Bosnian government.  While people still 
strongly express nostalgia for Yugoslavia throughout Bosnia and Serbia, the citizens of these 
countries also recognize that the tenuous union they formed ended in an unspeakably violent 
cultural and political implosion.  The idealized (or failed) cultural narrative of Yugoslavia as it is 
depicted through the monument to Bruce Lee creates enough confrontation with the past to open 




removal of the Bruce Lee monument encouraged the Bosnian people to critically examine their 
lives after the war; a discussion which was unthinkable immediately following the trauma and 
tragedy of the 1990s.   
MULTICULTURAL MARTIAL ARTISTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE  
On a theoretical level, the Lee monument creates important space for the discussion of 
trauma, identity, and representation.  As referenced in the introduction, creating and representing 
the narrative of the Yugoslav War was—and is—a virtual impossibility.  While a genocide of 
that magnitude defies comprehension, the relative newness of the events and the incoherency 
brought on by transitional ideologies further complicates and constrains the possibility of 
monumental representation.
42
  In regards to the former, Jacques Lacan explains that traumatic 
events, such as genocide, refuse symbolism, and consequently articulation and understanding but 
that does not mean that the trauma does not continue to affect those subjected to it. He claims,  
Trauma, insofar as it has a repressing action, intervenes after the fact.  At this specific 
moment, something of the subject becomes detached from the symbolic world that he is 
engaged in integrating.  From then on, it will no longer be something belonging to the 
subject. The subject will no longer speak of it, will no longer integrate it. Nevertheless, it 




The monument to Lee creates a displacement of meaning that allows traumatized subjects access 
to an affective space that does not directly confront the idea of war.  Local artists in the Balkans 
seem to recognize the limitations of comprehension and representation as well and instead have 
created affective rather than literal connections to the events of the 1990s.  Channeling affect 
through monuments is nothing new; rather, it is how these artists chose to capture the affective 
dimensions of violence, nationalism, and prejudice that proved perplexing.    
 But it is likely precisely because Bruce Lee, Bob Marley, and others initially appear so 




a case in point, the Bosnian government did not intervene or refuse the Urban Movement’s 
request to erect a monument to Bruce Lee because they wrongfully assumed that it would go 
largely uncontested. Choosing a symbol simply because it seems inoffensive and removed from 
history is unusual to say the least; the fact that that inoffensive symbol ended up being highly 
contested, vandalized, and removed speaks to the undeniable but unstable political power of 
commemoration.   
  Even the man behind the monument chose the subject based on the fact that it could not 
possibility offend anyone.  When Christian Science Monitor asked Gatalo to explain why the 
Urban Movement chose Lee, Gatalo responded, “He’s far [enough] away from us that nobody 
can ask what he did during World War II, during World War I, or what his ancestors did under 
Turkey.  He’s... not Catholic, not Orthodox, not Muslim…. Bruce Lee is part of our idea of 
universal justice—that the good guys can win.”
44
  While the desire to “win” seems odd in this 
context and likely speaks to a decade’s long war with no “winners,” the newspaper did note that 
“the Bruce Lee tribute will stand as the only monument raised in postwar Bosnia without an 




 Lee provided escapism from the harsh reality of Yugoslavia’s collapse.  The problem was 
that the Bosnian people did not seem entirely ready to escape the past; on some level, they seem 
to enjoy fantasizing about its possibility. What remains of this multicultural symbol of peace is 
an empty granite pedestal with Lee’s name and several etchings that say “Snooki and Jwoww 
were here,”
 








COMMEMORATIVE ETHICS AND CONSUMPTION: HOW TO REPRESENT WAR
 Finally turning to the commemorative ethics of the Lee monument and its eventual 
destruction and removal, the concept of the ironic monumental disruption proves valuable 
precisely because it does not demand that people confront their past in a particular way; rather, 
the rhetorical act of disruption simply asks its audience to bring all perspectives into a 
momentary dialogue.  Many scholars have suggested that it was—and is—the inability to create 
a cohesive and coherent understanding of national identity after the war that has led to the 
intrusion of a Western, capitalist-based mythos and the subsequent creation of non-representative 
commemorative works.
47
  Yet again, a transitional history that simultaneously admires and 
admonishes both capitalism and communism is difficult to represent without reifying one 
position over another. 
Serbian visual artist Milica Tomic and others have explained that rather than confront the 
devastating war that ended only a decade ago, Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats have instead chosen 
to ascribe a new set of values to their countries by commemorating a history and multicultural 
narrative that never was.  Additionally, Volcic reiterates her concerns, stating, “The politics of 
Yugoslav identity have not been eliminated but transformed and commodified within the context 
of political and economic globalization. Capitalism warps the past in order to commodify it. This 
impairs the chances for the emergence of real democratic reform based on the historical struggle 
against authoritarianism.”
48
  While Volcic and Tomic are not wrong, the commodification and 
consumption of Yugonostalgia in the current commemorative practices is not apolitical or anti-
democratic; it is the exact opposite.  
In an interview with Tomic, she expressed concern that all of the Western, pop statues 
came from a new culture of consumption and not production.
49




that a lack of understanding and identity encouraged a “turning to pop culture.”
50
  Tomic’s 
insights into popular culture and its obscuring effects are worth examining.  Tomic creates a 
binary between art and culture and says that art has the potential to create a rupture in meaning 
that “produces social and political power,” while culture, especially popular culture, 
“domesticates the rupture.”
51
  She insists that the artist or intellectual’s job is to force the rupture 
and be a part of the “world of production not the world of consumption.”
52
   
Tomic insists that it is important “to produce a living memory not a political project;” 
fortunately, the ironic monumental disruption of the Lee monument reveals that both realities are 
possible.
53
  The monument’s ability to extend time and ironically play with nostalgic identities 
creates space for subjects to interrogate their understanding of the war and its ideological 
implosion.  Interestingly, Tomic does not necessarily see the postponement of reckoning as an 
inherently bad thing.  She states, “You can’t start thinking and producing theories and 
remembering exactly in the moment when it happens or stops… you need time to understand 
what happens.… [M]onuments [like Lee] are postponing the moment of reckoning.”
54
  Much 
like Lacan, Tomic suggests that the memory is still there, somewhere, but creating time and 
distance for this memory to express itself can be both politically productive and paralyzing.
55
 
While Volcic and Tomic have important and valid critiques, they must also recognize that 
Lee and its companion monuments are the product of a confrontational irony that longs for a 
time when Yugoslavia was neither East or West.  The promise of Yugoslavia was still possible 
and monuments were frequently erected in its [the idea and the federation’s] honor.  As such, the 
monument to Lee bridges several symbolic gaps in Yugoslavia’s memory.  First, it purports to 
represent a multicultural ethic, a buzzword from the old Yugoslav days that led to the unraveling 




capitalism as he represents both the East and West while drawing attention to the fact that 
Yugoslavia is noticeably absent.  Third, in Lee’s destruction, the monument encourages people 
to question what underlying message the statue promotes and why that seemingly innocuous 
symbolism invites destruction.  Ultimately, the monument forces the various invested publics to 
forge complicated connections of identity, representation, and memory while questioning their 
contradictory understandings of past and present. 
The deliberative potential of engaging and consuming even the most naïve 
commemorative work is precisely why the concept of the ironic monumental disruption is a 
useful tool of inquiry. While nostalgia could easily obscure real historical and material realities 
in the former Yugoslavia, the (act of the) ironic monumental disruption encourages an 
engagement with multiple ideological perspectives.  The erection of the Lee monument 
reawakened old memories and anxieties about the war, its meaning, and how it shapes the future 
of the Balkans.  Tomic confirmed the potential of the ironic monumental disruption when she 
stated: “Even if you do something in a naïve, wrong way, it still has big potential,” to produce a 
living memory.
56
  She insists that “pop art has the potential of misleading or misinterpretation, 
but that is ok, I have nothing against it… even if it’s not perfect, it brings its own knowledge, and 
by that, I mean, political and social power.”
57
  She sees value in the Lee artifact because his 
commemoration draws further attention to the tragedy of a failed Yugoslavia and the inadequacy 
of static commemorative practices.  
While Tomic’s own political investments lean toward performance art, she is warming to 
the Bruce Lee statue.
58
  She explained that her initial concerns over this particular piece of art 






Tomic was intrigued that the removal of the monument had created a critical dialogue within the 
city of Mostar.  
RESPONDING TO IRONIC MONUMENTAL DISRUPTIONS:  CONFRONTATIONS 
WITH COMMEMORATION  
Out of all of the case studies, the defacement and subsequent removal of the Bruce Lee 
monument is the most confrontational example of an ironic monumental disruption and its 
deliberative potential.  Bruce Lee’s monument in Mostar, Bosnia, demonstrates how irony can 
serve as a mediator between both the memory of Yugoslavia and the extreme nationalism that 
led to its demise.  Ironically, the rhetorical harnessing of nostalgia through comic frames 
produces both the longing for Yugoslavia and the nationalism which made the Slavic federation 
impossible. As stated before, the juxtaposition of irony and nostalgia provide productive 
frameworks from which to analyze traumatic histories.  Consequently, this case study shows that 
physical confrontations with ironic monumental disruptions have the potential to create 
additional psychological and political benefits.   
While the ironic monumental disruption encouraged the process of reflection and 
dialogue in the aftermath of the war, it was the violent confrontation and removal of the Bruce 
Lee monument that really garnered attention on the local level.  Author Michael Taussig argues 
that “defacement in general tends simultaneously to unmask and to enhance the power of 
images.”
60
  Building on Taussig, John Peffer claims that such acts of vandalism are usually about 
“seeking attention, depriving an image of its power, and diminishing a political power by 
assailing its symbols.”
61
  He also states that examining these acts of vandalism is important 
because “we can witness individual attempts to come to terms with the problems of political and 






  The erection and subsequent removal of the Bruce Lee statue shows that there is 
on-going nostalgia for both multiculturalism and nationalism even while recognizing that both 
manifested themselves in the failed experiment of Yugoslavia.  In other words, Bruce Lee is a 
testament to irony and an acknowledgment that it is sometimes easier to live with contradictions 
that obscure tragedies. 
Consequently, the other pop monuments appearing in Yugoslavia have the potential to 
provide productive spaces of reflection as well—especially when traumatic histories are 
uncovered through metaphorical and physical acts of desecration.  Recognizing the 
interdependence of nostalgia (as it is produced through a comic frame), irony, and desecration in 
the former Yugoslavia, Bruce Lee will likely not be the last monument constructed and 
destroyed while acknowledging the utopian dream of Yugoslavia.  For now, even the memory of 
Lee [and the leftover pedestal] serves as an ironic monumental disruption that transforms public 
space and creates anxiety-provoking discursive openings for Bosnians to engage.  
In a final note on irony and nostalgia, the pedestal of the former Bruce Lee monument 
stands in clear view of a giant cross on the hillside.  This hill is known as Hum Hill and it marks 
the spot where Catholic Croatian snipers and Orthodox Serbs murdered Bosniak civilians. The 
local Catholic Church constructed the cross in 2000 so that they could “spread the fruit of peace 
to all sides of the world.”
63
  The Muslim population in town said that the cross was disrespectful, 
but Catholic groups claimed that Ottoman (Muslim) Turks built the Old Bridge and that 
Christians deserved a symbol of their own.
64
  The cross on Hum Hill is particularly painful 
because the hill served as the site of a sniper’s nest where Catholic Croat soldiers murdered 







It is perfectly poetic that Bruce Lee’s pedestal stands in the shadow of Hum Hill. The 
scars of war remain visible and the inability to peacefully reconcile multiculturalism lives on. 
The removal of the monument by city officials was the impetus that encouraged people to talk 
more freely about inept city politics and political violence.
66
  Regardless of what the Urban 
Movement intended, the Bruce Lee monument has become an important symbol of the 
government promoting politics over the welfare of its people.  Most importantly, the former 
monument to Bruce Lee reminds the people of Mostar that the past still casts a shadow on the 
present.  
To conclude this case study, the Bruce Lee monument shows the political potential of the 
concept of the ironic monumental disruption for monumentality.  This chapter demonstrated how 
the Lee monument is an ironic monumental disruption that represents a narrative directly 
contradicting its stated ideals and the historical reality of the former Yugoslavia.  Put simply, a 
comic frame situates the monument and gives the artifact and the memory it represents more 
historical, political, and memorial context.  Thus, the monument relies on the audience to engage 
it and give it its representational power.  Additionally, the monument to Lee serves as a 
disruption of commemorative space that allows Bosnians psychological distance so that they can 
try to untangle their relationship to the Yugoslav War.  The monument creates distance by 
indirectly drawing attention to the nostalgic fantasy many Bosnians express about Yugoslavia. 
The monument also shows that one memory can be symbolically replaced with another.   Finally, 
the ultimate destruction and removal of the monument shows that Yugoslavians still need more 
deliberative spaces to work through their past in the present. The next chapter builds upon the 
conceptualization of the ironic monumental disruption to show how irony interacts with a tragic 






Figure 5.5       Figure 5.6 
 
Close view of Lee pedestal and Cross on top of Hum Hill in Mostar, Bosnia 
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Chapter Six:  Memento Park in Budapest, Hungary 
 
Figure 6.1 
The view at the entrance of Memento Park 
 
ALL ROADS LEAD TO REAGONOMICS: BUDAPEST “LIBERATES” ITSELF FROM 
COMMUNISM  
Within the past year, Hungary’s abrupt ideological transformation manifested itself in the 
construction of a life-sized statue of Ronald Reagan in the same square as the infamous Soviet 
Liberators of Hungary monument.
1
  In 2007, and again in 2011, local groups asked the 
Hungarian government to remove the Liberation monument from downtown Szabadság tér 




Budapest.  The hammer-and-sickle adorned obelisk commemorates Hungary’s gratitude to the 
Red Army for defending their homeland against the Nazis.  Even more interesting, the 
monument is the only one in town that requires its own security detail.
2
  The “Liberation” 
monument continues to anger Hungarians as they repeatedly desecrate it.  Vandals have 
scratched the Russian figures off or painted over them forcing the Hungarian government to 
surround the space with two layers of iron fencing and police protection.
3
  The debate over the 
Liberation monument’s prominence rages on as well.  The communist symbol angered 
Hungarian Janos Meszaros who claimed that it was an unworthy political compromise.  “In the 
world of symbols, this is the murder of a country…. The fact that it's still standing after 1989 is 
an insult.  The communists ruined Hungary.  This statue reminds me of it.”
4
  
For many Hungarians, the solution is to remove the statue.  But Russia’s ambassador to 
Hungary, Igor Savolsky, has warned, “This is an unworthy sacrilege.  If this statue is removed, it 
would greatly worsen the atmosphere of binary relations.”
5
  Since 1996 a treaty stating that 
Russian artifacts cannot be disturbed has legally protected the monument.  Adding insult to 
injury to those who suffered under Stalinism, the monument displaced the Hungarian flag which 
resided in the same place for centuries.
6
  In the event that the government takes down the 
monument, they will relocate it to Memento Park, a space dedicated to Hungary’s political 
history of communism.   
The choice to erect a Ronald Reagan monument within the controversial space of 
Freedom Square comes as little surprise. In order to diminish the memory of the Liberation 
monument, local officials added President Reagan as a compromise.  Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban was overjoyed by the new Reagan monument. He discussed Reagan’s “undying 




despite the difficulties we should persist in the struggle for freedom and independence.”
7
 




Speaking to the unusual configuration of politics in the capital city of Budapest, journalist 
Marton Baranyi stated, “Reagan will be like David walking past Goliath… The place will have a 
new meaning and a new atmosphere.”
9
  The Reagan monument reveals that the ideology of 
capitalism along with struggles for national autonomy have created some unusual bedfellows. 
The memories of 1945 (Soviet “liberation”), 1956 (Hungarian Revolution), and 1989 (decline of 
communism) continue to be pivotal moments for Hungarian identity today.
10
   
 
Figure 6.2     Figure 6.3 
AP Photo/Reagan Monument in Budapest and Soviet Liberation Monument in Budapest, Hungary 
 
This final case study uses the city of Budapest and its commemorative project, Memento 
Park, to illustrate why the concept of the ironic monumental disruption is a useful tool for 
understanding the politics and ethics of commemoration.  I approached Memento Park 
differently than the other two case studies because no additional controversy ever accompanied 
its original erection.  No one harmed or adjusted the monuments once they were within the walls 




narrate the walk through the park and provide “context” for the tragic framing.  The tragic frame 
“requires a sacrificial scapegoat who suffers, dies, or is banished by society in a symbolic 
attempt to rid itself of chaos, disease and impurity.”
11
  Specifically, Memento Park uses the 
tragic frame (combining the lack of nostalgia with irony to ridicule the former power of the 
monuments and physically banish them to the outskirts of town) to mock the monuments and 
arrive at a singular conclusion—communism was misguided. While the previous two chapters 
demonstrated how ironic monumental disruptions operated within comic frames—where both 
communist and capitalist nostalgic fantasies were indulged and engaged—this chapter 
demonstrates how an ironic intervention produces less deliberation, but creates more conclusions 
when interrupting a tragic frame.  In the case of Hungary, communism is the scapegoat for all 
societal ills.  The “choice” to adopt the economic and ideological system of capitalism appears 
over-determined in the park. The park does not even present communism as a viable choice.  
In order to understand how Memento Park shapes its audience and vice versa, I analyzed 
the commemorative site from multiple angles. Initial research used newspaper articles and 
website postings to determine how the local and international community viewed the park.  
Additionally, I research controversies within the city of Budapest to understand how other 
commemorative artifacts are treated.  Next, I used Hungary’s historical to highlight major 
ideological shifts.  Finally, I studied the monuments in their original locations along with their 
new locations to see how recontextualizing them altered their message.  Within the park, I 
extensively relied on the tour guide, the tour book, and the website to guide the “read” of the 
commemorative space.  All of these various contexts shaped the decision to use irony as a 




monuments, what was unclear was how this interaction affected the space’s deliberative 
potential. 
The stories used to explain the statues, the on-site interviews, and the deeper 
contextualization of Budapest and the commemorative space suggested that  Memento Park was 
crafting a message that worked in opposition to an idea (communism) rather than allowing for an 
open space of interpretation that allowed people to come to their own conclusions.  Diverse 
perspectives were not encouraged; rather, the message, consciously or unconsciously, is 
reinforced that communism was a bad joke.  Memento Park created no space for nostalgia while 
interacting with the monuments.  The space already contained the answer to the historical 
“problem” of communism.  Democracy [aka capitalism] was and is the answer.   
The “conclusion” is not surprising considering that Hungarians do not look to 
communism for escapism like their Bosnian and Bulgarian neighbors.  The Hungarian people’s 
relationship to communism (specifically Stalinism) is decidedly un-nostalgic and they have 
narrativized those years as an oppressive chapter reminiscent of fascism before that.  Without 
any lingering nostalgia (or desire to re-envision the dream of the past), Hungarians appear more 
than happy to place blame on communism as a way to explain many of the countries’ social, 
political, and economic ills.  
In this vein, Hungarians produce a distinctly different commemorative space where they 
perform nostalgia as a way to encourage consumption not reflection.  The ironic intervention 
serves to reinforce Hungary’s new (capitalist) ideological loyalties not open up space for debate.  
Where Bulgarians created a temporary ironic monumental disruption through graffiti and 
Bulgarians constructed an ironic monumental disruption into a monument, the creators behind 




on an ironic read of Memento Park.  It is important to note that the performance has its own 
political value (i.e. humor helps Hungarians assert themselves over their past oppression), but it 
does not serve to open up the same ethical spaces of open deliberation as the other two sites do.   
This chapter demonstrates that ironic monumental disruptions produce alternative reads 
when implemented within a tragic frame where the conclusions have already been determined.   
Memento Park does not display its statuary in hopes that visitors will make sense of a contested 
space.  Those who personally experienced Stalinism in Eastern Europe are encouraged to use the 
space of Memento Park to toy with the monuments’ former messages of authority.  Audiences 
not directly affected by communism (or who were born after Cold War politics had diminished) 
see the park as an ill-conceived historical chapter to be overcome in the natural progression 
towards capitalism.  Neither audience is encouraged to engage in dialogue with the artifacts of 
Memento Park or to try to understand the monuments’ deeper historical, political, and 
commemorative contexts.  Channeling an ironic monumental disruption through a straw man 
argument simply presents communism as a static, foolhardy, ideology.  The space fails to 
encourage deliberation because it forces the audience to begin with the conclusion that 
communism was a simple joke.   
The following section briefly highlights two important ideological shifts in the 
progression of communism to show how Stalinism informs the current commemorative project 
and why nostalgia is decidedly absent. Next, I discuss the inspiration behind and the visitor’s 
experience within Memento in order to see how the ironic monumental disruption intervenes 
within this space.  Finally, I examine the commemorative site in order to see how visitors are 





GOULASH COMMUNISM AND THE KADAR COMPROMISE: CAPITALISM MEETS 
COMMUNISM  
As discussed in Chapter two, the Soviet Union made Hungary into a Soviet satellite state 
after the War, but communism never sat well with Hungarians who aspired to align themselves 
ideologically with Western Europe.  Many Hungarians insisted that the Soviet enforced their 
model of governance without the Hungarian population’s consent.
12
  Whether or not the 
population consented is still up for some debate. Elections immediately following WWII 
reflected the political tensions between Hungary and Soviet-style communism as the 1945 
election saw the more nationalistic Smallholders receive 57% of the vote, while the Hungarian 
Communist Party and Social Democrats received 17% each.
13
  The Communist Party in Hungary 
would claim sweeping political dominance within the next two years, but some historians have 
called the legitimacy of these elections into question.
14
 
The tension between nationalist Hungarian pride and Soviet imperialism erupted only a 
few years later when the Soviet Union demanded that the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy 
step down, leading to an armed revolt by the Hungarian people. The brief chaos that ensued 
became known as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in which the Hungarian people fought the 
Soviet Union for democratic reform in the streets of Budapest.  As a revolutionary act, 
“Hungarian leaders declared the country’s neutrality and announced plans to adopt a multiparty 
system,” but this action was, yet again, put down by Soviet force.
15
  
In the wake of the turmoil, Hungarians destroyed communist monuments and were 
subsequently arrested by local communist officials.  This would not be the first or the last time 
that Hungarians made a bid for national and economic reforms. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets 




Soviets eventually squelched the insurrection and tried Nagy for treason. To prevent Nagy from 
becoming a symbol of martyrdom, the government hanged him and buried him face down in an 
unmarked grave.
16
  Once the period of Soviet occupation ended, Kadar slowly moved his 
government toward a more Western model.  Economic changes were implemented that allowed 
for more private enterprise and greater wage differentiation.
17
 
The restructuring of the economic system became known as “Goulash Communism,” 
which was a tongue-and-cheek way of saying that, like the popular stew goulash, the Hungarian 
people were going to embrace a mixing of economic ingredients and ideologies.  In hopes of 
gaining the support of formerly alienated Hungarians, the “Kadar Compromise” promoted the 
proliferation of private enterprise and encouraged more dialogue and debate about cultural and 
political life.
18
  These ideological changes continued to reshape the social and economic 
landscape of Hungary leading up to the fall of communism in 1989.  
Curiously, the Hungarian government credits many of these changes not solely to the 
Hungarian people themselves but to their Western counterparts.  Upon the erection of Ronald 
Reagan’s statue in Freedom Square, the Hungarian government released a statement saying that 
they wanted to honor President Reagan for “bringing the Cold War to a conclusion, and for the 
fact that Hungary regained its sovereignty in the process.”
19
  Regardless of President Reagan’s 
perceived involvement in Eastern European politics, memories of 1989 continue to find their 
way into the city. 
The starts and stops of democratization continue to be visible in Budapest today.  The 
Hungarian people participate in a delicate balancing act between erasing and enhancing the past 
and present. In Budapest monuments line almost every street corner and address virtually every 




reappropriated most of the historical reminders of communism within the city.  They placed 
some of the monuments in museums and destroyed others.  A few monuments were saved and 
place within Memento Park in the countryside. The once prominent monuments are now 
accessible by a bus ride and a $20 tour ticket. 
THE INSPIRATION BEHIND MEMENTO PARK  
 After 1989, the city of Budapest faced a dilemma: what should they do with their 
monuments to communism?  The city organized a committee with the task of identifying any 
offensive statuary. As the Memento Park visitor’s guide explains: 
As a result of this committee, a list of 42 statues was put together which provided the 
basis for the architectural proposal of the Statue [Memento] Park. The subject generated 
lots of interest: in newspaper articles, TV and radio programs numerous opinions on what 
the statue park should be like. Eventually two main streams of thought emerged: the more 





The guide explains that they were fortunate to find another route altogether when architect Akos 
Eleod proposed a design based on the poem “One Sentence about Tyranny” published during the 
1956 uprising by Hungarian poet Gyula Illyes.  Eleod explains his choice stating, “This Park is 
about dictatorship, but as soon as this can be talked about, described and built, the park is already 
about democracy.”
21
 But Eleod is not operating under a false assumption that the park will affect 
everyone in the same way. He recognizes that the tyranny of dictatorship will not resonate fully 
to those who have never experienced it. He asserts,  
A foreign tourist, for whom dictatorship is merely something they have read about, has 
completely different thoughts when in the park than the person with a tragic past, who 
lived here, survived and under the aegis of these statues takes the drama of his own 




Eleod’s description of the emotion contained within the park is a powerful reminder of why we 




political dilemmas as he tried to preserve the contested historical narrative.  Eleod struggled to 
represent the past without neutralizing it or elevating it. He explains his rhetorical trap: 
I needed to summarize the individual thought-provoking elements of a historical series of 
paradoxes into one conceptual thought process. Paradox, because these statues are both 
the reminders of an anti-democratic society and at the same time pieces of our history; 
paradox, because they are symbols of authority and at the same time works of art; and 
finally, paradox because despite the fact that they were without a doubt originally set up 
for the purpose of propaganda, in assigning them a new location, I deemed it important to 
avoid the possibility that they would become anti-propaganda, which would have been no 




Ultimately, the visitor’s guide celebrates Eleod’s accomplishments, claiming that he found a way 
to avoid all of the pitfalls of commemoration and instead created a space that honors the “dignity 
of democracy.”
24
  While the designer envisioned a noble park honoring dignity, not parody or 
derision, the unintended consequence of this vision is a narrative teeming with irony and political 
protest.  By attempting to avoid both nostalgia and irony, Eleod has unknowingly produced a 
strong anti-communist, pro-capitalist message.   
 
 
Figure 6.4                                                                   Figure 6.5 






A COMMUNIST GRAVEYARD 
In 1993, the Hungarian government financed Memento Park to house all of the remnants 
of Hungary’s communist past.  Even though the government relocated the commemorative 
markers to the outskirts of town, the politics surrounding them still reverberate throughout 
Budapest.  The removal of the statues has ultimately drawn more attention to the communist 
ideology it sought to repress as thousands of tourists travel to see the monuments within the park 
each year.
25
  The “Hammer and Sickle Tour” is a popular expedition guided by locals barely old 
enough to remember communism.  Customers take the Statue Park bus to a rural neighborhood 
outside of Budapest to walk through the park and buy a few kitschy souvenirs.  
The existence of Memento Park shows that the people of Budapest still allow the 
displaced monuments to shape their cultural identity while simultaneously hoping to dismiss 
their communist past.  Art Historian Geza Boros explains that through Memento Park,  
An “atmosphere of dictatorship” is created by these threatening monumental reminders of 
authority.  However, in their new location, the positioning of the statues and 
accompanying buildings demonstrate to us that they are now simply the historical 
witnesses of the fact that there was once an era which expressed itself through these 
threatening symbols.
26
   
 
Physically, Hungarians have kept the statues, and thus, the “history” intact, but they are choosing 
to transform the story communism represents.  
The designer of Memento Park recognizes that history cannot be erased entirely; rather, it 
should be used to understand contemporary times.  Furthermore, the memorial space in Budapest 
creates a tension between desecrating/erasing history and making it highly visible for 
consumptive purposes.  But not everyone likes the decontextualization of Memento Park. Many 
Hungarian scholars suggest that moving the monuments is analogous to erasing the past. Istvan 




better purpose if they had been left in place and labeled with information about their era.  You've 
removed the visible signs of our past, and it makes it easier to think that we had nothing to do 
with communism.  We cannot deny that they are part of our history.  Rather than target a statue, 
we should deal with the decades of dictatorship.”
27
 While all Hungarians cannot agree on the 
appropriate course of action when it comes to these painful physical reminders of the past, it is 
clear that Memento Park produces a complicated and compelling space of memory from which 
to examine the rhetoric of place and the concept of the ironic monumental disruption. 
  
 
Figure 6.6       Figure 6.7 
 
Stalin’s Boots after 1956 and Cubist Marx and Engels 
 
STANDING IN THE SHADOW OF STALIN: A DESCRIPTION OF MEMENTO PARK  
As mentioned previously, Memento Park resides within the larger confines of Statue 
Park. Statue Park is approximately the size of a football field and sits in the middle of a vacant 
lot in a rural neighborhood outside of Budapest. Whereas spaces of this magnitude are typically 




relegated to the periphery.  Houses, power lines, and highways are all visible from the park and 
add to its misplaced, or possibly displaced, feel. There is a surprising amount of dirt and little 
else in the way of landscaping. The placement of the park was undoubtedly an intentional choice 
as it diminishes the power of the statues by not allowing them to take up significant space within 
the city of Budapest. The park is almost reminiscent of an abandoned drive-in so typically seen 
in the American West. The objects speak to an important past that no longer has a place in 
contemporary times.  
The entry gate of Memento Park displays the great philosophers behind communism. The 
world’s only cubist statues of Marx and Engel flank one side of the red brick entryway while 
Lenin occupies the other. Directly south of the temple-like entryway is a long stretch of dirt in 
the shape of a trapezoid. This space is known as Witness Square. Both sides of Witness Square 
house propaganda films and artifacts from the communist era along with detailed narratives 
about the inspiration and construction of Memento Park. Most poignantly, Witness Square 
consists of a giant brick pedestal with a pair of boots atop it. This pedestal is an exact replica of 
the former grandstand which housed an eight meter tall monument to Joseph Stalin. During the 
revolution of 1956, Hungarians cut Stalin’s monument down to his boots to show that his 
dictatorship was an object of ridicule.
28
  The revolution was short-lived, however, and the 
communist powers in Hungary tried to reclaim this sacred space by affixing a red star to the 
pedestal and holding national rallies there.
29
  Today, this historical space is a parking lot, but the 
remnants of that revolutionary moment live on in Statue Park.  
While not necessarily the architect’s intent, Memento Park echoes the playful critique of 
communism encapsulated in Stalin’s “boots.”  Tour guides gleefully tell stories about covert acts 




dignity of Art” and the power of propaganda, but the stories used to explain Memento Park are 
not about art’s dignity, they are about the Hungarian people reclaiming dignity by mocking what 
they perceive as distasteful propaganda.  For instance, one particularly comical story told by the 
tour guide involved the granite relief of a Soviet soldier in the throes of battle.  Water discolored 
the stone in a rather unfortunate place on the soldier’s pants.  The guide suggested that 
Hungarians reveled in the public embarrassment of the Soviets and took it as a sign that at least 




  Figure 6.8:  Soviet Soldier 
 
Other humorous stories punctuate the tour in the park as well. The mocking of statuary 
seems harmless and commonplace, but these little critical acts are important agentic acts.  During 
the communist period in Hungary, ridiculing the Soviet Union was treasonous, but, as evidenced 




consequences for questioning the memory and motives of this historical chapter. Even the threat 
of punishment did not prevent Hungarians from making light of their situation. During the 
communist era, Hungarians would occasionally sneak a slice of bread into Lenin’s outstretched 
hand.  Slavoj Zizek explains the power of this little act of disobedience, asserting, “The 
materialization of ideology in external materiality reveals inherent antagonisms which the 
explicit formulation of ideology cannot afford to acknowledge.”
31
  
Another monument that drew the ire of the Hungarian people was the monument to the 
Hungarian Socialist Republic.  This monument, built in 1969, is one of the largest in Memento 
Park.  The guide insisted that the monument looked absolutely terrifying in its original 
placement.  Located on the Pest side of the city, the monument looked like “a huge giant was 
running out from among the trees of the City Park.”
32
  In order to combat the image of this 
intimidating figure, the people of Budapest began jokingly referring to the monument as the 
“cloakroom attendant.”  A common joke was that he was chasing after a patron saying, “Sir, you 
forgot your scarf!”
33
  These days, people enjoy imitating the “cloakroom attendant” or sliding 
down his pedestal.  The monument’s shockingly grand scale makes it an easy target for visitors 






Figure 6.9     Figure 6.10 
Statue of Lenin and Cloakroom Attendant 
 
 Many of the other monuments have comedic bents as well. Locals placed one Soviet 
monument in cement up to his knees to show how limited his power now was.  Another female 
figure, of which there are only two in the park, was also an object of critique as the guide pointed 
out how “sturdy” she was.  The guide suggested that a “real” Soviet woman was supposed to be 
hearty and hardworking, “let’s just say, not exactly a supermodel.”
34
  Mocking the Soviet ideal 
was a central focus of the tour.  The communist refashioned Soviet busts so they would appear 
more attractive—or more Greek and less Russian.
35
  While most of the commentary was 
speculative, the speculation reveals that the public was willing to get in their subversive critiques 






Figure 6.11            Figure 6.12 
Soviet Woman  and Russian/Greek Bust 
 
 
The theme of revision also reverberates widely throughout the park. There were many 
stories of the communist government altering the historical narrative to place their policies and 
people in a better light.  In fact, the two monuments that stand opposite of the temple-like 
entryway have several competing stories surrounding them.  The two figures are the last stop on 
the “Hammer and Sickle Tour.”  Captain Steinmetz and Captain Ostapenko are considered 
important figures in the Siege of Budapest of 1944.  Steinmetz was a Hungarian-born captain in 
the Soviet Army. He was an integral force in the surrender of the Hungarians during WWII and 
died shortly thereafter.  The Soviet-backed government insisted that a political dissident 
murdered Steinmetz.  They [the government] then used the captain's demise as a rallying cry for 





Similarly, the Soviets blamed Captain Ostapenko’s death on a German captain who they 
later executed for the crime.  By all accounts, Ostapenko was likely not killed by enemy fire, but 
rather, died at the hands of bad luck or possibly even friendly fire.
36
  The Soviets went to great 
lengths to prevent this story from going public.  They claimed that Ostapenko was a martyr for 
the cause and dedicated a statue to him in 1951.  Ostapenko’s statue became one of the most 
debated in the 1990s, as Hungarians resented the Soviet symbolism but grew accustomed to his 
presence located near the gateway to the city of Budapest.
37
  Finally, the Hungarian government 
removed his statue and placed it prominently in Memento Park, but the story of his inglorious 
end lives on for many Hungarians.  The tour of tyranny ends at this point. The guide proudly 
points out that the tour now takes a turn for democracy. The pathway to the exit is paved in white 
stone and represents the new terrain of freedom. 
But the terrain of freedom is not without its own propaganda.  The white rocks lead the 
visitor straight to the gift shop where they are able to purchase mugs adorned with Lenin’s face. 
There are old communist postcards and key chains for sale as well.  T-shirts with Marx’s 
likeness run about $30. Whether the message is intentional or not, the viewer is encouraged to 





   
Figure 6.13: Steinmetz and Ostapenko 
 
All of these stories, while amusing and occasionally heartbreaking, suggest that the 
architect might have created a relatively closed space of reflection.  Hungarians used these 
monuments as reminders of their own dignity—of the dignity they forged by mocking their lack 
of perceived dignity.  The Soviets (and the Communist Party in Hungary) created the monuments 
to represent a universal notion of brotherhood and communal sacrifice, but the aggressive 
intimidation which accompanied these messages undercut the [monuments'] political promise. 
The disconnect between the promise of equality and the historical experience of suffering could 
conceivably open up a space of deliberation, but unfortunately, the deliberation is already 
conducted on the visitor’s behalf.  The statues (as they are paired with the tour narrative) 
consciously attempt to perform as ironic monumental disruptions but ultimately fail to create 
much deliberative space because there is no real claim being made on behalf of communism.  
Rather, the monuments simply reinforce the pre-determined message that communism failed to 




communist statuary in Memento Park reveals that while the appearance of deliberation is there, 
the reality for Hungarians is that communism was never really a valid choice. 
IRONIC MONUMENTAL DISRUPTIONS: CONFLATING IRONY AND TRAGIC 
FRAMES 
As the other case studies have show, the dynamic application of irony can produce 
deliberative spaces while avoiding the pitfalls of reductionist critiques.  Irony creates critical 
space for dialogue by juxtaposing political positions and representations in order to highlight 
institutions of power, nostalgia, or gaps in the ideological narrative. Author Shane Michael Boyle 
explains that ironic critiques 
achieve political significance not by commenting on or reflecting the dominant social or 
political configuration, but rather through inserting the possibility of play into the system 
or exposing the fictive foundations of structuring power.  Again, these radical 
performances effect change not through didacticism, but rather by virtue of their play 
with authority, established hierarchies and normative values. As a type of prefigurative 
politics, they create something altogether different from the strategically imposed order 




Additionally, Boyle speaks to the potential of ironic protest within the space of Memento Park, 
insisting, “The effect of performative irony is not predetermined but rather depends on a 
subjective and contextually-dependent interpretation that is triggered by the performer’s 
purposeful imperfect citation of the rituals and operations of strategic power.”
39
  Building on 
Boyle, monuments-as-art typically encourage their viewers to have some distance between 
person and object. Whether this is physical or psychological distance is unimportant; it is simply 
the idea that the artwork is presenting an important idea for reflection. In this vein, Boyle insists 
that irony stimulates critical reflection and “should not merely be seen as pedagogical or 






Unfortunately, the analysis of Memento Park suggests that it [the park] utilizes critical 
irony to solidify an idea and then oppose it.  Much like the politics of counter-monuments, 
Memento Park creates a one dimensional depiction of communism (devoid of its ideological 
context) in order to contradict it.  Irony does not perform in Memento Park as it does in the other 
sites because of its tragic framing of historical perspectives.  Scholar Allen Carter explains how 
tragic frames transform identity stating, “At one moment the chosen victim is a part of the clan, 
being one of their members; a moment later it symbolizes something apart from them, being the 
curse they wish to lift from themselves.”
41
  For Hungarians, communism becomes the former 
source of meaning and stability that must be sacrificed in order to show a new allegiance to 
capitalism. 
 Namely, the park asks visitors to embrace “freedom” by rejecting communism and 
accepting capitalism.  Tourists assert themselves over (what is depicted through the Hungarian 
tour guide as) a naïve ideology by being “in” on the jokes.  Memento Park literally comes with 
instructions (in the form of a $15 tour book) on how to view the statues, what jokes accompany 
each statue, and how one should progress through the tour.
 42
   It is no coincidence that tourists 
are encouraged to buy communist tokens on the way out of the park.  You can own a piece of the 
memory. 
 Memento Park and its accompanying Statue Park do have their own political value but 
they do not live up to their stated intent.  Instead, Memento Park functions more like a closed 
circuit with the tour book dictating how the artifacts should be read.  The monuments become 
antagonistic critiques of a former history with little space for further interpretation.  The park 
positions the viewer to critique each monument’s privilege through acts of ironic sabotage not 




production and engagement of irony within open (or comic frames of meaning) that produce 
spaces of unsettled deliberation.  The Hungarian government salvaged all of the monuments in 
Memento Park to demonstrate that institutionalized power can be reclaimed and re-narrativized 
(in order to impose a critique on itself in the tragic frame).  The problem is that the resolution to 
this commemorative space is already a foregone conclusion. The space does not address any 
nostalgia for the past.  The space does not invite or encourage interrogation. The site holds no 
respect for the memory of communism at all, so it ends up reproducing its own propaganda.   
 As a case in point, Memento Park serves as a place where locals can consume their old 
history and describe how they laughed in the face of Stalinism.  Statue Park is not about play; it 
is about power.  Viewers are not encouraged to engage the ideas behind the monuments; the tour 
book and tour guide ask them to dismiss the historical episode.  Communism appears entirely 
devoid of meaning and context in the sanitized commemorative space.   The representational 
distinction is important in how it shapes the subjectivity and identity of those attending the park.  
The viewer is physically encouraged to walk away from the monuments without questioning 
how things could have been different.  The road to freedom is paved with tchotchkes. 
Needless to say, commemorative sites do not need to honor perceived sources of tragedy 
in order to communicate loss, but the designer constructed this site with that stated purpose.  The 
government salvaged the monuments precisely because communism was an undeniable part of 
Hungarian history—a history the park’s creator wanted to acknowledge.  But while making these 
monuments into silly jokes might create empowerment, irony, in this case, does not encourage 
further deliberation.  Ironic monumental disruptions have the ability to continue to speak to 
contemporary times by responding to ideological shifts but they need real political 




the “eternal truth” label onto monuments making them overstated symbols rather than sites of 
engagement.   As discussed by Jacques Ranciere in Chapter three, we build monuments with the 
hope of bridging a gap between an idea and a “still-missing” people.
43
  Using these monuments 
to represent a fixed idea (communism was a miserable joke) misses the explicit intent of the 
space.   
The architect responsible for the site explained that he built Statue Park so visitors could 
reflect on tyranny and injustice.  But much like Riceour explained in Chapter one, it is the 
tyranny of memory that takes center stage in Budapest.  The way the park arranges and engages 
its monuments encourages visitors to mock their memory and former power.  Tourists are 
encouraged to buy the Lenin mug after smirking at the Lenin statue.  The park does not want 
visitors to honor this site; it wants them to buy a piece of it on the way out the door. While the 
park is officially referred to as a museum and even occasionally as a graveyard, the most 
accurate description of these monuments is that of a virtual communist petting zoo.
44
  You are 
free to touch and mock the former symbols of power.  Visitors are encouraged to feel superior to 
this particular chapter of history because it did not foresee its downfall.  The park wants you to 
smirk at the monumental hubris. In this way, Memento Park provides a great space for critiquing 
symbols of power but misses an opportunity to encourage ongoing dialogue. 
Ultimately, the visitor within Memento Park recognizes a failed historical narrative as 
one economic system is traded out for another.  Memento Park is an unfortunate misstep because 
monuments have the potential to create an important outlet for people still wanting to understand 
their present in terms of their past.  Duncombe recognizes how ironic monuments produce 
productive political openings by concerning themselves “less about presenting facts and more 






  The monuments of Memento Park exemplify the desires of oppressed 
people trying to regain their agency, but only real choices can produce real agency.   
CAMPAIGNING FOR CAPITALISM  
Monuments tend to remain relatively unchallenged until historical narratives are 
interrupted by new philosophical and ideological paradigms.  In the case of Hungary, the country 
underwent these rapid shifts almost overnight.  Whether it was the adoption, challenge to, or 
overthrow of Stalinism, or the instant adoption of capitalism in 1989, Hungarians have quickly 
abandoned powerful ideologies that once offered them a national identity.  These abrupt 
narrative shifts have created unsettled formations of public memory that need nuanced 
commemorative representations in order to articulate their complexity.  
But Memento Park misses the opportunity to disrupt political spaces and produce 
alternative discourse.  Of course, the Park is not incredibly accessible for those who once lived 
with the communist monuments anyway.  One local did confess that she and her friends would 
like to visit the space, but its location on the outskirts of town made it too much of a hassle.
46
 
Regardless of audience, Memento Park brings all visitors to the same conclusion. The park 
encourages Hungarians to reassert their national identity while reinforcing a capitalist ideology. 
While a reinforcement of Western ideology may not seem groundbreaking or even surprising, it 
is an important by-product of this political space because it absolves Westerners and non-
Westerners alike for never intellectually engaging any other ideological alternatives. 
The visitor’s guide for Memento Park ultimately describes the two-pronged effect of the 
space, stating, “Memento/Statue Park has a dual message: to call forth the atmosphere of 
dictatorship and to simultaneously provide the opportunity for this chapter to be processed and 
critically analyzed.”
47




of the Hungarian victim, it appears to conflate the tyranny of dictatorship with communism and 
contrast it with a “civilized” democratic capitalism.  
Whether the architect intended the promotion of capitalism is of little consequence. The 
very first stop on the Hammer-and-Sickle tour is to gawk at the baby blue Yugo parked behind 
the gate entrance. The guide took great pride in calling the Yugo a piece of garbage.
48
  The guide 
suggested the car was an amusing but unfortunate relic of their past. Needless to say, the 
combination of Lenin standing on top of Soviet Realist architecture, next to a Yugo, in the 
shadow of a communist kitsch gift shop creates a very clear message.  
  Figure 6.14:  You go! No, Yugo! 
 
Memento Park asks tourists to consume its story while simultaneously positioning them to reject 
the communist ideal. 
Jean Baudrillard captures the contradictory message of Memento Park best when he asks, 
“What is the reason for the strange acculturation phenomenon whereby advanced people seek out 
signs extrinsic to their own time or space, and increasingly remote relative to their own cultural 
[existence]?”
49
 Visitors to Memento Park seem to be answering this question quite differently. 




ideology of capitalism and to take pleasure in the fact that they “controlled” their own destiny.  
For the people of Hungary, returning to Memento Park means that they are keeping memories of 
oppression alive, even if only to show that they are the masters of their fate.  This sentiment was 
never more clearly expressed than by the antagonistic narrative surrounding the Lenin 
monument.  The story goes that in the 1980s Lenin’s monument was found with a sign hanging 
around his neck.  The inscription on the card read: “Stop smirking, Lenin, this will not last 
forever, after one hundred and fifty years we didn’t become Turkish either.”
50
 
CONCLUSION: TRAGIC IRONY  
 All three of these case studies showed the potential of the concept of ironic monumental 
disruptions and the representational ethics they could provide. The case study of Memento Park 
revealed that irony within a tragic frame produces a different kind of deliberative engagement.  
While Memento Park still produces its own kind of ethical representation, it does not provide the 
same kind of deliberative space that the other two case studies present.  Each site revealed a 
balancing act between irony and nostalgia, deliberation and manipulation.  The three countries of 
Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Hungary all commemorated their past with an ironic twist, but the citizens 
of those countries remember and represent their pasts in starkly different ways. The juxtaposition 
of irony and nostalgia (or lack thereof) revealed that histories in transition sometimes need a 
little more time and space for reflection, while other histories are content to preclude reflection 
on behalf of their new ideological loyalties. The next chapter addresses future avenues of 
research for ironic monumental disruption as rhetorical (monumental) interventions.  
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Conclusion: Final Thoughts on Irony and “Post” Identities 
The potential of ironic monumental disruptions in Eastern and Southeastern Europe is 
just beginning to be explored.  On July 6, 2011, Albanians erected a nine foot tall statue of 
George W. Bush in the tiny Albanian village of Fushekruje.  The monument-raising happened to 
coincide with Albania’s bid for membership to the European Union.  The bronze monument 
depicts Bush in a shirt with rolled-up sleeves and slacks. The hope was to capture his affable 
nature. Albanians erected the monument to honor the former President’s 65
th
 birthday, but more 
significantly, they built the monument to honor the fact that Bush was the first U.S. President to 
visit Albania after the Yugoslav War (and the fall of communism).  According to journalist Leon 
Cika, “Albanians have a special affection for the United States, which they credit with ending 
their country's Cold War isolation and leading NATO's 1999 bombing offensive that halted 
ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians by Serbian troops.”
1
  
In 2007, then President Bush toured Albania and encouraged the country to join the 
NATO military alliance. Curiously, Albanians do not reflect on Bush’s visit as a political 
mission.  Prime Minister Sali Berisha explained that, “Albanians’ pro-Americanism has its roots 
in our attempts... to build our deserved future as a free nation, as a free country.”
2
 On a strangely 
emotional note, Thomaidha Kaziu insisted, “I will not die without meeting him again.”
3
 Kaziu 
explained that the President told her she looked like his mother. Kaziu explained their 












President Bush is not the only Western President to find his way to the region. Former 
President Bill Clinton also received a statue in Kosovo for “taking action to stop Belgrade's 
1998-99 war against Albanians in Kosovo.”
6
  The monuments are unsettling at best, but their real 
political contributions may come at a later date.   For now, President Bush and countless other 
monuments hold the potential to be sites of regional, national, and international confrontation 
and deliberation.  The global effects of capitalism may be taking root all over the world, but that 
does not mean that the ideology must go unquestioned.  The critical application of irony to 
nostalgic or even fantasy-driven commemorative practices can open up new interpretations of 




The three case studies examined in this project show that nostalgia can produce critically 
engaging spaces of deliberation depending on how irony intervenes with nostalgia in comic or 
tragic frames.  Throughout the case studies, I have utilized Burke’s comic and tragic frames to 
explain why irony and nostalgia take on such different formation is Bulgaria, Bosnia, and 
Hungary.  I have argued that, while all of these countries have experienced transitional histories, 
they have adopted unique commemorative strategies to articulate their current ideological 
investments.  For Bulgaria and Bosnia, the people of these nations are not ready or willing to 
completely abandon the ideal of communism (or in some instances, the nostalgic representation 
of communism as a time before war and capitalism brought social and economic uncertainty). 
But Hungarians have kept the memory of communism alive largely for consumptive purposes. 
Thus, Hungarians create space for nostalgic representations but only so that tourists (and the 
Hungarian people as well) can interact with them through a capitalist lens.   
In this dissertation, I have challenged the conceptualization of counter-monuments in 
order to show that more rhetorical focus is possible through what I have termed ironic 
monumental disruptions.  The field of monumentality is troubled by scholars labeling their 
objects of study as counter-monuments but not being able to identify what constitutes the 
“counter” position and how it operates differently because of the self-professed distinction.  
Scholars within the field need to recognize that monument studies can achieve more conceptual 
clarity by going back to its rhetorical foundation and analyzing monuments in their political, 
ideological, and historical contexts.  In order to understand how (ironic) monuments affect the 
public and how the public’s interaction with them produces valuable deliberation, the field must 
make space for ironic practices.  The concept of ironic monumental disruption does not seek to 




dialogue, which is why it thrives within Burke’s comic frame.  Additionally, the concept of the 
ironic monumental disruption has the potential to trouble nostalgia and respond to shifting 
ideological narratives without simply reinforcing hegemonic discourses.  Ironic monumental 
disruptions offer critical and deliberative opportunities in their interactions with visitors and they 
provide more conceptual insight into transitional commemorative practices.  Monument studies 
must address how the idea of the counter-monument, in which the "counter" supposedly resides 
in the artifact itself, valorizes monolithic critiques and fails to recognize that contexts, 
interactions, and artifacts all shape the symbolism of the commemorative site.  
Through my dissertation, I hope to provide scholars of monumentality new avenues of 
research as they explore commemorative phenomenon (like irony) that largely fall outside the 
current monumentality literature.  Specifically, I encourage scholars to evaluate monuments as 
interactive nodes of memory with valuable historical, political, and ideological contexts. Placing 
too much emphasis on the audience or the artifact misses the important relationships and 
connections monuments make.  I urge scholars to evaluate the entire space rather than default to 
a counter-monument categorization.  This dissertation has relied on three central questions of 
irony, nostalgia (as it shapes subjectivities and frames of acceptance), and counter-monument 
politics.  In addressing these questions throughout the case studies, I hope to open up new 
conceptual possibilities for irony and representational ethics in the field of monument studies.   
The monuments reviewed in this project initially appeared to provide additional 
reinforcement for escapist, capitalist narratives, but my examination of them has revealed that 
allowing for commemorative contradictions provides discursive openings for publics 
unknowingly silenced by a lack of public deliberation.  Whether a society has moved its 




critical spaces of reflection.  In the three case studies examined here, irony was the disruptive 
tool used to engage a spectrum of nostalgic representations in order to encourage further 
deliberation.  As a larger category of study, counter-monuments stand to gain from the continued 
conceptualization of the ironic monumental disruption as it pushes counter-monument studies to 
address artifacts with more historical and rhetorical specificity.    
More monuments do not necessarily need to be built in order to counter or question the 
politics of commemoration; the power of the ironic monumental disruption comes from the fact 
that previous institutions of memory are interrogated and then challenged through physical or 
symbolic disruptions.  Public memory and monumentality theorists should be seeking more 
grounded ways to examine historical narratives struggling through transitions.   For now, the 
ironic monumental disruption provides the necessary outlet for histories still in the making.  
“CANNED BEEF” AND THE FUTURE OF FEUDING IDEOLOGIES  
Eastern and Southeastern Europeans have complicated histories. They have histories 
filled with war, violence, imperialism, and devastation. The fact that anyone can look back on 
the last 100 years and laugh is a miracle unto itself.  The new genre of pop monuments 
throughout this region suggests that irony helps affected publics cope with loss and create new 
outlets for political deliberation.  This truth is no more evident than outside a museum in 
Sarajevo, Bosnia. Tanks surround the museum’s outdoor café.  Children use the tanks as a 
ghoulish playground of sorts. Next to these disturbing military artifacts is another monument 
constructed through the De/construction of Monument project in Sarajevo.
7
  Locals call the 
monument Canned Beef.  It represents the “generous” food donations made by the United 
Nations during the Yugoslav War.  The food was largely expired by the time it reached the 




was such an afterthought to the Western world.  Curiously, both the tank-as-a-toy and the 
inedible food “donation” serve as prime examples of ironic monumental disruptions.   Located 
within 10 feet of each other, the tank and the canned beef remind the people of Sarajevo that the 
tragedy of war is not that far removed but the memory appears to be a non-threatening source of 
amusement for the next generation.  For those with a memory of the Yugoslav War, this space 
ensures that they will continue to question both the failed promises of the past and present. 
 
 
Figure 7.2    Figure 7.3 
United Nations’ Canned Beef  and Tank outside of museum cafe 
  
  Collecting the research for this project proved to be a humorous and heartbreaking 
experience.   Interviews were not the only way to gain insight into a world still reeling from 
tragedy.  In many ways, the people of Eastern and Southeastern Europe have moved on, but the 




when I asked her for directions, clearly recalls that the U.S. bombed Serbia (with NATO 
backing) on “behalf” of the Albanian population in the former Yugoslavia.  The young Bosnian 
man, who was likely no more than eighteen, told me that the book I was reading, the Fall of 
Yugoslavia, was filled with lies even though he had no memories of his own from that time.  He 
explained that, according to his grandfather, Yugoslavia was a wonderful chapter for their nation 
and he [the young man] wished they could return to that time.   A middle-aged Serbian woman 
on a train told me I looked like her daughter while another Bosnian woman in a grocery store 
said I looked cold and hugged me.  A Croatian man in the airport told my German travelling 
companion that they shared a history.  He was referring to a policy of mass extermination of 
minority populations.  One woman from Budapest stated that she was twelve when communism 
ended in Hungary but she mostly recalled faint memories of learning Russian coupled with 
distinct memories of religion being (re)introduced after 1989.
8
  
  As a final thought, monuments produce living memories; they are not just static 
selections of the past.  Monuments change over time depending on their context and viewing 
audience.  They have the potential to simultaneously provide closure and more confrontation. 
They are powerful markers of memory, and like memory, their work is on-going.  Today, the 
citizens of Eastern and Southeastern Europe have worked tirelessly to put the past behind them 
while recognizing that they would like to revisit it again in the future. Their methods may appear 
unorthodox, but their messages are powerful not in spite of but because of their vexing 
contradictions.  
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